JUDGMENT G.C. Mathur, J. - The dispute in this case relates to plot No. 3298/ 345 situate in Mauza Kakrahta, Pargana Nizamabad, District Azamgarh. The name of the petitioner was recorded under Section 8 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act and, in the statement prepared under Section 11 of the Act. An objection was filed under Section 12 of the Act by respondent No. 4 claiming to be sirdar of the plot and praying that the name of the petitioner be expunged. The Consolidation Officer found that the petitioner was recorded as an occupant in 1356 Fasli but that he was not in possession from before the date of vesting till 1366 F. On these findings, he held that though the petitioner had become an adhivasi, he lost his rights under Section 210 of the U. P. Z. A and, L. R. Act as he failed to file any suit with - in time. He accordingly directed that the name of respondent No. 4 be recorded as sirdar and that the petitioner be treated as a trespasser of Class 9. Against this order the petitioner preferred an appeal but the appeal was dismissed by the Settlement Officer and the finding regarding possession given by the Consolidation Officer was affirmed. Thereupon the petitioner filed a revision but the revision was also dismissed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation on the same finding. The petitioner has now filed this writ petition, contending that he had acquired the right if an adhivasi and, subsequently, that of a sirdari and that the decisions of the consolidation authorities are erroneous. 2. In this case, we are concerned with the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to its amendment in 1958. The petitioner has now filed this writ petition, contending that he had acquired the right if an adhivasi and, subsequently, that of a sirdari and that the decisions of the consolidation authorities are erroneous. 2. In this case, we are concerned with the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to its amendment in 1958. Before considering the questions raised by the petitioner, it is necessary to set down the facts of the case: (1) Admittedly, the petitioner was recorded as an occupant in 1356 Fasli and, upon the coming into force of the Z. A. and L. R. Act, he became an adhivasi: (2) all the consolidation authorities have found that the petitioner was not in possession over the plot immediately before the abolition of the zamindari and he obtained possession after 1366 Fasli; (3) the notification under Section 4 of the Act was made on March 19, 1955; (4) the statement under Section 11 of the Act was published on July 31, 1958; and (5) no suit was ever filed by the petitioner for the eviction of respondent No. 4. 3. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that even though the petitioner was not in possession, in view of the decision of a Full Bench of this Court reported in Gajadhar Singh v. Harnandan, 1964 A. L. J. R. 379 (F.B.) he became a sirdar under Section 240-B of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act and he had a further period of three years from the date, on which he became a sirdar, to file a suit for eviction c,f respondent No. 4 and that, before the expiry of the said period of limitation, a notification under Section 4 of the Act was made on March 19, 1955, which arrested the running of limitation against him and as such he did not lose his sirdari rights in the plot in dispute. Learned counsel for respondent No. 4 contended that even if the petitioner became a sirdar under Section 240-B and even if he got a fresh period of three years for filing a suit for eviction; he filed no suit within that period and his rights were extinguished under Section 210 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. Learned counsel for respondent No. 4 contended that even if the petitioner became a sirdar under Section 240-B and even if he got a fresh period of three years for filing a suit for eviction; he filed no suit within that period and his rights were extinguished under Section 210 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act. According to learned counsel for respondent No. 4, neither the publication of the notification under Section 4 nor the publication of the statement under Section 11 barred the petitioner from filing the suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Z. A. and L. R. Act and his failure to file the suit within the period of limitation resulted in the extinction of his rights in the plot in dispute. In my opinion, the contention of learned counsel for respondent No. 4 is sound and must be accepted. In Chinnoo v. The State, of Uttar Pradcsh, C.M. Writ Petition No. 2258 of 1957, decided on May 4, 1959 A. P. Srivastav J., held in identical circumstance that Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, as it stood the relevant time did not bar the filing of a suit under Section 209 observed: "It was, however, said that N Mohammad could not file a suit possession in view of Section 49 of Consolidation of Holdings Act. that section, however, two kinds suits are barred. The first are the that relate to matters arising out consolidation proceedings and thug 2 C. M. Writ Petition No. 2258 1957 decided on May 4, 1959 second must be in respect to any other matter in regard to which a suit or application can be filed under the provisions of Consolidation of Holdings Act. A suit for possession by Noor Mohammad on the ground that he was a Sirdar and the petitioners were in possession without any right could not be filed under the provisions of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Nor could it be said a matter arising out of consolidation proceedings. Section 49 could not, therefore, bar the suit of Noor Mohammad." 