Chandra Reddy, C.J.- This appeal is preferred against the Judgment of Venkataraman, J., adjudicating the appellant an insolvent. The material facts may be briefly stated. One Narayanan Chettiar obtained a decree against the appellant in C.S. No. 235 of 1955. In execution of hat decree, he attached the house of the appellant situate in Alwarpet, on 10th July, 1962, and it remained in force for over twenty one days. Basing himself on this attachment: this Narayanan Chettiar presented the petition giving rise to this appeal. The petitioning creditor invoked section 9 (a) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act alleging that the debtor committed an act of insolvency by reason of the property remaining under attachment for over twenty-one days. Incidentally it may be mentioned here that he withdrew from the petition subsequently; and, a number of creditors, one after another, came on the scene for proceeding with this petition. Most of them went out of the picture on receipt of some payment, from the appellant. Finally, respondents 1 to 3 who came on record at a later stage prosecuted the petition. This petition was opposed by the appellant on the ground that he had not committed any act of insolvency as the property attached did not belong to him by reason of it having been already sold in a revenue sale. Overruling this opposition the learned Judge accepted the petition for adjudication. Before dealing with the question whether any property of the appellant was under attachment for more than twenty-one days so as to attract section 9 (e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, in the light of the relevant statutory provisions, a few facts bearing on the revenue sale may be narrated here. For arrears of sales tax due from the appellant the property under appeal was put up for sale on 5th March, 1962 and was purchased by the Picture Financiers, a partnership firm, for Rs. 50,100 subject to a mortgage existing on the property amounting to nearly rupees three lakhs. The purchaser paid fifteen per cent, of the bid amount immediately and the balance was deposited within thirty days as required under the terms of the conditions of sale and the relevant statutory provisions. 50,100 subject to a mortgage existing on the property amounting to nearly rupees three lakhs. The purchaser paid fifteen per cent, of the bid amount immediately and the balance was deposited within thirty days as required under the terms of the conditions of sale and the relevant statutory provisions. On 3rd April, 1962, the appellant impeached the validity of the sale in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in this Court alleging certain irregularities in the conduct of the sale. This petition was dismissed by Srinivasan, J., in the view that the sale was not vitiated by any irregularity or illegality. On these facts could it be asserted that the property of the appellant was attached for more than twenty-one days within the connotation of section 9(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act ? The answer to this depends upon the proper interpretation of the provisions of the Madras City Land Revenue (Amendment) Act read with section 9(e) and (2)(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. We will first read section 9(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act, omitting the unnecessary portions. “9. A debtor commits an act of insolvency in each of the following, cases, namely: — ..................................... (e) if any of his property has been sold or attached for a period of not less than twenty-one days in execution of the decree of any Court for the payment of money.” “Property” has been defined in section 2 (e) of that Act: that is “Property includes any property over which or the profits of which any person has a disposing power which he may exercise for his own benefit.” Can it be posited that the appellant had a disposing power over this property within the meaning of section 2(e) of this Act? To answer this question we have to look at the relevant sections of the Madras City Land Revenue (Amendment) Act in so far as it is of immediate relevancy to this enquiry. To answer this question we have to look at the relevant sections of the Madras City Land Revenue (Amendment) Act in so far as it is of immediate relevancy to this enquiry. “ Section 18.-In the sale of immovable property under this Act, the following rules shall be observed:- Third..........A sum of money equal to fifteen per cent, of the price of the lands shall be deposited by the purchaser in the hands of the Collector, or other officer empowered by the Collector in that behalf, at the time of the purchase; and where the remainder of the purchase-money may not be paid within thirty days, the money so deposited shall be liable to forfeiture.” We are unconcerned with the other provisions of this section as the initial deposit of fifteen per cent, was deposited on the date of the sale and the balance was paid within thirty days as required by the section. Section 19 is in these words: “It shall be competent to the defaulter or to any person acting on his behalf, or claiming an interest in the laid, to tender the full amount of the arrears, of revenue with the interest thereon, and all charges, which have been incurred in demanding the arrears, or in attaching the property, or in taking the steps, necessary for sale, and thereupon the sale shall be stayed: Provided always that such tender must be made before sunset on the day previous to that appointed for the sale; and all sums so paid by any tenant, or bona fide mortgagee, or other incumbrances may be recovered in the manner provided in section 17.” This section does not come into operation as no tender of arrears due by the appellant was made the day previous to the sale. We will now turn to section 20 which plays a vital role in the context of this enquiry. “Section 20. We will