Judgement MUDHOLKAR, J.: This appeal and Criminal Appeal No. 113/63 arise out of a joint trial of the appellant Mangaldas and the two appellants Daryanomal and Kodumal in Cri. A. 113 of 1963 for the contravention of S. 7 (v) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) in which they were convicted and sentenced under S. 16 (1) (a) of the Act. The appellants Mangaldas and Daryanomal were each sentenced under Section 16 (1) (a) (ii) of the Act to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs. 500 while the other appellant was sentenced under sub-cl. (i) to undergo imprisonment until the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 200. On appeal they were all acquitted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Nasik. The State preferred an appeal before the High Court of Bombay which allowed it and restored the sentences passed on Mangaldas and Daryanomal by the Judicial Magistrate but imposed only a fine of Rs.200 on Kodumal. They have come up to this Court by special leave. 2. The admitted facts are these. Mangaldas is a wholesale dealer, commission agent, exporter, supplier and manufacturer of various kinds of spices doing business at Bombay. Daryanomal is engaged in grocery business at Nasik while Kodumal is his servant. On November 7, 1960 Daryanomal purchased from Mangaldas a bag of haldi (turmeric powder) weighin 75 kg. which was despatched by the latter through a public carrier. It was received on behalf of Daryanomal at 11-45 a.m. on November 18, 1960 by Kodumal at the octroi post of Nasik Municipality. After he paid the octroi duty to the Nasik Municipality and took delivery of the bag the Food Inspector Burud purchased from him 12 oz. of turmeric powder contained in that bag for the purpose of analysis. The procedure in this regard which is laid down in S. 11 of the Act was followed by Burud. A portion of the turmeric powder was sent to the public Analyst at Poona whose report Ex. 16, shows that the turmeric powder was adulterated food within the meaning of S. 2 (1) of the Act. The procedure in this regard which is laid down in S. 11 of the Act was followed by Burud. A portion of the turmeric powder was sent to the public Analyst at Poona whose report Ex. 16, shows that the turmeric powder was adulterated food within the meaning of S. 2 (1) of the Act. Thereupon Burud, after obtaining the sanction of the Officer of Health of the Municipality, filed a complaint against the appellants in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate for offences under S. 16 (1) (a) read with S. 7 (v) of the Act. At the trial Kodumal admitted that he had taken delivery of the bag at the octroi post and sold 12 oz. of turmeric powder to the Food Inspector and that he had also received a notice from him under S. 11 of the Act. It was contended at the trial on behalf of Daryanomal that actually no delivery had been taken but that point was not pressed before the High Court. While Mangaldas admitted that he had sold and despatched the bag containing turmeric powder he contended that what was sent was not turmeric powder used for human consumption but was "Bhandare" which is used for religious purposes or for applying to he forehead. This contention was rejected by the Judicial Magistrate as well as by the High Court but was not considered by the Additional Sessions Judge. It was sought to be challenged before us by Mr. Ganatra on his behalf but as the finding of the High Court on the point is upon a question of fact we did not permit him to challenge it. 3. We will take Mangaldas s case first. Mr. Ganatra had made an application on his behalf for raising a number of new points, including some alleged to raise constitutional questions. At the hearing, however, he did not seek to urge any question involving the interpretation of the Constitution. The new points which he sought to urge were. (1) that the appellant was not questioned regarding the report of the Public Analyst; (2) the joint trial of Mangaldas with the other two appellants was illegal; and 3. that the sanction was not valid. 4. As regards the first of these points his contention is that he had raised it before the High Court also though it has not referred to it in its judgment. that the sanction was not valid. 4. As regards the first of these points his contention is that he had raised it before the High Court also though it has not referred to it in its judgment. The High Court has stated clearly that all the points raised in argument before it were considered by it. In the face of this statement we cannot allow the point to be urged before us. 5. As regards the second point it is sufficient to say that it was not raised before the Magistrate. Section 537 (b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that no judgment conviction or sentence can be held to be vitiated by reason of misjoinder of parties unless prejudice has resulted to the accused thereby. For determining whether failure of justice has resulted the Court is required by the Explanation to S. 537 to have regard to the fact that the objection had not been raised at the trial. Unless it is so raised it would be legitimate to presume that the accused apprehended no prejudice. The point thus fails. 