4. Nor could it be said a matter arising out of consolidation proceedings. Section 49 could not, therefore, bar the suit of Noor Mohammad." 4. Against this order a special appeal No. 384 of 1959 was filed by Noor Mohammad which was dismissed on August 25, 1959, by a Bench consisting of Mootham, C. J. and Dayal, J. Referring to the order of Srivastava, J., the Bench observed as follows:- "The learned Judge agreed with their contention that the mere entry of Noor Mohammad's name in the papers of 1356 Fasli did not justify the decision that he was a sirdar and entitled to have his name recorded as such in the village papers, as he had lost any such right on account of his being out of possession and having failed to recover possession within limitation. It was contended before him by the appellant that in view of Section 49 of the Act no suit for the recovery of possession could be filed in the regular revenue court. This contention was not accepted, anti we think rightly." It is clear from this that the learned Judges took the view that Section 49 c,f the Act did not prevent the filing of a suit for recovery of possession in a regular revenue court. 5. In Dwarka v. The Deputy Direc tor of Consolidation, C.M. Writ No. 632 of 1959, decided on Aug. 16. 1960, Dwivedi, J., had to consider in identical question. Dwivedi, J., followed the decision in Noor Mohammad's case and observed as follows: "The respondent No. 2, however, submits that he could not institute a suit on and after 30th June, 1957, in view of the provisions of Section 49 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. It is urged that Section 49 bars the institution of a suit or an application in a civil or revenue court with respect to any matter regarding consolidation operations after the publication of the statements under Section,11 of the said Act. An identical submission was made in Noor Mohammad v. Chinno, Sp. A. No. 384 of 1959, and was overruled by a Division Bench of this Court. An identical submission was made in Noor Mohammad v. Chinno, Sp. A. No. 384 of 1959, and was overruled by a Division Bench of this Court. In view of that decision, which is binding on me, I would hold that the respondent No. 2 was not so inhibited by Section 49 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act from instituting a suit under Section 209 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for the ejectment of the petitioner from the disputed plots. Since the respondent No. 2 failed to institute a suit for recovery of possession from the petitioners, the petitioners became Sirdars of the plots in dispute on the expiry of the period of limitation provided for the institution of the suit under Section 209 of the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act." 6. In view of the above mentioned decision of the Division Bench, the petitioner had, in spite of the consolidation proceedings, a right to institute a suit under Section 209 but he failed to do so. Accordingly, his rights in the plot in dispute were extinguished. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance, in this connection, on the decisions of D. S. Mathur, J., reported in Mangal Singh v. Regional Deputy Director of Consolidation, 1960 ALJR 639 and of K. B. Asthana, J., in Mahabir Gadaria v. The Deputy Director of Consolidation 1965 R.D. 192. In these two decisions, the learned Judges have taken a view contrary to that taken by the Division Bench in Noor Mohammad's case which apparently was not cited before them. I am bound to follow the decision of the Division Bench and, in view of that section, the contention of the petitioner must be rejected. 8. The only other contention, which learned counsel for the petitioner sought to raise, was that the order under Section 8 (3) of the Act was in his favour and that operated as res judicata against respondent No. 4. The consolidation authorities have pointed out that no finding regarding the petitioner's possession was recorded in the order under Section 8 (3) and that respondent No. 4 was not made a party to the proceedings though his possession was found during the consolidation partal. On account of these facts, the consolidation authorities have held that the order under Section 8 (3) was not binding on respondent No. 4. On account of these facts, the consolidation authorities have held that the order under Section 8 (3) was not binding on respondent No. 4. n the grounds of the writ petition, no ground has been raised contending that the.order under Se 8(3) operated as res judicata. Learned counsel for the petition contended that a learned Judge of this Court has referred the question whether the order under Section 8(3) operates as res judicata in subsequent proceedings to a Division Bench and prayed that I may await the decision of the Division Bench. In the circumstances of this case, l am unable to accede to this request. 9. There is no force in this writ petition, and it is accordingly dismissed 'with costs to respondent No 4.