Ramakrishnan, J.- The petitioner was the karnam of Ellakudi Village, Tiruchirapalli district. The first respondent is the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tiruchirapalli, the 2nd respondent, the District Judge, Tiruchirapalli and the third respondent, the Superintendent, Central Jail. On the allegation that the petitioner had embezzled Rs. 32, 467-49 on account of collections of loan arrears due to the Government, the first respondent, the Revenue Divisional Officer, took proceedings under the Madras Revenue Malversation Regulation (Madras Regulation IX of 1822) and, after holding an enquiry as prescribed therein, found the petitioner guilty of embezzlement, and directed him to remit to the Government double the amount, namely, Rs. 64,934-98, purporting to pass this order under section 5, clause (1) of the aforesaid Regulation, on 25th November, 1964. Acting under the same section 5, clause (2), the Revenue Divisional Officer detained the petitioner in the Collector’s Cutchery or Office. Thereafter acting on a report of the Revenue Divisional Officer, that the property of the petitioner was not sufficient to pay the amount imposed against him, the Government Pleader, Tiruchirapalli, filed a petition before the District Judge under section 13, clause (2) of the Regulation, praying for the confinement of the petitioner in the jail, till the amount imposed against him was paid. This request was granted by the District Judge, by an order passed on 27th November, 1964, and thereafter the petitioner was confined in the District Jail of Tiruchirapalli. The present petition is filed for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus, for the release of the petitioner from jail. The petitioner alleged that even the report of the Revenue Divisional Officer, on which the Government Pleader acted, showed that the petitioner possessed only meagre property which would be totally inadequate to satisfy the amount which he was ordered to pay. In effect, therefore, the detention of the petitioner in the jail till the amount was paid would amount to his imprisonment for an indefinite period, his release being dependent upon the ‘sweet mercy’ of the Revenue Divisional Officer, who should move the Court for his release under section 13, clause (2). Such a punishment, according to the affidavit of the petitioner is unknown to the criminal law and is in effect a punitive detention. Such a punishment, according to the affidavit of the petitioner is unknown to the criminal law and is in effect a punitive detention. It is further urged that after the enactment of the Indian Penal Code, a separate punishment has been provided for the trial and punishment for embezzlement of money by public servants that while the several classes of the officers mentioned in section 2, clause (3) of the Regulation are liable to be proceeded against for the offence of embezzlement under the draconian provisions of the aforesaid Regulation, other officers similarly situated who embezzle public revenue reaching their hands for remittance to the Government, are liable to be proceeded against only under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code, that therefore the Madras Revenue Malversation Regulation involves a violation of the fundamental rights of the petitioner under Article 14 of the Constitution and that the provisions of the Regulation, under which the petitioner has been detained, are ultra vires the Constitution of India. It was also urged that the detention of the petitioner was violative of the petitioner’s fundamental rights under Articles 20, 21 and 22 of the Constitution of India. But the argument mentioned last was not pressed at the time of the hearing of the petition before us. There was a further plea in a memorandum of additional grounds, that the terms of the aforesaid Regulation showed that the proceedings therein amounted to a trial and conviction followed by punishment for a criminal offence, that the identical contravention had been made the subject-matter of trial and punishment under the Indian Penal Code and that, therefore, it must be inferred that there had been a repeal by implication of the penal provisions in the aforesaid Regulation. To this supplementary affidavit, the first respondent has filed a counter stating that the proceedings under the Regulation are not proceedings for punishing a crime but amount only to a civil proceeding for speedy recovery of arrears of Government revenue, misappropriated, and therefore there would be no question of implied repeal. The main allegations in the affidavit of the petitioner are also traversed by the first respondent, the Revenue Divisional Officer, the substance of the plea being that the proceedings undertaken against the petitioner under the Regulation were all regular and that the petitioner was given full opportunity at every stage for meeting the allegations against him. The main allegations in the affidavit of the petitioner are also traversed by the first respondent, the Revenue Divisional Officer, the substance of the plea being that the proceedings undertaken against the petitioner under the Regulation were all regular and that the petitioner was given full opportunity at every stage for meeting the allegations against him. Bearing in mind the objects