now turn to section 20 which plays a vital role in the context of this enquiry. “Section 20. Lands purchased at a public sale shall be registered in the name of the actual purchaser, who shall receive a certificate of sale signed and sealed by the Collector, which shall be conclusive evidence of the fact of the purchase in all Courts, and Tribunal where it may be material to establish the same; and no proof of the Collector’s seal or signature shall be necessary, unless the authority before whom it is produced shall have reason to doubt its genuineness.” We may also notice sections 21 and 22 of the Act. Section 21 reads as follows: “When land may be purchased at public sale, the Collector, or other officer empowered by the Collector in that behalf, shall publish in the villages in which the land sold may be situated, in the Collector’s kacheri, and in the Official Gazette of the Madras district, the name of the purchaser and the date of purchase, together with a declaration of the lawful succession of such purchaser to all the rights and property of the former landholder in the said lands.” Section 22 reads as follows: “If, notwithstanding such publication, any lawful purchaser of land be resisted and prevented from obtaining possession of his purchased land, by any Court of competent jurisdiction, on application, and production of certificate of sale provided for by section 20, shall cause the proper process to be issued for the purpose of putting such purchaser in possession in the same manner as if the purchased lands had been decreed to the purchaser by a decision of the Court.” On these provisions could it be postulated that the purchaser had not acquired title to the property because no sale certificate was granted to him before the attachment of this property was effected ? As stated earlier, before the expiry of thirty days, the appellant had recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution and obtained a stay of further proceedings in that writ petition with the result that the sale certificate was not issued to the auction-purchaser though he had made the requisite deposit within thirty days as contemplated by section 18 of the Act. In the opinion of the learned Judge the non-issue of the sale certificate had the effect of continuing the right of the appellant to this property notwithstanding the sale on 5th March, 1962. The learned Judge was of opinion that the auction-purchaser could perfect his title to the property only on the issuance of the sale certificate. We arc disinclined to share this view of the learned Judge. A careful reading of the provisions of sections 20, 21 and 22 of the City Land Revenue (Amendment) Act can leave no room for doubt that it is not the sale certificate that confers title to the property but it is the sale itself. The certificate will operate as conclusive evidence of title to the property. But the purchasers’ title had become unimpeachable notwithstanding the want of a sale certificate. The property becomes vested in the purchaser from the date of the sale and not from the time of the issue of the sale certificate. Section 20 makes this position abundantly clear apart from other concepts of law. It is seen from section 20 that the grant of a sale certificate is to be preceded by the registry of this property in the name of the purchaser. Surely the property will not be registered in the name of a person unless he has become the owner thereof. If the passing of title depends upon the issue of a sale certificate mutation cannot be effected in his name till that certificate is issued. But section 20 talks of the land being registered in the name of the purchaser after the sale. Thereafter he is automatically entitled to the grant of a sale certificate. The sale certificate would prove conclusively the title of the auction-purchaser. Thus the certificate is not the root of title but evidence of title. That being so the purchaser had acquired title to the property the moment he deposited the balance of eighty-five per cent, with the authorities concerned. It should be remembered that there was nothing further to be done, by the purchaser and the authorities would have automatically granted the sale certificate but for the order of this Court preventing them from doing it. What then is the basis for the opinion that the judgment-debtor continued to be the owner of the property? We are unable to discover anything in this case, for that conclusion. What then is the basis for the opinion that the judgment-debtor continued to be the owner of the property? We are unable to discover anything in this case, for that conclusion. As soon as the title to the property vested in the purchaser, the judgment-debtor the erstwhile owner of the property, cannot be deemed to have a saleable interest in or disposing power over this property. His interest ceased in the house when the auction purchaser obtained title to the property. The auction-purchaser could from that moment effectively dispose of that property even in the absence of a sale certificate. Apart from the plain language of sections 30 to 22 of the City Land Revenue (Amendment) Act this position is established by the authoritative decision of the Privy Council in Bhawani Kumar v. Mathura Prasad Singh1 . It was pointed out by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee that the sale in execution of the mortgage decree took effect from the actual date of sale and not from the date it became absolute. It is not necessary to multiply citations for this position. In such a situation the appellant cannot be deemed to have allowed his property to be attached for more than twenty-one days. He could be expected to redeem this property within twenty-one days, if it was his property, or, at any rate, if he had a saleable interest therein. We therefore hold that the present case cannot be brought within the ambit of section 9 (e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. It was next urged by Sri Lakshmi Ratan that the appellant should be deemed to continue to be the owner of the property since there was no confirmation of the sale as required by the sale notice. This contention is founded on Condition No. 7 of that notice. We do not think we can accept this proposition. It must be stated at the outset that the Department made use of a printed form intended for sale of properties outside the City of Madras and governed by the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864. This contention is founded on Condition No. 7 of that notice. We do not think we can accept this proposition. It must be stated at the outset that the Department made use of a printed form intended for sale of properties outside the City of Madras and governed by the Madras Revenue Recovery Act, 1864. But the authorities concerned sought to adapt this to Act VI of 1867 which is applicable to sale of property in the city of Madras by scoring out section 36 of Act II of 1864 corresponding to section 18 of Act VI of 1867, and over-writing section 18 of Act VI of 1867 thereby indicating that it was the provisions of Act VI of 1867 that are applied to the instant case and not the provisions of Act II of 1864. It is to be mentioned here that under section 38(3) of Act II of 1864 the Collector has to confirm the sale after the expiry of thirty days if no application to have the sale set aside was made or if such an application was made and dismissed. It may be stated here that this enactment contains elaborate provisions for setting aside a sale and for confirmation of the sale, similar to those contained in the Civil Procedure Code. But Act VI of 1867 does not contemplate either the setting aside of the sale by an application or confirmation of the sale. Unlike in Act II of 1864 or in the Civil Procedure Code, the deposit of the amounts due to the Department was to be made a day previous to the sale and not after the sale. In such circumstances, it could not be stated that the sale had to be confirmed before it became absolute. Obviously the Department concerned overlooked the existence of clause 7 and did not score it out. If the form used was not the form used under section 36 of Act II of 1864, but the one under Act VI of 1867, and such a condition was found in the sale notice plausibly, it may then be argued that that was a condition inserted by the Commercial Tax Department pursuant to the power derived under section 18 of the Act, viz., the power to prescribe conditions of sale. In the context of the circumstances, indicated above, we attribute the existence of this condition in the form to inadvertance of the sales tax authorities. Further, clause 7 does not invest the officer with any discretion either to confirm or to refuse to confirm. If the conditions as to deposit were complied with he would be obliged to confirm the sale. There was no impediment in the way of the officer concerned confirming it but for the order of this Court. It may also be stated here that this was not a ground urged in the present petition. This was a contention raised in the course of argument. Assuming that the sale could become absolute only after the confirmation of the sale, that does not vitally affect the position in this case as it is not the confirmation of sale that vests rights in the property to the purchaser. The moment the sale is held, the judgment-debtor or the erstwhile owner losses all his right, title and interest therein and it is the purchaser that becomes the owner thereof from the date of the sale. That this is so also appears from the decisions of this Court, one of which is Ramaswamy Iyer v. Komalavalli Ammal1. It is not necessary to cite other cases which contain the same proposition. Further section 65 of the Code of Civil Procedure is of great assistance in this controversy. That section recites: “Where immoveable property is sold in execution of a decree and such sale has become absolute, the property shall be deemed to have vested in the purchaser from the time when the property is sold and not from the time when the sale becomes absolute.” In the instant case, now that the writ petition is dismissed, even if the confirmation is necessary the sales tax authorities are bound to confirm the sale and that dates it back to the date of the sale. In any view of the matter, the appellant cannot be said to have been the owner of the property which he could redeem within twenty-one days and have the attachment raised, and consequently, section 9(e) was not available to the petitioning creditors. In any view of the matter, the appellant cannot be said to have been the owner of the property which he could redeem within twenty-one days and have the attachment raised, and consequently, section 9(e) was not available to the petitioning creditors. There remains the argument that the present petition was not a bona fide one in that the petitioning creditors were actuated by a desire to put pressure upon the appellant by this device and to extract as much money as possible from him. The learned Judge negatived this contention in the view that the creditors were entitled to realise their dues and there was nothing strange if they sought to come in the place of the petitioning creditor. Though the narration of facts of this case, indicates that there is considerable force in the complaint of the appellant, we do not think it necessary to express ourselves finally on this issue. In view of our conclusion that the appellant is not guilty of an act of insolvency within the contemplation of section 9(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act his adjudication is unsustainable. In the result, the appeal is allowed, and, the order of adjudication is set aside. The parties will bear their own costs. The costs of administration of the estate, if any, will come out of the estate. V.K. ----- Appeal allowed.