6. As regards the alleged invalidity of sanction it is sufficient to point out that the contention was not raised in the High Court or earlier. We, therefore, decline to consider it. 7. Mr. Ganatra urged that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to try the appellant as the appellant had not committed any offence within its jurisdiction. With regard to this point the High Court has held that Mangaldas had distributed the commodity within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate and, therefore, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to try him. Apart from that we may point out that under S. 182 of the Code of Criminal Procedure where it is uncertain in which of the local areas an offence was committed or where the offence is committed partly in one local area and partly in another or where an offence is a continuing one and continues to be committed in more local areas than one or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Since Mangaldas actually sent the bag from Bombay to Nasik he could be said to have committed the offence partly in Bombay from where it was despatched and partly in Nasik to which place it had been consigned. Apart from that, the mere fact that proceedings were taken in a wrong place would not vitiate the trial unless it appears that this has occasioned a failure of justice (see S. 531, Cr. P. C.) Mr. Ganatra, however, says that there was failure of justice in this case because had Mangaldas been prosecuted at Bombay, one of the samples taken from the bag of turmeric powder would have been sent to the Public Analyst at Bombay and not to the Public Analyst at Poona. We are wholly unable to appreciate how this could make any difference whatsoever. Apart from that since the samples were actually taken at Nasik the one meant for analysis had, according to an administrative order of the Government, to be sent to the Public Analyst at Poona. Therefore, even if Mangaldas had been tried at Bombay the report of the Public Analyst at Poona could be put in evidence. There is nothing in the Act which prevents that from being done. 8. In view of the fact that the finding of the Judicial Magistrate and the High Court that the turmeric powder had been adulterated was based solely on the report of the Public Analyst Mr. Ganatra raised three contentions before us. One is that such evidence is not by itself sufficient for the conviction of an accused person; the second is that the Pubic Analyst was not called as a witness in the case and the third is that unless notice is given to an accused person under S. 11 of the Act after a sample had been taken of the allegedly adulterated commodity, the report of the Public Analyst concerning that commodity is not admissible against him. 9. In support of the contention that the conviction could not be based solely upon the report of the Public Analyst that the turmeric powder was adulterated. Mr. Ganatra relied upon the decisions in State v. Bhausa Hanmantsa, 1962-64 Bom LR 303 and City Corporation, Trivandrum v. Antony, ILR (1962) 1 Kerala 430. The first of these is a case under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (Bombay XXV of 1949). Mr. Ganatra relied upon the decisions in State v. Bhausa Hanmantsa, 1962-64 Bom LR 303 and City Corporation, Trivandrum v. Antony, ILR (1962) 1 Kerala 430. The first of these is a case under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 (Bombay XXV of 1949). In that case a large quantity of angurasava, partly contained in two barrels and partly in three boxes containing 109 bottles was recovered from the house of the accused person. Samples taken from the barrels and boxes were sent for analysis to the Chemical Analyser and to the Principal, Podar Medical College, Bombay. The report of the former showed that three out of the four samples contained alcohol in varying degrees. Thereupon the accused was prosecuted for offences under Ss. 65, 66 (b) and 83 (1) of the Bombay Prohibition Act. His defence was that he manufactures a medicinal preparation called angurasava which contains Ayurvedic ingredients which generate alcohol. According to him, therefore, what was seized from him was outside the ambit of the Bombay Prohibition Act. Partly relying upon the certificate issued by the Principal of Podar Medical College, the trying Magistrate acquitted the accused holding that the prosecution has failed to discharge the onus of proof that angurasava is prohibited liquor. On appeal by the State of Maharashtra, before the High Court reliance was placed upon the certificates issued by the Chemical Analyser as well as by the Principal, Podar Medical College. The certificate of the former showed that three out of the four samples contained "2.2 and 6% v/v of ethyl alcohol respectively and they contain yeast. No alkoloidal ingredient or metallic poison was detected in them". The certificate of the Principal of the Podar Medical College is as follows: "Formula supplied is found to be similar to that given in the Ayurvedic Books. There are no easy methods to find out the herbal drugs dissolved in a liquid. It is not possible for us, to find out the herbal drugs used in the above liquids. The colour and smell of the samples supplied is not identical with the colour and smell of fermented Ayurvedic preparation like, Assav and Arishta. Hence it is very difficult to give any definite opinion in the matter". On behalf of the accused it was urged that by virtue of sub-s. (ii) of S. 24 (a) of the Prohibition Act, the provisions of Ss. Hence it is very difficult to give any definite opinion in the matter". On behalf of the accused it was urged that by virtue of sub-s. (ii) of S. 24 (a) of the Prohibition Act, the provisions of Ss. 12 and 13 thereof do not apply to any medicinal preparation containing alcohol which is unfit for use as intoxicating liquor. Section 12 of the Act prohibits the manufacture and possession of liquor and S. 16 prohibits the possession of materials for the manufacture of liquor. It was, however, contended on behalf of the State that once it is established that what was seized from the possession of the accused contains alcohol the burden of proving that what was seized falls under S. 24 (a) was on the accused person. The High Court, however, held that the burden of establishing that a particular article does not fall under S. 24 (a) rests on the prosecution. In