Judgment:- This appeal arises out of an order passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (Chief Judge, Court of Small Causes), Madras, awarding compensation in a sum of Rs. 5,000 for causing the death of an unfortunate child aged 4 years by a lorry belonging to the Corporation of Madras. The Tribunal found that the accident was due to the negligence of the driver of the Corporation. The Corporation has filed this appeal. Kemp in his book on the Quantum of Damages, Volume 2, page 174, has observed that pain and suffering and loss of expectation of life are matters which cannot be calculated in terms of money. Nevertheless, the law recognises these as topics upon which damages may be given. The observation of the learned author is more apt, when the deceased is an infant. If the deceased is an infant, there may well have been no actual pecuniary benefit derived by its parents during the child’s lifetime. But this will not necessarily bar the parents’ claim. The House of Lords and the Court of Appeal were often engaged in fixing compensation for loss of expectation of life. In Tafe Vaie Railway v. Jenkins1, the respondent brought an action under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846, against the Railway for damages for the loss of his daughter who was killed in a railway accident. The deceased was aged 16 at the time of her death and she was a dressmaker’s apprentice who had the prospect of earning by pursuing her business. Lord Atkinson said: “All that is necessary is that a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit should be entertained by the person who sues. It is quite true that the existence of this expectation is an inference of fact that there must be a basis from which an inference can reasonably be given........” And Lord Moulton said: “The fact of past contribution may be important in stengthening the probability of future pecuniary advantage, but it cannot be a condition precedent to the existence of such a probability.” Their Lordships were not inclined to disturb the verdict of the jury who had awarded £75 as damages. In Barnett v. Cohen2, the Court of Appeal had to decide whether the parents of a boy aged 4 who had died in an accident were entitled to damages for the loss of expectation of life of the child. In Barnett v. Cohen2, the Court of Appeal had to decide whether the parents of a boy aged 4 who had died in an accident were entitled to damages for the loss of expectation of life of the child. McCardie, J., did not award damages as there was no evidence of damage, present or prospective. The learned Judge observed: “The deceased was a bright and healthy boy........The boy was subject to all risks of illness, ......The whole matter is best with doubts, contingencies and uncertainties.....Upon the facts of this case the plaintiff has not proved damage either actual or prospective.....The action therefore fails. Only the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1934, provided for the first time, that on the death of any person after the commencement of that Act, all causes of action subsisting against or vested in him shall survive against, or, as the case may be, for the benefit of, his estate. Thus, the Law Reforms Act provided that an action would lie for loss of expectation of life. After the passing of the Act, Ross v. Ford3, the House of Lords had to decide the question of damages for loss of expectation of life of a woman aged 23 who died as a result of a motor car collision. The father of the deceased woman brought an action against the defendant for pain and suffering, the loss of leg and for the shortening of reasonable expectation of life of the deceased. Humphreys, J., awarded a sum of £300 under the head of pain and suffering and did not award’ damages for loss of expectation of life. In appeal, majority of the Judges of the Court of Appeal gave damages in a sum of £1,000. On further appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Atkin said: "......living person can claim damages for loss of expectation of life. In appeal, majority of the Judges of the Court of Appeal gave damages in a sum of £1,000. On further appeal to the House of Lords, Lord Atkin said: "......living person can claim damages for loss of expectation of life. If he can, I think, that right is vested in him in life, and on his death, under the Act of 1934 , passes to his personal representative......How the damages are to be calculated is a question which this Home has not to decide, for there has been quarrel with the amount, fixed by the Court of Appeal in this case of £1,000.“ In Benham v. Gambling4, the House of Lords had, for the first time, to decide what should be the quantum of damages to be awarded for loss of expectation of life. In that case a child aged two and a half years was involved in a car accident. The only question was the diminution of the child’s expectation of life. Evidence showed that the child was living in modest but otherwise favourable circumstances. At the trial, Asquith, J., fixed the damages at £1,200 as it was neither unreasonably excessive and unreasonably deficient. In appeal it was held that the award of £1,200 shouldstand, but Goddard, L.J., thought that the amount should be reduced to £350. Finally, when the matter came up to the House of Lords, Viscount Simon, L.C., posed the question what were the main considerations to be borne in mind;n assessing damages under the head of loss of expectation of life, and observed: " ......I am of opinion that the right