JUDGMENT M.C. Desai, C.J. - This is an appeal from a judgment of our brother Dwivedi allowing a petition of respondent No. 1 and quashing an order passed by respondent no. 2 directing the Managing Committee, respondent no. 1 to reinstate the appellant in service and pay him his arrears of salary. Respondent no. 1 is a recognised Intermediate College maintained by respondent no. 1 and the appellant was employed as a teacher in it. A complaint was made against the appellant to the effect that he had assumed false name and false age and thereby secured employment with respondent no. 1. That complaint was enquired into by a Deputy Director of Education and was found to be true. On receiving a report from the Deputy Director, the Director of Education passed an order that respondent no. 1 should take necessary action against the appellant. Thereupon on 24-7-1960 respondent no. 1 passed a resolution terminating the appellant's service with effect from that date. In the meanwhile the appellant had been placed under suspension. 2. Section 16-G (3) of the Intermediate Education Act lays down that no teacher may be served with a notice of termination of service except with the prior approval in writing of the Inspector, that the decision of the inspector must be communicated within the period to be prescribed by regulations, that the inspector "may approve or disapprove or reduce or enhance the punishment or approve or disapprove of the notice for termination of service proposed by the management; provided that in the cases of punishment, before passing orders, the inspector shall give an opportunity .... to the teacher to show cause.... why the proposed punishment should not be inflicted", that an appeal against the order of the Inspector must be made to the Regional Appellate Committee and the committee "may" confirm the order or set aside or modify "it" and that "the order passed by the.... Committee shall be final." This section also provides that an order made or direction given by a competent authority shall not be questioned in any court and the parties concerned shall be bound to execute the direction contained in the order or direction within the period that may be specified in it. 3. Committee shall be final." This section also provides that an order made or direction given by a competent authority shall not be questioned in any court and the parties concerned shall be bound to execute the direction contained in the order or direction within the period that may be specified in it. 3. The appellant's services could be terminated under Section 16-G (3) only with the prior approval in writing of the inspector but there was no approval in writing of the Inspector on 24-7-1960 with effect from which the service was terminated. A copy of the resolution was sent to the Inspector but he took no action on it and in any case did not give approval to the termination of service. The appellant on receipt of the notice asked the respondent no. 1 to review its resolution but it refused to do so. Then he preferred an appeal to the Committee against the resolution. No appeal lay against the resolution. The only provision for an appeal to the committee is, as mentioned above, from an order of the inspector approving or disapproving of the notice for termination of service, and, as there was no approval or disapproval of the notice for termination of service, there was nothing against which an appeal could be filed to the Committee. The Committee instead of dismissing the appeal on this short ground passed an order to the effect that the Inspector on receipt of a copy of the resolution ought to have served a notice on the appellant as required by Section 16-G (3) and then given his decision in the matter and that without this being done it was not regular to put the matter in appeal and expressly directed the Inspector to comply with the provisions of the Act. On receipt of this order the Inspector served upon the appellant a notice to show cause against the termination of service and after hearing him on 3-2-1962 approved of the resolution terminating the service. The appellant filed an appeal to the Committee against this approval. On merits the committee found that the complaint against the teacher was true and that he had dishonestly changed his name and age but allowed the appeal with the following "direction". "The teacher should be reinstated that all his arrears of salary paid to him. The appellant filed an appeal to the Committee against this approval. On merits the committee found that the complaint against the teacher was true and that he had dishonestly changed his name and age but allowed the appeal with the following "direction". "The teacher should be reinstated that all his arrears of salary paid to him. It shall be open to the management to start fresh proceedings against him after reinstatement." 4. The reasons given by it for the decision were that respondent no. 1 should have sent a copy of the resolution to the Inspector, who should have, after serving upon the appellant a notice to show cause and hearing him, communicated his decision to the respondent that the respondent did not do so, and terminated the service of the appellant straightaway in contravention of Section 16-G (3) and merely informed the Inspector of this Act, that even on receipt of this information the Inspector did not take any action, that the action taken by him on 3-2-1962 was belated action when the violation was pointed out to him by the Committee and that thus there had been non-observance of the provisions of the Act vitiating the proceedings. The respondent applied for certiorari for the quashing of this decision of the committee and the petition has been allowed by our brother Dwivedi. 