JUDGMENT D.P. Uniyal, J. - These two connected appeals arise out of one and the same judgment and decree of the learned Additional Civil Judge, Varanasi and may be disposed of by common judgment. 2. First Appeal No. 269, of 1955 by the defendant is against the decree of Rs. 10,289/12/- together with interest, on account of arrears of rent due from the defendant for the period between 1-5-1949 and 30.4.1952. First Appeal No, 382 of 1955 by the plaintiff is against the decree allowing abatement of rent to the extent of Rs. 180/- in favour of the defendant and disallowing one-fourth of the costs of the suit. 3. The plaintiff's case was that 22 pukka built shops situate to the south of Manmandir Palace and the Chhetra in the City of Varanasi, bearing Municipal No. 15/1 and 15/1-A belonged to the erstwhile Jaipur State which is now merged in the plaintiff, the State of Rajasthan. On 25-6-1947 the Maharaja of Jaipur executed a registered deed in respect of the aforesaid shops in favour of the defendant for a term of 50 years on an annual rental of Rs. 3,116/-. The demised premises were shown and delineated in a map annexed to the said lease. The northern boundary of the leased premises was described as Manmandir and Chhetra Mahal and private houses, while the southern boundary was described as private lane. One of the conditions incorporated in the lease deed was that the lane passing between the demised shops and the parti land would remain vacant and would be used by the lessee and the lessor for all purposes. It was alleged that the defendant was put in possession of the premises in suit but he defaulted in the payment of rent and hence the suit. 4. The defendant contested the claim on several grounds. He pleaded that he was induced to enter into the transaction by misrepresentation of facts and the law and that when he came to know of the true position he stopped payment of rent to the plaintiff. 4. The defendant contested the claim on several grounds. He pleaded that he was induced to enter into the transaction by misrepresentation of facts and the law and that when he came to know of the true position he stopped payment of rent to the plaintiff. It was alleged that the Maharaja of Jaipur had previously executed a lease dated 9-9-1946 in his favour in respect of plot No. 8839 with an area of 1 bigha 4 biswas and 13 dhurs and that the said leasehold comprised the 22 shops in dispute, for which reason the second lease dated 25-6-1947 was invalid and unenforceable at law. It was further pleaded that the plaintiff had dispossessed the defendant from one of the shops by letting it to one Angnu, a sand contractor, and that this fact dis entitled the plaintiff to recover any rent of the premises in suit. 5. On a consideration of the oral and documentary evidence on the record the learned Civil Judge found that the earlier lease dated 9-9-1946 was in respect of an open piece of land and was distinct and separate from and not included in the lease of 1947. He further held that the defendant had failed to establish any misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff and that there was no credible evidence that the defendant was induced to enter into the transaction of 1947 under a mistake of fact. He, however, accepted the defendant's version that he had been wrongfully dispossessed by the plaintiff from a portion of the premises in suit in 1949 and, therefore, held that the defendant was entitled to a proportionate abatement of rent. 6. The first contention of the learn ed counsel for the defendant-appellant was that the subject matter of the lease dated 9-9-1946 included the premises covered by the lease dated 25-6-1947 and that the defendant's local agent Babunandan had misrepresented the facts to him on account of which he was induced to enter into the subsequent transaction of lease. This part of the defendant's case is belied by his own statement wherein he admitted that when he visited Varanasi after the lease of 1946 he was told by Babunandan that there were 22 shops adjoining the land which was the subject matter of the lease of 1946 and that it would be profitable if those shops were also taken. This part of the defendant's case is belied by his own statement wherein he admitted that when he visited Varanasi after the lease of 1946 he was told by Babunandan that there were 22 shops adjoining the land which was the subject matter of the lease of 1946 and that it would be profitable if those shops were also taken. He added that Babunandan further told him that those shops were separate from the leasehold of 1946. In cross-examination he further admitted that he knew that the 22 shops were separate from the land of 1946 which was an open piece of land. Uma Shanker D. W. 1, brother-in-law and Mukhtaram of the defendant, admitted that the lease of 1946 was in respect of vacant land and that the 22 shops in dispute were adjacent to the north of the land covered by the lease of 1946 and were not included in that lease. The witness added that the shops in dispute had been taken under the lease of 1947. Brij Bhushan Tiwari, another witness for the defendant, also admitted that in 1946 a lease in respect of the vacant land and chabutra had been executed and that the lease relating to 22 shops in dispute had been taken in 1947. 