JUDGMENT Bhargava, J.- 1. The respondent had filed an application under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act seeking a decree for restitution of conjugal rights against his wife, Smt. Bhinsariya who is the first appellant in this appeal. In the petition, the respondent had also joined his father-in law Chunnoo who is the second appellant in this Court. The case against the second appellant as that he was preventing the first appellant from returning to the petitioner-respondent and from performing her matrimonial obligations. 2. The claim had been decreed by the learned Additional District Judge, Umaria, by his order, dated 27-3-1961. Both the defendants have joined in filing this appeal. 3. It is not disputed that the first appellant is the married wife of the respondent and that she was married about seven years before the date of presentation of the petition under section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act. 4. The case of the first appellant is that as the respondent developed illicit intimacy with one Smt. Bhriniya alias Buddhu and he was leading an adulterous; life with her, she had reasonable cause to withdraw from the society of the respondent who was not entitled to get a decree of restitution of conjugal rights on the said ground against her. 5. In our opinion, the decree passed by the trial Court must be set aside. The learned Additional District fudge came to the conclusion that the respondent's living in adultery with Smt. Bhariniya or the fact of his having sexual intercourse with her could not be held to be proud because there was no direct evidence given on the point. In our view, this approJ.ch is entirely erroneous. It is unreasonable it expect direct evidence of adultery. Actually, if such evidence were adduced before the Court from its very nature, it must be suspected and is apt to be disbelieved; The trial Court should have appreciated the evidence from this view as to whether the circumstantial evidence which was brought before the Court was such as to lead to a fair inference of adultery as necessary conclusion. The circumstances, of course, must be such as would lead the guarded judgement of a reasonable and just person to that conclusion. 6. Five witnesses wer examined on behalf of the appellants in the trial Court in duding the first appellant herself, One of these witnesses is Mahadevna (D. W. 3). The circumstances, of course, must be such as would lead the guarded judgement of a reasonable and just person to that conclusion. 6. Five witnesses wer examined on behalf of the appellants in the trial Court in duding the first appellant herself, One of these witnesses is Mahadevna (D. W. 3). He is the maternal grandfather of Buddhu. In his statement, dated 2-8-1960, he deposed that the plaintiff used to come to the house of Smt. Buddhu from the month of Kuar last. He clearly stated that in the said month of Kuar, the plaintiff was staying and sleeping for the entire nights the house of Smt. Buddhu. He also stated that he tried to persuade Smt. Buddhu to give up the course of conduct that she was following but she had stated that she was unable to do so and that she would live with the respondent. In the last sentence of his examination in-chief, he clearly stated that respondent Gowardhan was still continuing to visit Buddhu. In his cross-examination, there is nothing to shake the weight of his testimony. There appears to be no good reason as to why he would come forward to make a damaging statement against the character of his own grand-daughter to the aforesaid effect if the assertions made by him were not factually correct. Dadan (D.W.4). is another important witness on the point. Respondent Gowardhan is his maternal unele's son. He stated that at the village Pachagaon, there was a Panchayat of the community in which about 300 persons had assembled. The said Panchayat resolved that as Smt. Bhariniya had gone to the keeping of the respondent, they would not dine with the respondent and his father; He further stated that the people of his community called the respondent and asked him as to whether he had kept that woman and the respondent replied that he had, and would not give her up. Nothing has been brought out in his cross-examination even to remotely suggest that his version could be untrue. Sahnu (D.W.2) and Ramghirwa (D.W.5) ala fully support the version of the appellant on this point. Smt. Bhinsariya, the first appellant, also in her statement as (D.W.1) categorically stated that she refused to go to the respondent on the ground that he was having Smt. Bhariniya in his keeping. Sahnu (D.W.2) and Ramghirwa (D.W.5) ala fully support the version of the appellant on this point. Smt. Bhinsariya, the first appellant, also in her statement as (D.W.1) categorically stated that she refused to go to the respondent on the ground that he was having Smt. Bhariniya in his keeping. It is significant that the respondent has not examined any of the panchas to controvert the version of Dadan (D.W.4). No doubt, he has examined some witnesses who have stated that the respondent was not having adulterous relations with Smt. Bhariniya. But, in our opinion, the evidence adduced on behalf of the appellants is more weighty and consistent and the mere denial of the respondent and his witnesses does not destroy the weight of their strong positive testimony. 7. A decree for judicial separation can be granted under section 10 (f) of the Hindu Marriage Act if it is proved that after the solemnization of the marriage, the other party to the marriage had sexual intercourse with any person other than his or herspouse. Proof of a single act of adultery is sufficient for decreeing judicial separation though for a decree of divorce under section 13 (1) (i) of the said Act, it is necessary to prove that the other party to the marriage is living in adultery. on the evidence aforesaid, in our opinion, it should have been inferred that the plaintiff-respondent was living in adultery as alleged by the appeallants and even if this inference could not be made, there is ample material on record to show that the plaintiff-respondent after his marriage with the first appellant committed sexual intercourse with Smt. Bhariniya. For refusing to grant relief; any of the grounds on which the first defendant could have asked for a decree of judicial separation or for nullity of marriage or for divorce is sufficient under section 9 (2) of the Act aforesaid. In our view; the respondent was not entitled to a decree for restitution of conjual rights because the first appellant had reasonable excuse for withdrawing herself from his society on the aforesaid ground. 8. In the view we take, it is not necessary to consider whether the second appellant was proventing the first appellant from returning to her husband or not. 9. The result, therefore, is that this appeal succeeds. 8. In the view we take, it is not necessary to consider whether the second appellant was proventing the first appellant from returning to her husband or not. 9. The result, therefore, is that this appeal succeeds. The decree passed by the trial Court is set aside and the petition of the respondent seeking the relief of restitution of conjugal rights is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 50/- in this Court if certified.