5. The view taken by our learned brother, though with some hesitation, is that the Committee had no jurisdiction to give the direction for reinstatement of the appellant and payment of the arrears of salary to him. He was constrained to take this view because such a view was expressed by our brother Pathak in an earlier case. He did not think this to be an appropriate case for differing from our brother Pathak and referring the case to a larger bench. 6. We have reproduced the relevant provisions. The power of the Committee when exercising appellate jurisdiction, on the Inspector order approving or disapproving of a notice for termination of service is confined to confirming it or setting it aside or modifying it. If the order is confirmed or set aside (in to to) there is no question of its being notified also; the three orders that can be passed by the Committee on appeal are mutually exclusive. If the order is confirmed or set aside (in to to) there is no question of its being notified also; the three orders that can be passed by the Committee on appeal are mutually exclusive. Here the Committee did not confirm the 4 approval but set it aside and once it set it aside there was no question of its being modified or its passing any other or additional order or direction. If the approval was set aside there was nothing else that could be done by it; it could not give any direction. It was concerned solely with the question whether the termination of service should be approved or not; that was the only matter decided by the Inspector. It exercised appellate jurisdiction only over the Inspector's decision and the decision was confined to the question whether the termination of service should be approved or not. It could only decide whether the Inspector's decision to approve or disapprove the termination was correct or not. It had no concern with the termination of service actually ordered by respondent No. 1 or with suspension of the applicant and certainly had no jurisdiction to direct it to reinstate the appellant or to pay him the arrears of salary. Reinstatement of the appellant and payment of the arrears of salary to him were matters entirely foreign to the jurisdiction of the Inspector and, therefore, of the Committee also. The Committee had no greater jurisdiction than the Inspector had and could not pass an order which the Inspector could not. The Act contemplated that there should be an approval before the termination of service of a teacher i.e. that so long as there is no approval there is no actual termination of service and, therefore, did not contemplate the possibility of an Inspector giving any direction about reinstatement or payment of arrears of salary. As the Act itself never contemplated that there could be actual termination of service before the approval, it never contemplated that an Inspector when deciding whether to approve or disapprove the termination could give any direction about reinstatement or payment of arrears of salary. Similarly, there was no question of the Committee's giving any such direction on an appeal from the Inspector's decision. Similarly, there was no question of the Committee's giving any such direction on an appeal from the Inspector's decision. Therefore, the direction given by the Committee that respondent No. 1 should reinstate the appellant and pay him arrears of salary was without jurisdiction and was rightly quashed by our learned brother. 7. Sri Misra contended that the Inspector was required by Section 16-G (3) read with notification No. Ka (1) 1612/15-1712-58 dated 8-4-1959 to communicate his approval of termination of the appellant's service within six weeks of the date of the resolution. Here the Inspector communicated his approval many months after the date of resolution. But we find that the appellant did not plead before the Committee that the approval was vitiated by the lapse of so much time and we cannot permit a new point to be raised before us for the first time in an appeal or even in a petition for certiorari. Further, the Inspector approved of the termination of service in order to comply with the direction given by the Committee itself in its previous order. The appellant is bound by that direction given on the appeal preferred by him. Under sub-Sec. (4) of Section 16-G the direction given by the Committee was binding upon the Inspector and he had to comply with it. When in compliance with it he gave the approval it could no longer be challenged on the ground of lapse of time. The prescribed period of six weeks had expired even before the Committee gave the direction. 8. The Committee itself on the prior occasion directed the Inspector to decide whether to approve or not to approve the termination of the appellant's service and the inspector faithfully carried out the order and decided to approve of the termination. We are surprised that the Committee itself held now that the approval given by him was vitiated. The Inspector did not commit any breach of any provisions of the law after receiving the direction from the Committee and the Committee by directing him to decide whether to approve or not the termination of the appellant's service condoned whatever breaches had been committed by him previously and it was no longer upon it to revise its opinion and to hold that the approval was vitiated by what had happened previously. If the breaches already committed could not be condoned the Committee could not have directed him to approve or not to approve the termination of the appellant's service. 9. We see no substance in this appeal and dismiss it summarily.