7. Another argument of the learned counsel was that the lease of 1947 was obtained by fraud in that the rent reserved under the deed bore no relation to the actual income of the property, which was said to be only Rs. 55/- or 60 p.m. From the statement of Nar Singh Das defendant it is clear that he took the shops on lease not for their rent value but because he wanted to raise a three storied building after demolishing the shops. 8. It is thus idle to contend that the defendant executed the lease of 1947 under a misapprehension of facts. The evidence produced on behalf of the defendant unmistakably goes to show that he was fully aware of the true facts regarding the value of the shops and knew that the lease of 1946 did not include the 22 shops which were the subject matter of lease in 1947. The evidence produced on behalf of the defendant unmistakably goes to show that he was fully aware of the true facts regarding the value of the shops and knew that the lease of 1946 did not include the 22 shops which were the subject matter of lease in 1947. The finding arrived at by the learned Judge that the defendant had failed to prove any misrepresentation is, in our opinion, fully borne out by the oral evidence adduced by the defendant, as also by the two maps annexed to the lease deeds of 1946 and 1947 which clearly delineated the property demised under the said two leases. 9. The second contention of the learned counsel was that the plaintiff was dis entitled to recover rent of the premises in suit inasmuch as he let out a portion of the demised premises to one Angnu, a sand contractor, after taking a large premium and a monthly rent of Rs. 5/-. In the court below the learned counsel of the plaintiff made a statement under Or. X, Rule 2, Civil Procedure Code and said that Angnu was in possession of some open land and was not in possession of any shop. He asserted that he was not a tenant of the plaintiff but was a tenant of the defendant. He went on to say that "the land in possession of Angnu is covered by the lease of 1947 but is intended to be used as a passage. The plaintiff does not realise any rent from Angnu." The evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff, however, disclosed that Angnu was a tenant of the plaintiff since February, 1949 and was in occupation of one of the demised shops. Shyam Sunder P. W. 3, who was General Attorney, of the plaintiff, stated in examination-in-chief that there was a plot of land near the gate below the Observatory and towards north of the Manmandir Mahal and that Angnu was tenant of this land on behalf of the State on a monthly rent of Rs. 5/- from January, 1951 to July, 1952. In cross-exam 'nation the witness admitted that Angnu used to keep sand on the land below the Observatory and his tenancy had been settled by the plaintiff at Maninandir office. 5/- from January, 1951 to July, 1952. In cross-exam 'nation the witness admitted that Angnu used to keep sand on the land below the Observatory and his tenancy had been settled by the plaintiff at Maninandir office. Sukhrain P. W. 4, a Karinda of the plaintiff, deposed that the gate at the shops in dispute and the shop occupied by Angnu were included in the lease of 1947 and that Angnu used to keep sand at that place. He denied that Angnu paid rent to the plaintiff. In cross-examination he admitted that receipt No. 2235 dated 9-2-1952 of receipt book paper No. 201 of list 138-C was in respect of rent for 4 or 5 months paid by Angnu to the plaintiff. 10. The learned Civil Judge observed that the case set up by the plaintiff in evidence that Angnu was in possession of a piece of land which did not include the premises in dispute was an after thought. In view of the categorical statement of the plaintiff's counsel that the land in possession of Angnu was covered by the lease in dispute it is not possible to believe the story trotted out by the defendant that he was not the tenant of the plaintiff. In our opinion the learned judge below was right in holding that the defendant's evidence that Angnu had been let into possession of a portion of the demised premises by the plaintiff in 1949 was true. The evidence given by Uma Spanker D. W. 1 and Brij Bhushan Tiwari D. W. 2 that Angnu was in possession of a portion of the demised premises as tenant of the plaintiff since 1949 is worthy of acceptance. The defendant's case that the plaintiff dispossessed him from a portion of the leased premises in February, 1949 by letting it out to Angnu is fully borne out by the evidence and the circumstances of the case. The learned judge rightly believed this part of the defendant's case and was justified in deducting Rs. 180/- on account of the rent realised by the plaintiff from Angnu is respect of a portion of the disputed 1 premises. 