JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a landlord's second appeal from the decree of the Temporary Civil Judge of Mathura dismissing his suit for the ejectment of the tenant. The plaintiff appellant Khushi Ram is the owner and landlord of a shop of which Smt. Anaro Devi is the tenant. The agreed rent is Rs. 8/5/4 per month. She fell into arrears and on 26-9-1957 the appellant issued a notice of demand, together with a conditional termination of tenancy, for Rs. 166/10/8, being 20 months rent. It was received by the defendant on 27th September. On 27th October, the last date of the time limit of one month prescribed under Sec. 3(1) (a) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, she went to the appellant and paid a sum of Rs. 116/10/8 which was accepted by him. It is admitted by the appellant that at the time of the payment she said that she would like to pay the balance later on and he replied that she could pay later. The exact words of the conversation between the parties, in the appellants own words were "Baki rupiye ke liye prativadi ne kaha ke peechche de dungi; to main ne kaha peechche de dena." For the next 18 months nothing happened; the landlord filed no suit for her ejectment and she did not pay either the arrears or the current rent but continued to occupy the shop. On the 18th of May, 1959 the landlord served another notice demanding a sum of Rs. 225/- being the arrears of rent from 1-3-1957 up to the date of notice. The notice was accompanied by an unconditional termination of the tenancy. In response to it the defendant paid the entire amount within one month of the service of the notice. Nothing happened for another two months, but on the 2nd of September, 1959 the appellant filed the present suit for ejectment. The defendant resisted the suit and denied that she had committed any default in payment of rent. In the alternative she pleaded that the appellant must be deemed to have waived the first notice when he served the second. The trial court held that she had committed default in payment of rent and decreed the suit. On appeal the lower appellate court held that the second notice had the effect of waiving the first. In the alternative she pleaded that the appellant must be deemed to have waived the first notice when he served the second. The trial court held that she had committed default in payment of rent and decreed the suit. On appeal the lower appellate court held that the second notice had the effect of waiving the first. As the defendant had paid the entire amount within one month of the service of the second, he held that she had committed no default and dismissed the suit for ejectment. The plaintiff has come to this Court in second appeal. 2. Mr. H. N. Seth for the appellant argued that the finding of the lower appellate court that the appellant must be deemed to have waived the first notice when he served the second is erroneous. It is not necessary for me to consider this point as I think the plaintiffs suit must be dismissed on a simple ground. The suit for ejectment was filed without the permission of the District Magistrate on the ground that the bar against ejectment imposed by Sec. 3 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act had been lifted under Cl. (a) of that Section. But to claim the benefit of this clause he had to prove three things-namely, (i) the tenant had been in arrears of rent for more than three months; (ii) that he had served a notice of demand; and (iii) that she had failed to pay the rent within one month of the notice of demand. In this case the .appellant proved the first two conditions but not the third. When the tenant went to him on the 27th of October 1957 and said that she would like to pay the balance afterwards and he gave her permission to do so, this amounted to giving her credit for a further period beyond the prescribed time limit, or extended the time of payment. A landlord who making a demand for rent under Sec. 3(1) (a) of the Act afterwards accepts a portion of rent in part payment and agrees to extend the time beyond one month as regards the balance, cannot afterwards be permitted to say that the tenant has failed to pay the rent in spite of his notice of demand. A landlord who making a demand for rent under Sec. 3(1) (a) of the Act afterwards accepts a portion of rent in part payment and agrees to extend the time beyond one month as regards the balance, cannot afterwards be permitted to say that the tenant has failed to pay the rent in spite of his notice of demand. The law will not in these circumstances regard the tenant as having failed to pay the rent on demand, because the extension of the time for payment was a part of the demand. Mr. Seth argued that Cl. (a) does not provide for any extension of time by the landlord, and, therefore, if the tenant fails to pay the rent even with the permission of the landlord, the bar against ejectment will be lifted. I cannot agree. The prescribed time limit for one month is for the benefit of the landlord and it is open to him to waive this benefit by extending the time for payment beyond one month. Cl. (a) was not intended to overrule the established principles of equity, fair-play, and honest dealing between the landlord and the tenant. It was enacted as a safeguard for the benefit of the landlord against defaulting tenants, but it cannot be interpreted so as to convert it into an engine of fraud and enable a landlord first to extend the time for payment and then utilise this very extension as a ground for ejecting the tenant. 3. I think the decision of the lower court is correct, though I have given my own reasons for it. The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances the parties are directed to bear their own,costs in this Court. Appeal dismissed.