for which the Regulation was passed, namely, to secure the speedy recovery of the revenues of Government, and the welfare of the people, and having regard to the classes of the persons and the nature of the offences dealt with under the Regulation it was urged that there was no question of any discriminatory treatment and consequent violation of the fundamental right under Article 14 of the Constitution. We shall take up the first contention of an implied repeal of the provisions of the Regulation by the subsequent enactment of the Indian Penal Code. Before this contention can be accepted, it must be shown that the Regulation provides for the conviction and punishment of an offence, committed by an accused person, after his guilt has been determined in a proceeding in the nature of a trial for a’ criminal offence. Section 2, clause (1) provides that Collectors of land revenue are authorised to take primary cognizance of all cases in which persons of the descriptions specified thereinafter shall be accused or suspected of having wilfully committed or allowed to be committed any of the acts of malversation mentioned in clause (2) of the section and, on proof, of the guilt of the accused or suspected persons, to inflict on them such punishments as by the Regulation the said Collectors are authorised to adjudge. Clause (2) reads: “The several classes of the offences cognizable by the Collectors under this Regulation are declared to be as follows.” Class 1 under this clause includes money received as a bribe in circumstances which are very similar to those stated in section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, though the language employed is slightly different. Class 2 deals with levying extra and unauthorised cesses or extra collections and intended for the private and personal use and profit of the persons levying or causing the same to be levied. Class 3 for which the petitioner in this case was punished deals with embezzlement or fraudulently misappropriating public money. Class 2 deals with levying extra and unauthorised cesses or extra collections and intended for the private and personal use and profit of the persons levying or causing the same to be levied. Class 3 for which the petitioner in this case was punished deals with embezzlement or fraudulently misappropriating public money. Class 4 deals with false or fraudulent entries in the public accounts. Class 5 deals with wilfully falsifying public accounts relating to the receipt or expenditure of public money. Section 2, clause (3) gives the descriptions of persons in regard to whom the Collectors are empowered to apply the Regulation and punish. They are item 1, all the servants of the Collector’s public establishments; item 2, all head inhabitants, karnams and their gumasthas or persons doing the duty for them and all other village officers and servants within their respective collectorates; item 3, all persons not on the public establishment whether in the private service of a Collector, Sub-Collector or Assistant to a Collector, and pretending to act under his or their authority, or whether assuming the character of public officers who shall in any way interfere in the collection or disbursement of the public money or who shall demand or receive money as public revenue or shall exact or receive money or other valuable consideration under pretence of procuring some public act to be done. Section 3 gives powers to the Collectors to examine witnesses for the investigation, obtain documentary evidence and also send interrogatories to witnesses through the Judge of the Zilla in whose jurisdiction the witnesses may reside who shall procure the written answers of the witnesses to such interrogatories. Section 4 states that the investigation by the Collector shall be summary. Section 5, clause (1) provides that persons of the descriptions mentioned above shall be convicted before a Collector after his enquiry of any of the offences of the first, second or third class specified in clause (2) of section 2 and shall be liable to be sentenced to pay any sum not exceeding twice the amount of the money ascertained to have been extorted, unduly received, embezzled or misappropriated. Clause (2) enables the Collector to detain a person in his Cutcheri and thereafter the Zilla jail as provided in section 13. Clause (2) enables the Collector to detain a person in his Cutcheri and thereafter the Zilla jail as provided in section 13. Clause (3) states that the amount adjudged by the Collector in the above manner shall be executed in the same manner as decrees of the Courts of Adalat (civil Court) by a warrant permitting of attachment and sale of property. Clause (4) deals with persons of the description mentioned above who are convicted of the offences in the fourth or fifth class specified in clause (2) of section 2 mentioned above, and who will be liable to fine not exceeding Rs. 500 and in default of payment of fine, the Collector shall sentence the offender to imprisonment for a period not exceeding twelve months, or until the said fine has been paid. Section 13, clause (1) empowers the Collectors to keep the persons against whom enquiries have to be undertaken in house custody under the care of the Collector’s peons or by confinement in his Office; after the