11. Sri A P. Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant, vehemently contended that the conduct of the plaintiff in dispossessing the defend. ant from a portion of the demised property dis entitled it from recovering any rent. 180/- on account of the rent realised by the plaintiff from Angnu is respect of a portion of the disputed 1 premises. 11. Sri A P. Pandey, learned counsel for the appellant, vehemently contended that the conduct of the plaintiff in dispossessing the defend. ant from a portion of the demised property dis entitled it from recovering any rent. It was said that where the rent reserved is a lump sum and the lessee is wrongfully dispossessed from a portion of the land leased the plaintiff disqualifies himself from recovering the rent by reason of the doctrine of English common lay; that where the tenant is dispossessed from a portion of the property leased the lessor cannot apportion )his own, wrong by realising the rent the remaining portion of the leased property in the tenant's possession. He invited our attention to the case of Smt. Katyani Devi v. Udoy Kuinar Das, 52 I.A. 160, in which it was laid down that "the doctrine of suspension of payment of rent, where the tenant has not been put in possession of part of the subject leased, has been applied where the rent was a lump rent for the whole land leased treat as an indivisible subject. It has no application to a case where the stipulated rent is so much per acre or bigha." 12. The principle enunciated in the above case was adopted by the Cal cutta High Court in Nilkantha Pate v. Kshitish Chandra Satpati, AIR 1951 Calcutta 338. In that case it had been found that the landlord had dispossessed the tenant from a portion of the tenancy because he wanted to straighten out his boundary. On these facts R. P. Mukerji and Lahiri, JJ. In that case it had been found that the landlord had dispossessed the tenant from a portion of the tenancy because he wanted to straighten out his boundary. On these facts R. P. Mukerji and Lahiri, JJ. held : "The mere fact that the area dispossessed is a small one is not of overriding importance so as to dissuade the court from applying the principles of justice, equity and good conscience if the court finds that the act of the landlord was definitely a tortuous one." They went on to say: "Irrespective of the principles enunciated by the English courts we have no doubt, on the facts of the present case, that the landlord having dispossessed the tenant in a high-handed manner, is not entitled to claim any rent on the basis, of the contract with the tenant, as the former had acted tortuously in not allowing the tenant to hold the land peacefully." 13. In Jatindra Kumar v. Raimohan Rai, A.I.R. 1961 Assam 52, Sarju Prasad, C. J. followed the decision in the case of Nilkaantha and held that the eviction of a tenant from a part of the demised premises entails suspension of the entirz rent so long as the eviction lasts, irrespective of the fact that the tenant may be in possession of the residue. 14. The same view found acceptance in Hahim Sardar Bahadur v. Tej Parkash Singh, A.I.R. 1962 Punjab 385. Falshaw, C. J. referred to large number of cases of the Calcutta High Court as well as the case of Dalip Narain Singh v. Suraj Narain, A.I.R. 1935 Patna 38 and observed: "The preponderance of authorities is clearly of the view that in a case where the landlord tortiously deprives a tenant of the use of part of the demised premises, so long as the deprivation continues the landlord cannot even claim the rent for the rent of the premises which the tenant still continues to occupy." The long line of decisions of the Calcutta High Court appears to have had its origin in the case of Gopanund Jha v. Lalla Gobind Pershads, (1869) 12 W.R. 109, where Sir Barnes Peacock, Chief Justice, cited Bacon's Abridgement as an authority for showing that an entire rent could not be apportioned. It will be noticed that that Judgement was rendered before the Indian Contract Act came to be enacted in 1872. It will be noticed that that Judgement was rendered before the Indian Contract Act came to be enacted in 1872. By Section 70 of that Act the mere fact that a party has done work which has been accepted or supplied goods which have been taken, entitles him to compensation, subject if need be to any claim for damages. "It is not supposed that a contrary rule is needed to encourage people to keep their bargains." 15. There seems to be no justification, therefore, for implanting an exotic rule in the juridical system of this country. 