conclusion is not to be reached by applying what may be called the statistical or actuarial test.... And in any case, the thing to be valued is not the prospect of length of days, but the prospect of a predominantly happy life. The age of the individual may in some cases, be a relevant factor. The ups and downs of life, its pains and sorrows as well as its joys and pleasures-all that makes up ‘life’s fitful fever’-have to be allowed for in the estimate. The age of the individual may in some cases, be a relevant factor. The ups and downs of life, its pains and sorrows as well as its joys and pleasures-all that makes up ‘life’s fitful fever’-have to be allowed for in the estimate. In assessing damages for shortening of life, therefore, such damages should not be calculated solely, or even mainly, on the basis of the length of life that is lost......." The noble Lord thought that in the case of a very young child, there was uncertainty about the future, that happiness did not depend on wealth or status and it would be an attempt to equate incommonsurables and that therefore in assessing damages whether in the case of a child or an adult, very moderate figure should be chosen. In the end, the House of Lords agreed that the proper figure in that case would be £200. They also observed that even that amount would be excessive if it were not that the circumstances of the infant were most favourable. Thus, with regard to the measure of damages under the Law Reforms Act, without attemping to lay down any hard and fast standard, the House of Lords clearly disapproved the generous scale which had hitherto almost universally prevailed. And cases held that a sum approximating to anything like £1,000 must be the exception and not the rule. This case has been reviewed in the Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 65 at page 10 thus: " Perhaps the most remarkable instance of judicial legislation to be found in the books is Benham v. Gamblingl, in which the House of Lords faced with the insoluble problem of giving a reasonable construction to an Act which was itself unreasonable, established a fixed limit to control the award of damages for loss of expectation of life under the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act ,1934." In Bingam’s Motor Claims Cases, the learned author observed at page 463, that the difficulties of assessment have been lessened but by no means abolished by the Benham’s case1. The difficulty was felt in Gumper v. Pothecary2, by the Court of Appeal, where Goddard, L.J., observed that damages for loss of expectation of life would have to be scaled down very considerably. In Garein v. Harland and Wolf Ltd.3, the deceased was a workman aged 27. He had settled prospect, good health, valuable industrial knowledge of an expert worker. The difficulty was felt in Gumper v. Pothecary2, by the Court of Appeal, where Goddard, L.J., observed that damages for loss of expectation of life would have to be scaled down very considerably. In Garein v. Harland and Wolf Ltd.3, the deceased was a workman aged 27. He had settled prospect, good health, valuable industrial knowledge of an expert worker. Atkinson, J., said: "I cannot help feeling that Counsel for the plaintiff was right when he said that I have to deal with ‘a case where really the maximum damages that could ever properly be given, should be given ......Nevertheless, I have regard to what the House of Lords obviously thought, namely, that large damages ought not to be given in such cases......." In Hart v. Griffiths Jones4, Streatfield, J., while dealing with damages for the death of a child aged 4, observed: "I must also bear in mind the age of the deceased child, and the fact that she had yet to pass through the ordinary dangers of childhood, and I do not think that as large an award of damage is applicable to a child of that age. I have also to take into account the chance of the child’s happiness of life......." It was also held in that case that in assessing the amount of damages to be awarded in respect of the loss of expectation of life of a child, regard must be had to the depreciation in value or money since the decision in Benham v. Gamling1. In Ware v. Gunare White Star6. Hodson, J., observed: " It is not possible to lay down any figure which even appears to limit the discretion of the Court by mathematical rules............There is no principle of law upon which either a maximum or a minimum can be fixed. The discretion of the Registrar is not readily to be disturbed if the figure is not obviously widely different from what the Court thinks it ought to be." The award of £500 by the Registrar was confirmed. In Sellare v. Best6, in assessing Law Reform damages in the case of married woman (age not stated) Pearson, J., observed that he gave the more or less conventional sum of £400. In Sellare v. Best6, in assessing Law Reform damages in the case of married woman (age not stated) Pearson, J., observed that he gave the more or less conventional sum of £400. Thus on a review of the entire English case law on the subject, it is seen that the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords were reluctant to give damages of more than £500, though they were anxious to increase the quantum of damages taking into consideration the depreciation of the value of money, at the current time. Even in Hart v. Griffith Jones1, Streatfield, J., observed: “I would not be justified in awarding as much as £200 which was the award of the House of Lords to a child living in rather special