judgment is given until the persons pay the amount adjudged they shall be kept in restraint in his Cutcheri. Section 13, clause (2) empowers the Collector, in cases where the person proceeded against has no property of his own to pay the amount adjudged, to forward him to the Zilla Court and at the initiative of the Government Vakil, the Zilla Judge may be moved to order him to be kept in such confinement and he shall be discharged only in the event of his paying the full amount adjudged by him or on an application by the Collector. Section 10 gives the aggrieved party a right of suit in the Court of Adalat (civil Court) provided the plaint is accompanied by an order referred in section 14, clause (2) of the Regulation remitting the party complaining to seek his redress in the Court of Adalat. In the original Regulation when it was passed in 1822, there were certain other provisions which were progressivley deleted by the subsequent Regulations and also by Acts of the Madras Government. In the original Regulation when it was passed in 1822, there were certain other provisions which were progressivley deleted by the subsequent Regulations and also by Acts of the Madras Government. They include section 11 which provided that the judgment of a Collector under section 4 was not to be executed till sanctioned by the Board of Revenue, section 14 which provided for an appeal to Governor-in-Council against the Collector’s decision and in such a case section 15 provided that the Governor-in-Council shall appoint a commission to revise the Collector’s proceedings. The further clauses of section 15 provided in a detailed manner for the functioning of his commission and the method of its enquiry and decision. Section 17 subsequently deleted gave power to the ‘criminal Judges’ to take cognizance of such cases as Collectors might bring before them “where any of the persons mentioned in clause (3) of section 2 of this Regulation may be accused of having committed any of the offences enumerated in clause (2) of the same section.” On conviction the criminal Court should sentence them to imprisonment in no case exceeding one year. Likewise, the criminal Judges were authorised to take cognizance of cases of bribe giving to a public officer or servant on the Collector’s establishment or any head inhabitant, or other village officer and on conviction sentence such person to pay a fine not exceeding twice the amount of the bribe proved to have been paid. Section 18 provided that in cases of an aggravated nature, the criminal Judge could commit the person to take his trial before the Court of Circuit. The Court of Circuit had power to impose a punishment of imprisonment for a period not less than one year and not exceeding five years. It is no doubt, true that the several sections in the Regulation use the words ‘offences, ‘ ‘conviction, ‘ ‘punishment, ‘ ‘fine ‘in relation to proceedings before the Collector. There is also the fact that the maximum amount that the person ‘convicted ‘can be adjudged to pay is twice the amount misappropriated or embezzled, giving the punishment a highly penal character. Likewise, the period of imprisonment for default of payment of money can be prolonged for an unlimited period until the amount is paid or until the Collector sees fit to move the authorities for the release of the offender. Likewise, the period of imprisonment for default of payment of money can be prolonged for an unlimited period until the amount is paid or until the Collector sees fit to move the authorities for the release of the offender. This is also a provision of a highly penal character. At the same time one has to take into account the Preamble to the Regulation which is as follws: “A Regulation for empowering Collectors to take primary cognizance of cases of malversation in revenue affairs; for prescribing the rules to be observed in such investigations, and in the recovery of money embezzled or corruptly received by public servants and others amenable to the Collectors’ jurisdiction; and for providing for the admission and trial of appeals from the summary decisions of Collectors in such cases. Whereas it is necessary to the security of the revenue of Government and to the welfare of the people, the Collectors should be empowered to make summary enquiry and decision in case in which it may come to their knowledge that the public servants under their superintendence, or the officers of the village establishments, or any other persons in their behalf, or on any assumed or pretended authority, have embezzled the public money, or made unauthorised collections, or received bribes or extorted money or other valuable consideration, and that Collectors should have power to enforce the judgments they may pass in such cases; and whereas the trial of appeals from such judgments, cannot always be made with the necessary expedition, nor without public inconvenience by the regular Courts, and it is therefore expedient to provide that in certain cases commissioners may be appointed to try such appeals; the Honourable the Governor-in-Council has therefore enacted the following rules......” This Preamble clearly shows that the object of the Regulation was to enable Collectors to make a summary enquiry in the cases of default mentioned in the Regulation, and