16. We may, however, point out that even in the Calcutta High Court dissentient opinion has been expressed in a number of cases against the wholesale applicability of the said doctrine. In Dhunpat Singh v. Mahomed Kasim Ispahain, I.L.R. 24. Cal. 296, Ghosh and Hill, JJ. allowed apportionment of rent although the covenant for rent was entire. In Kali Prasanna Khusnabra v. Mathura Nath Sen, I.L.R. 34 Cal. 191, Brett and Sharifuddin, JJ. held that where a tenant was deprived of a portion of the holding by other tenants of the landlord whose lease was made subsequent to his own, to remain in possession of the remainder he was bound to pay rent for that portion. In Anand Prasad Mukhopadhya v. Mathur Nag Mazumdar, 13 Calcutta Weekly Notes 702, Chittey and Vincent, JJ. were of the opinion that the English rule was not applicable to this country. 17. The applicability of the English Common Law doctrine also came up for discussion before the Madras High Court in Meenakshi Sundara Nachiar v. Chidambaram Chetty, Indian Cases 711. Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ. were considering the problem, that arises in the present case, namely, as to what is the resulting right of a lessee if his lessor has put a tenant in possession of the property leased, but deprives the tenant subsequently of a portion of the leased premises. The learned Judges observed: "It may be open to the lessee to say that he is not willing to enjoy only a portion of the premises paying proportionate rent and that, until the landlord restores possession of what he has wrongfully taken, he is not willing to perform the obligations of a lessee at all but would treat it as rescinded during such time. But, in that case, it seems to be clear that it should be his duty to restore to the landlord the part of the premises still remaining in his occupation and not to r:,tain possession of them until he is put in possession again of the whole of the leased property. It must be admitted that this is not the manner in which the law has developed in England." 18. Tracing the genesis of the English Common Law rule their Lordships went on to say that it was based on the feudal system which prevailed in that country and referred to the observations of Chief Justice Haine in Hodgkins v. Robson, 1 Ven. 276, as follows: "If the lessor enters into a part by wrong, this would suspend the whole rent, for, in such a case, he shall not so apportion his own wrong as to enforce the lessee to pay anything for the residue." 19. From the above quotation it is obvious that the rule in England is based on the obligation of a Lord to his tenant according to feudal principles which are not applicable in this country. 20. The principle of law obtaining in America is different and has been stated thus in Adams' "Landlord and Tenant," page 1293: "It is an elementary rule in regard to constructive eviction that the tenant must abandon possession of the premises to the landlord for he cannot claim that he has been forced to go out while he remains in." 21. The Madras High Court in the case cited above concluded by observing: "In our opinion, it is difficult to hold on principle, that the landlord-is not entitled to any portion of the rent if the tenant remains in possession of a portion of the land let., He must be held entitled to it on the contract of lease, since the tenant prefers not to throw up the lease during the period of eviction or as compensation for use and occupation and it would, in our opinion, be reasonable to hold that the tenant, where he retains possession of a portion of the land, must be estopped from pleading that he is not liable for the rent of that portion." 22. The view so forcibly expressed by the Madras High Court in Meenakshi Sundara's case found indirect but tacit approval of the Judicial Committee in Ram Lal Dutt Sarkar v. Dhirendra Nath Roy, 70 I.A. 18. That was an appeal from the decision of the Calcutta High Court. Referring to the observations of the board in the case of Katyayani Devi', their Lordship's pointed out that the views expressed in that case "have only added to the perplexity since they have in some cases been wrongly taken to lay down that if the rent is a lump sum rent then in all cases of failure to give possession of any part there must be a suspension of the entire rent. They were intended only as showing that on its facts that case raised no question of suspension even if the course of discussions in Bengal be taken as correct, a question upon which there was no need to embark." 