so far as the certificate of the Chemical Analyser was concerned the High Court observed as follows: "It is beyond controversy that, normally, in order that a certificate could be received in evidence, the person who has issued the certificate must be called and examined as a witness before the Court. A certificate is nothing more than a mere opinion of the person who purports to have issued the certificate, and opinion is not evidence until the person who has given the particular opinion is brought before the Court and is subjected to the test of cross-examination." It will thus be clear that the High Court did not hold that the certificate was by itself insufficient in law to sustain the conviction and indeed it could not well have said so in view of the provisions of S. 510, Cr. P. C. What the High Court seems to have felt was that in circumstances like those present in the case before it, a Court may be justified in not acting upon a certificate of the Chemical Analyser unless that person was examined as a witness in the case. P. C. What the High Court seems to have felt was that in circumstances like those present in the case before it, a Court may be justified in not acting upon a certificate of the Chemical Analyser unless that person was examined as a witness in the case. Sub-section (1) of S. 510 permits the use of the certificate of a Chemical Examiner as evidence in any enquiry or trial or other proceeding under the Code and sub-s. (2) thereof empowers the Court to summon and examine the Chemical Examiner if it thinks fit and requires it to examine him as a witness upon an application either by the prosecution or the accused in this regard. It would, therefore, not be correct to say that where the provisions of sub-s. (2) of S. 510 have not been availed of, the report of a Chemical Examiner is rendered inadmissible or is even to be treated as having no weight. Whatever that may be we are concerned in this case not with the report of a Chemical Examiner but with that of a public Analyst. In so far as the report of the Public Analyst is concerned we have the provisions of S. 13 of the Act. Sub-section (5) of that section provides as follows: "Any document purporting to be a report signed by a public analyst, unless it has been superseded under sub-s. (3), or any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory, may be used as evidence of the facts stated therein in any proceeding under this Act or under Ss. 272 to 276 of the Indian Penal Code: Provided that any document purporting to be a certificate signed by the Director of the Central Food Laboratory shall be final and conclusive evidence of the facts stated therein." This provision clearly makes the report admissible in evidence. What value is to be attached to such report must necessarily be for the Court of fact which has to consider it. Sub-section (2) of S. 13 gives an opportunity to the accused vendor or the complainant on payment of the prescribed fee to make an application to the Court for sending a sample of the allegedly adulterated commodity taken under S. 11 of the Act to the Director of Central Food Laboratory for a certificate. Sub-section (2) of S. 13 gives an opportunity to the accused vendor or the complainant on payment of the prescribed fee to make an application to the Court for sending a sample of the allegedly adulterated commodity taken under S. 11 of the Act to the Director of Central Food Laboratory for a certificate. The certificate issued by the Director would then supersede the report given by the Public Analyst. This certificate is not only made admissible in evidence under sub-s. (5) but is given finality of the facts contained therein by the proviso to that sub-section. It is true that the certificate of the Public Analyst is not made conclusive but this only means that the Court of fact is free to act on the certificate or not, as it thinks fit. 10. Sub-section (5) of S. 13 of the Act came for consideration in Antony s case, ILR (1962) 1 Kerala 130 (supra) upon which the State relied. There the question was whether a sample of buffalo s milk taken by the Food Inspector was adulterated or not. The Public Analyst to whom it was sent submitted the following report: "I further certify that I have analysed the aforementioned sample and declare the result of my analysis to be as follows: Solids-not-fat 9.00 per cent. Fat 5.4 per cent Freezing point 0 (Hortvet s method) 0.49 c. and am of the opinion that the said sample contains not less than seven per cent (7%) of added water as calculated from the freezing point (Hortvet s method) and is, therefore, adulterated". The Magistrate who tried the accused persons acquitted them on the ground that it was not established that the milk was adulterated. Before the High Court it was contended that the certificate was sufficient to prove that water had been added to the milk and reliance was placed upon the provisions of S. 13 (5) of the Act. The learned Judge who heard the appeal observed that the provision only says that the certificate may be used as evidence but does not say anything as to the weight to be attached to the report. The learned Judge who heard the appeal observed that the provision only says that the certificate may be used as evidence but does not say anything as to the weight to be attached to the report. The learned Judge then proceeded to point out what according to him should be the contents of such report and said: "In this case the Court is not told what the Hortvet s test is, what is the freezing point of pure milk and how the calculation has been made to find out whether water has been added. I cannot, therefore, say that the Magistrate was bound to be satisfied on a certificate of this kind, which contains only a reference to some tes For Citation : AIR 1966 SC 128