in particular of malversation of public revenue, by subordinates of the Collectors entrusted with the collection of such revenue. The Preamble also states that resort to the regular Courts for the purpose of hearing appeals from the decision of the Collectors would be prolonged and therefore commissioners could be appointed to try such appeals. The Board’s Standing Order issued by the authority of the Board of Revenue No. 158 deals with the Regulation. The Preamble also states that resort to the regular Courts for the purpose of hearing appeals from the decision of the Collectors would be prolonged and therefore commissioners could be appointed to try such appeals. The Board’s Standing Order issued by the authority of the Board of Revenue No. 158 deals with the Regulation. It contains several directions of an executive nature to the Collectors for their guidance in applying the Regulation. Clause (4) of B.S.O. No. 158 states that Collectors acting under Regulation IX of 1822 must consider themselves as exercising judicial functions, that the Regulation is of a highly penal character and that it is of much importance that the investigation which Collectors are authorised to make should be conducted and recorded in the regular form of a judicial enquiry with a view to revision by the Board and the Government when the case goes before them. Clause (6) says that the fine of double the sum proved is the maximum punishment to be awarded and should be inflicted only in cases of a very aggravated nature. Clause (7) refers to the power of the Collectors granted under clause (3), section 3 of Regulation VII of 1828 to revise the orders of Subordinate and Assistant Collectors in cases tried by them under Regulation IX of 1822. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (7) of B.S.C. No. 158 deals with the power conferred on the Board of Revenue granted by section 6 of Regulation VII of 1828 to revise the order of the Collector at the instance of the party aggrieved by the decision who is given three month’s time to present the petition. Many of the provisions in the Regulation of 1822 were modified by Regulation VII of 1828. Section 6, clause (2) of Regulation VII of 1828 states that the Board of Revenue may either grant the relief to the petitioner or reject the petition and in the latter case, it can refer the aggrieved party to seek redress if it thinks proper to the established Courts of Adalat. On a careful consideration of the above provisions, we find that though they are highly penal in nature, they cannot be equated to the proceedings for the trial and conviction followed by punishment for a crime or a criminal offence, in the ordinary criminal Courts of the land. On a careful consideration of the above provisions, we find that though they are highly penal in nature, they cannot be equated to the proceedings for the trial and conviction followed by punishment for a crime or a criminal offence, in the ordinary criminal Courts of the land. It has been stated that " to define ‘crime’ is a task which so far has not been satisfactorily accomplished by a writer.... The outstanding characteristics of a crime, in modern times are that it normally results in punishment and that a special legal procedure is followed in deciding on the guilt of the accused person." (Russell on Crime, Vol. 1, 12th Edition, page 18). This observation of Russel, is supported by the different definitions of a criminal offence, which we find in different provisions of the law. Section 40 of the Indian Penal Code defines the word ‘offence ‘as a thing made punishable by that Code. But even this definition is hedged in by reference to several exceptions. For example in the case of sections mentioned in certain chapters of the Penal Code, a limit of imprisonment is prescribed for making the contravention an offence. An offence punishable under any special or local law is also made an offence for the purpose of the Penal Code with reference to particular chapters of the Penal Code. In the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, ‘effence’ is defined in section 4(o) as any act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. This latter definition is similar to that in section 3(38) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. But it is pointed out by the Supreme Court in Thomas Dana v. State of Punjab1, that "expressions like ‘offence’, ‘guilty’, ‘punishment’ are commonly used in judgments given in criminal trials, bat the same argument can be used against the petitioners, by saying that mere nomenclature does not mater. What really matters is whether there has been a prosecution." (Page 381 of the Report.) Again in the same Report, their Lordships pointed out that all criminal offencesare offences, but all offences in the sense of infringement of law are not criminal offences. Their Lordships in that decision were dealing with the case of one Thomas Dana who was found smuggling currency. Their Lordships in that decision were dealing with the case of one Thomas Dana who was found smuggling currency. He was first of all dealt with by the customs Authorities under section 167, clause (8) of the Sea Customs Act and punished with confiscation of goods and levy of penalty. Thereafter, he was prosecuted under section 167(81) of the Sea