circumstances, but I think Counsel for the plaintiff is right in saying that some addition must be made in respect of the alteration in the value of the £......” Even in the year 1945, in Sanes v. Devan2, Lord Normand said: “Since we must perforce measure the damage in money, we must I think take account of a large and relatively permanent variations in the value of money.” In the same case, Lord Monerieff said: “As regards what falls to be paid in money the Court must take note of changes in the value of money.” Now, coming to the principles on which an appellate Court will interfere with an award of damages made by a Tribunal , I would refer to a well known passage from the judgment of Greer, L.J., in Flint v. Levell3. “In order to justify reversing the trial Judge on the question of the amount of damages, it will generally be necessary that this Court should be convinced either that the Judge acted upon some wrong principle of law, or that the amount awarded was so extremely high or so very small as to make it, in the judgment of this Court, an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage to which the plaintiff is entitled.” To the same effect is Lord Wright’s observation in Davies v. Powell Puffryn Associated Collieries Ltd.4. “An appellate Court is always reluctant to interfere with a finding of the trial Judge on any question of fact, but it is particularly reluctant to interfere with a finding on damages which differs from an ordinary finding of fact in that it is generally much more a matter of speculation and estimate ......Where, however, the award is that of the Judge alone, the appeal is by way of rehearing on damages as on all other issues, but as there is generally so much room for individual choice so that the assessment of damages is moral like an exercise of discretion than an ordinary act of decision, the appellate Court is particularly slow to reverse the trial Judge on a question of the amount of damages......” Similarly, Viscount Simon, delivering the judgment of the Board in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway5. “Whether the assessment of damages by a Judge or a Jury, the appellate Court is not justified in substituting a figure of its own for that awarded below simply because it would have awarded a different figure if it had tried the case at first instance. Even if the Tribunal of first instance was a Judge sitting alone, then, before the appellate Court can properly interfere, it must be satisfied either that the Judge, sitting in assessing the damages, applied a wrong principle of law (as by taking into account some irrelevant factor or leaving out of account some relevant one ); or, short of this, that the amount awarded is either so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damage.” Denning, L.J., said in McCarthy v. Coldair6: “I think Mr. Everett put the test graphically and rightly when he said that this Court would interfere if it said to itself. Good ‘Gracious me-as high as that’” The very same Lord made a very similar remark in Tayler v. Mayor Alderman and Burgesses of Southampton7. “This Court does not interfere with an award of a Judge who tries a case, unless, looking at it, is out of all proportion to the figure which this Court considers the proper award. When I heard the facts of this case, I said to myself: ‘Good Gracious me-as low as that for these injuries’. “This Court does not interfere with an award of a Judge who tries a case, unless, looking at it, is out of all proportion to the figure which this Court considers the proper award. When I heard the facts of this case, I said to myself: ‘Good Gracious me-as low as that for these injuries’. Giving the best consideration I can to it, it seems to me that this sum is too low.” Now, coming to our High Courts, in Krishna Gounder v. Narasingam8, arising under the Fatal Accidents Act, where a boy aged 7 was killed in a lorry accident, the learned Subordinate Judge awarded Rs. 5,000 as damages for loss of expectation of life. The learned Judge (Jagdisan, J.) observed: “.........it will not be too much to assume that boy would have taken his place as a citizen of India and derived all the advantages in life thrown open to the citizens of India under our present Constitution......I am unable to say that the award of Rs. 5,000 given by the learned Subordinate Judge as damages for loss of expectation of life is in any way excessive or extravagant.” In Abdul Mahomed Aga v. Peter Leo of Melie1, Justice Patel had to decide a case where the parents of the boy claimed Rs. 5,000 as compensation on account of the death of that boy alleged to have been killed by rash and negligent driving. The learned Judge reviewed the entire case-law and came to the conclusion that the amount awarded was not immoderate. In the instant case, the Tribunal has found that the accident was due to the negligence of the appellant’s driver and has awarded Rs. 5,000 as adequate and reasonable damages. On the facts of evidence, there is no reason to interfere with that finding. Further, taking into consideration the value of rupee and the depreciation in the value of money, I am unable to say that the amount of Rs. 5,000 is an entirely erroneous estimate of the damage. I cannot also think that the amount awarded is so inordinately high as would call for a reduction. Nor can I say to myself “Good gracious me-as high as that!”. In the result, the appeal must fail and it is dismissed. But I direct each party to bear its costs throughout. R.M. ----- Appeal dismissed.