H. R. Khanna, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision filed by Kanwar Shiv Charan Singh under section 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 (No. XXXVIII of 1952) is directed against the judgment and decree of learned Additional District Judge, Delhi affirm- ing on appeal the decision of the trial court by which the petitioner s suit for ejectment of Sant Singh defendant respondent from the premises in dispute was dismissed. ( 2 ) THE brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is the owner and landlord of house No. 8315 built on plot No. 17 situated on Rohtak Road, Delhi. The Respondent 1s occupying the ground floor of that house as a tenant of the petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs. 250. 00 The petitioner filed a suit on 30th October 1958 against the respondent for ejectment from the premises in dispute on the allegations that Rs. 750. 00 as arrears of rent from July to September 1958 were due from the respondent, and the petitioner bonafide required the premises in dispute for occupation as residence for himself and his family as he had no other suitable accommodation Arears of rent were duly paid by the respondent. It was denied by the respondent that the premises in dispute were required by the petitioner for his occupation. It was also averred that the petitioner had other suitable accomodation with him and that his only object was to enhance the rent and coerce the defendant by filling this suit following issue was framed by the trial court :- "whether the defendant is liable to ejectment on the grounds mentioned in the plaint ? The trial court held that the accommodation in possession of the petitioner was suitable and that he had failed to prove that hi required the premises bona fide for his residence on the residence of his family. The decision of the trial court was upheld on appeal by the learned Additional District Judge. The petitioner has, accordingly come up in revision to this court. ( 3 ) CLAUSE (2) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 13 of Act XXXVIII of 1952 gives the circumstances in which an order for ejectment on the ground of personal requirement can be made. The petitioner has, accordingly come up in revision to this court. ( 3 ) CLAUSE (2) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 13 of Act XXXVIII of 1952 gives the circumstances in which an order for ejectment on the ground of personal requirement can be made. According to this clause an order for ejectment can be made if the premises let for residential purposes are required bonafide by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a residence for himself or his family and that he has no other suitable accommodation. It is not disputed that the premises in dispute were let for residential parposes. The lower appellate court while deciding the case against the petitioner held that he did not require the premises boafide for his own residence as he had no honest intention to occupy them. ( 4 ) IN revision Mr. Avadh Behari, on behalf of the petitioner has argued that the approach of the courts below in deciding the question about the personal requirement of the petitioner has not been correct and is contrary to the view taken by this court in a number of cases. Reliance in this connection is placed upon case Shanti Parshad v. Khazano Devi. Civil Revision 524-D of 1959 decided by Mahajan J. on 14th April, 1961, wherein the learned judge made reference to the following observations of Dua, J. in Mahabir Parshad v. Mohinder Kumar. "the Controller cannot say that if he were in the position of the landlord he would not have required the residential building in question for his own occupation. That, in my view is not and cannot be the true test. it is the landlord s own state of mind according to which the requirement has to be considred and not according to that of the Controller or of the Appellate authority or even of this court. It is true that it is not mere whim or bare desire of the landlord to occupy the residential building concerned that would establish his requirement but at the same time. it is difficult to substitute the requirement from the standard of the Rent Controller or of any outside authority which is coatemplated by section 13 (3) (a) (1) of the Act:"reliance has further been placed by Mr. it is difficult to substitute the requirement from the standard of the Rent Controller or of any outside authority which is coatemplated by section 13 (3) (a) (1) of the Act:"reliance has further been placed by Mr. Avadh Beharion a decision of Shimsher Bahadur, J. in Shrimati Lila Tally v. Gopal Singh where in the learned judge after referring to the earlier decision of this court held that bonafide requirement does not mean that the landlord has an absolute necessity for the accommodation in respect of which he seeks ejectment of his tenant, and that all that is necessary is that the owner must come with an honest intention to occupy the premises in question. In my opinion there can be no dispate so far as the general principles are concerned which should weigh with court in deciding a case under clause (a) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 13 of Act XXXVIII of 1952 and perusal of the judgment of the lower appellate court goes to show that it was not obvious of the dictum laid down in the above cases because in considering the question of bonafide requirement it went into the matter as to whether the petitioner honestly intended to occupy the premise, in dispate and decided upon consideration of the evidence against the petitioner. The question of bona fide requirement would ultimately depend upon the facts of each individual case upon which a finding would hive to be given before an order for ejectment is made. Normally a landlord is the best judgs of his requirement and court would not substitute its own assessment of that requirement for that of the landlord but all the same the court has to be satisfied that the landlord honestly intends to occupy the premises and ha? not initiated ejectment proceedings only to put pressure for enhancement of rent. If the court, on consideration of the facts of the case comes to the conclusion that such an intention to honestly occupy the premises is no", there and the claim for eviction is a subterfuge employed to secure enhancement of the rent, in such a case the order for ejectenant cannot be passed. If the court, on consideration of the facts of the case comes to the conclusion that such an intention to honestly occupy the premises is no", there and the claim for eviction is a subterfuge employed to secure enhancement of the rent, in such a case the order for ejectenant cannot be passed. A bare assertion of the landlord that he needs the premises for his parsonal a requirement does not warrant an order of eviction irrespective of the other circumstances of the case It is significant that the words used are "required bonafide. " The mention of the word bonafide indicates that the matter has to be decided judicially and not on it ipse dixt or bare assertion of the landlor I Required bonafide by the landlord. . . . . . . . . . . . for occupation as a residance for himself or his family are not words of magic at the mention of which all barriers to an action for eviction immediately disappear and the case taken above the plane of of judicial determination ( 5 ) THE material facts as they merge on the record of this case are that the family of the petitioner can consist of the petitioner and his wife. Although the petitioner claimed that his father and brother also lived with him yet his assertain in this respect was not accepted by the trial court and the lower appellate court did not express any view to the contrary. It has also been found that the petitioner is occupying the four rooms in an annexe in the same compound in which the premises in dispute are situated. Two of the rooms are on the first floor and two on the ground floor. The petitioner earlier filed a suit for ejectment against Shri Shivrolkar who is occupying the first flor of the building of which the premises in dispute are on the ground floor but after about two months of the filing of the suit he compromised with Shri Shivrolkar and withdraw the suit. The petitioner earlier filed a suit for ejectment against Shri Shivrolkar who is occupying the first flor of the building of which the premises in dispute are on the ground floor but after about two months of the filing of the suit he compromised with Shri Shivrolkar and withdraw the suit. The suggestion on behalf of the respondent was that the suit was withdrawn as Shri Shivrolkar agreed to pay enhanced rent, and it was contended that the object of the petitioner in filing the present suit for ejectment against the respondant was to enhance the rent This contention prevailed with the court below and the finding of the learned Additional District judge in this respect is as under :- "in the present case, however, I am not satisfied from the evidence on the record that the appellant has an honest intention to occupy those premises. From the fact that the appellant had bought a similar suit against another tenant some time ago and got it dismissed shows that the real intention of the appellant is not to occupy the premises and the suit has been filed only with a view to coerce the defendant respondent to pay more rent. This conclusion is also established from the statements of D. W. s who have stated thnt they were requested by the plaintiff appellant to ask the defendaat respondant to enhance the rent. Thus the decision of the trial court is perfectly correct and the same is upheld. "it would appear from the above that the conclusion of the court below is based upon a finding of fact and as such it cannot in my opinion be interfered with in a revision under section 35 of the Act, while dealing with the scope of this revision it has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Hari Shanker and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdurv that the High Court is not entitled to assess the value of the evidence and to substitute its own conclusion of fact in place of those reached by the court below. ( 6 ) THE revision consequently fails and B dismissed. The parties in the circumstances are left to bear their own costs of the revision.