Customs Act for the offence of being concerned in the fraudulent evasion of payment of customs duty. For quashing the criminal trial Article 20(2) of the Constitution was invoked as that Article provided that no person shall be prosecuted twice for the same offence. After discussing the provisions of the Sea Customs Act, and in particular, clauses (8) and (81) of section 167 and also the law bearing on the subject of offences, the Supreme Court observed at page 380: "When a proceeding by the Revenue Officers is meant, as is the case in most of the items in the schedule to section 167, those officers have been empowered to deal with the offending articles by way of confiscation, or with the person infringing those rules, by way of imposition of penalties in contradistinction to a sentence of imprisonment or fine or both. When a criminal prosecution and punishment of the criminal, in the sense of the Penal Law, is intended, the section makes a specific reference to a trial by a Magistrate, a conviction by such Magistrate, and on such conviction, to imprisonment or to fine or both. " In the Regulation IX of 1822 we have referred to the separate provisions for trial and punishment for the contravention of the provisions in the Regulation by criminal Judges and Courts of Circuit but later on these provisions were deleted by Central Act XII of 1876 presumably because the Indian Penal Code which was enacted in 1860, dealt with most of such contraventions and it was felt to be no longer necessary to include in the Regulation a provision for the prosecution and trial of such contraventions by the criminal Courts. But the incorporation of a separate provision for dealing with the same contravention as a ciminal offence by the criminal Court in the Regulation when it was passed, is very significant. But the incorporation of a separate provision for dealing with the same contravention as a ciminal offence by the criminal Court in the Regulation when it was passed, is very significant. It shows that the intention of the framers of the Regulation was to treat the proceeding before the Collector as one of a civil nature and not as a prosecution followed by conviction and punishment for a criminal offence. The other provisions, for example those contained in section 5, clause (3) for enforcing the judgment of the Collector for recovery of the money adjudged as if it was a decree of the civil Court, the provisions for an appeal to the District Collector and a revision to the Board of Revenue and finally a right of suit on endorsement by the Board of Revenue granted to the party aggrieved, are also indicia which show that the proceedings before the Collector under the Regulation were only proceedings of a civil nature against the party notwithstanding the highly penal nature of the provisions. In view of the finding above that the proceedings before the Collector under the Regulation are not in the nature of proceedings for the trial, conviction and punishment of a criminal offence, there is no need to discuss the further argument of the petitioner’s Counsel that the subsequent enactment of parallel provisions in the Penal laws like section 409, Indian Penal Code, for a dealing with the offence of criminal breach of trust by public servants and section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), for dealing with the offence of dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriating public money entrusted to them involves a repeal by implication of the provisions in the Regulation now impugned. But, if for the sake of argument, it were to be held that the proceedings before the Collector under the aforesaid Regulation amount to a prosecution, trial, and conviction for a criminal offence there will be room for an inference of an implied repeal by the subsequent enactment of the Indian Penal Code etc., on the analogy of the principles ennuciated in Fortescue v. Vestry of St. Mathew Bethnal Green1, and other English decisions quoted in Craies on Statute Law (Sixth Edition). Mathew Bethnal Green1, and other English decisions quoted in Craies on Statute Law (Sixth Edition). It is observed at page 177: "........that an Act describing the quality of an offence, or prescribing a particular punishment for it, is impliedly repealed by a later Act altering the quality of the offence, or prescribing another punishment for it............The later enactment operates by way of substitution , and not cumula lively giving an option to the prosecutor or Magistrate. " But as found by us, above, since Regulation IX of 1822 does not provide for the Collector dealing with the contravention of its provisions, as a criminal Court dealing with a criminal offence, but only as a civil proceeding specially designed for the speedy recovery of the amount due to the Government by highly penal provisions, there is no question of an implied repeal of the aforesaid provisions by the later enactment of the Indian Penal Code or the Prevention of Corruption Act. However, the more important question for consideration is whether after the coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the provisions now impugned involve a contravention of the fundamental right of the petitioner guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution. That Article states