23. Their Lordships were averse to applying the doctrine of English Common Law in India and added: "In these circumstances their Lordships think it impossible to require the Courts in Bengal as a matter of justice, equity and good conscience to follow such English cases as Neale v. Machenzie, (1836) 1 M and W 747. The English context of English decisions must be borne in mind, the social system, the character of the countryside, the well settled boundaries, the limited term of leases. It is not matter for surprise that learned Judges in Bengal have from time to time rejected the doctrine that suspension of rent should follow from a failure to deliver possession of any part of the land demised. Their Lordships are not of opinion that this can be justified as a 'dependable rule' to be adhered to notwithstanding hard cases." And further : "Moreover, the right of a tenant to obtain possession of all that has been demised arises at the commencement of the lease and any legal theory which permits such claim to be raised after 50 years as a claim to pay no rent at all stands condemned". 24. There could hardly be a stronger denunciation of the rigid applicability of the English Common Law rule of suspension of rent in this country. 24. There could hardly be a stronger denunciation of the rigid applicability of the English Common Law rule of suspension of rent in this country. It seems to us, therefore, that the views expressed by the Calcutta High Court cannot, with respect, be considered to be in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience. 25. In Surendra Nath Bibra v. Stephen Court Ltd., AIR 1960 Calcutta 346, the re-statement of law by the Privy Council in the case of Ram Lal Dutt was accepted and it was held that the doctrine of suspension of rent has no application in India in cases of failure of the landlord to give possession of a part of the demised premises. 26. So far as our own High Court is concerned, in Gopalji Maharaj v. Shiain Lal, A.I.R. 1952 Alld. 125, Mushtaq Ahmad, J. clearly held that where a lessee is put in possession of the leased premises but is subsequently evicted by the lessor from a portion of the premises the lessee is liable to pay rent for the premises in his possession in spite of the rent being a lump sum. We are of opinion that the view expressed by Mushtaq Ahmad, J. in the above case is in accord with the law laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Ram. Lal Dutt's case and we find ourselves in complete agreement with it. 27. In Hajira Bibi v. Abrar Husain, A.I.R. 1964 Alld. 343, S. D. Singh, J. gave expression to the contrary view and adopted the reasoning of the Calcutta High Court in Nilkantha Pali v. Kshitish Chandra Satpati The learned Judge held that the plaintiff having dispossessed the defendant from a portion of the house which was let out to him and the rent being payable for the house as a whole, he is not entitled to claim any rent so long as the defendant remains dispossessed of a portion of the leased property. The opinion expressed by Singh, J. flies in the face of the Judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Ram Lal Dutt. The learned Judge failed to see that the English Common Law rule was held inapplicable to India by the Privy Council and it was held that it was opposed to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The learned Judge failed to see that the English Common Law rule was held inapplicable to India by the Privy Council and it was held that it was opposed to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. It is unfortunate that the attention of the learned single Judge was not invited to the earlier case of our own High Court, Gopalji Maharaj v. Shiam Lal with the result that he was misguided in arriving at a conclusion which was erroneous. 28. We have given our anxious thought to this matter and we are firmly of the view that resort to the archaic principle of the English Common Law doctrine is foreign to the social conditions in this country and can have no application in a democratic set up. We are not aware of any principle of justice, equity and good conscience which would permit a lessee to retain possession of a portion of the leased land without paying any rent on the plea that he had been wrongfully dispossessed from a portion of the land leased. The question in such a case is one of enforcement of the contract of lease. It is open to the lessee to treat the contract as at an end and give up possession of the demised property or sue the lessor for damages of breach of contract. If he retains possession of any portion of the property he cannot be heard to say that he has discharged his obligation to pay rent in respect of the premises in his possession. We, therefore, repel the contention of the learned counsel that the plaintiff has no right to recover rent. 29. The appeal filed by the plaintiff has no merit. The learned Judge was quite right in allowing deduction of Rs. 180/- in respect of the rent due. In view of the conduct of the plaintiff in setting up a false plea that Angnu was not its tenant we are of the opinion that the learned Judge was justified in disallowing one-fourth of the cost of the suit. 30. The result, therefore, is that both these appeals fail and are accordingly dismissed with costs.