that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the Law or the equal protection of the Laws within the territory of India. Several enactments have made classifications of persons for dealing with acts of contravention and omission by them, by means of proceedings conducted before criminal Courts, or before quasi-judicial tribunals. They have also provided for different procedures for the trial, enquiry and award of penalty in different cases. Decisions of the Supreme Court have examined the validity of the classification of such persons from the point of view of the infringement of Article 14 of the Constitution. The broad principle has been laid down in Shri Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and others1where at page 296, the gist of the prior decisions has been extracted thus: "It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. The broad principle has been laid down in Shri Ramkrishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar and others1where at page 296, the gist of the prior decisions has been extracted thus: "It is now well established that while Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes perons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely, geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. The principle enunciated above has been consistently adopted and applied in subsequent cases." The protection under this Article extends not merely to criminal Courts dealing with offences and awarding punishments, but also to quasi-judicial Tribunals, entrusted with powers of a penal nature like the Collector in the Regulation now impugned. The protection can be extended also to the procedure adopted as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Bhudhan Choudhry and others v. The State of Bihar2. At page 1049 of the Report, it is observed that Article 14 condemns discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure. The decision of the Supreme Court in Shri Ramakrishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S. R. Tendokar and others1at page 298 states: "A statute may itself indicate the persons or things to whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons or things may appear on the face of the statute or may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances known to or brought to the notice of the Court. In determining the validity or otherwise or such a statute the Court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes such person or things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply only to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or things. The Preamble to the Regulation IX of 1822 has already been extracted earlier in the judgment. Section 2, clause (3) of the Regulation picks out for being dealt with under the Regulation, a specific class of persons, namely, servants of the Collector’s public establishment, all head inhabitants, karnams and their gumastas and persons officiating for them, village officers and village servants, and all persons who though not in the public establishment abovementioned, pretend to act in those categories and thereby demand or receive public money. The Regulation was passed at a time when the East India Company had acquired vast territories from the then Rulers of this land either by treaty or by conquest. In the earlier pattern of administration introduced by the company, they concentrated the entire power of local administration including the collection of revenue in the hands of Collectors. The principal sources of income were land revenue as well as octroi duties and the like, but land revenue formed the largest portion in the scheme of collection. Till 1860 the Indian Penal Code had not been enacted containing specific provisions, for the offence of criminal breach of trust by a public servant, extortion, bribe taking by a public servant, falsification of accounts and public records and so on. It was in such a context that Regulation IX of 1822 was passed to ensure two stated objects, namely, (1) speedy collection of revenue to ensure the welfare of the people, and (2) keeping the administration of the Collector’s subordinates pure from acts of bribery, false personation etc. To ensure these objectives the Regulation selected the public servants mentioned above for being specifically dealt with under the Regulation by the Collectors after exercising summary powers of enquiry and punishment. To ensure these objectives the Regulation selected the public servants mentioned above for being specifically dealt with under the Regulation by the Collectors after exercising summary powers of enquiry and punishment. But with the passage of time, the Government of Great Britain took over the administration of India from the East India Company. The levy of Government however extended to other regions beyond land tax. Many more official agencies, in addition to Collectors were entrusted with the task of collection of the taxes of different kinds. A perusal of the budgets of State Governments in recent years, would bear out the variegated nature of the source of public revenue at the present moment, with correspondingly different classes of officials entrusted with the task of collection. Taking up the budget of the Madras State for the year 1964-65, the following particulars are given: Tax Revenue: Rs. in lakhs I. Share of Central Taxes: (1) Share of income-tax .. 880 (2) Share of Union Excise Duties and share of additional excise duties. .. 1,000 (3) Share of Estate Duties .. 37 &151;&151;&151; 1,917 &151;&151;&151; II State Taxes: (1) Agricultural Income-tax .. 116 (2) Land revenue inclusive of receipts from irrigation .. 841 (3) State excise duties .. 35 (4) Taxes on vehicles .. 1,200 (5) General Sales Tax .. 2,150 (6) Central Sales Tax .. 515 (7) Motor Spirits Tax .. 340 (8) Entertainment Tax .. 380 (9) Betting Tax .. 43 (10) Electricity Duties and other items .. 287 (11) Stamps .. 645 (12) Registration fees .. 140 (13) Receipts from additional taxation .. 100 &151;&151;&151; 6,792 &151;&151;&151; It is obvious from a perusal of the above tabular statement, that land revenue, whose collection is made specifically the duty of the Collector and the village establishment under him, has come to occupy a minor position in the scheme of tax. levy in the present day. Other taxes, for example the General Sales Tax, the Central Sales Tax and the Entertainment Tax which are levied through the medium of the Commercial Tax Department of the State far exceed the land revenue. There is a provision in the Madras General Sales Tax Act which empowers the officers of that department to collect the sales tax dues. Section 26 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 provides for the mode of recovery of the sales tax by the officers of that department. There is a provision in the Madras General Sales Tax Act which empowers the officers of that department to collect the sales tax dues. Section 26 of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 provides for the mode of recovery of the sales tax by the officers of that department. Section 29 invests the Commercial Tax Officers with power under the Revenue Recovery Act for the recovery of any amount due under that Act. Likewise, the registration fees which form a sizable portion of the State revenue, are collected by the officers of the Registration department; stamps and stamp duties are also collected by the Registration Officers. Another sphere of public revenue is the collection of taxes by Corporations, Municipalities and Panchayat Boards. At the time of the passing of the Regulation, these bodies, did not exist at all. Later when the aforesaid local bodies were constituted, they were also given the delegated power to levy taxes and collect them for the public: benefit. These bodies engage Bill Collectors authorised to collect their taxes, and the revenue so collected is used for the welfare of the people, which is one of the principal objects of Regulation IX of 1882. The above brief discussion is sufficient to show that the area of public revenue and the classes of officers entrusted with the duty of its collection, have increased so enormously at the present moment, that the selection which the Regulation has. mode of a particular class of Government servants for the purpose of being dealt with for malversation of the revenue in the several ways mentioned in the Regulation, ignoring other classes of public servants entrusted with similar duties, must be considered to be discriminatory, involving a classification which, at the present moment, has no reasonable nexus to the objects of the Regulation. The result at the present time is that if a village headman or a karnam misappropriates land revenue or loan collections, he will be exposed to a double penalty, namely, proceedings before the Collector which involve the onerous punishments mentioned earlier, and also a prosecution before the criminal Court; whereas a Commercial Tax Officer guilty of a similar act of misappropriation would be subject only to the punishment provided under section 409, Indian Penal Code or section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Whatever might be the position at the time when the Regulation was passed in the days of the East India Company, after the passing of the Constitution at the present moment, the Regulation has outlived the purposes for which it was passed and clearly operates in a discriminatory way between different classes of persons similarly situated and contravenes Article 14 of the Constitution. The learned Advocate-General referred us to the decision of the Supreme Court in Narayanlal v. M.P. Maistry1, in support of the Regulation. That decision dealt with a special power granted to Inspectors appointed by the Government under section 138(4) of the old Companies Act to investigate irregularities committed by directors and managing agents of companies. The Inspector in this case served notices upon the appellant, a managing agent of a company to appear before him on a date specified for being examined on oath and produce before him books of accounts or other papers relating to the said company and the appellant was told that in default of compliance with the requisition, legal steps would be taken against him. He filed a writ in the Bombay High Court challenging the vires of section 239 and 240 of the new Companies Act as being violative of Article 20(3) and Article 14 of the Constitution. The Bombay High Court dismissed the petition holding that the provisions did not infringe the said Articles of the Constitution The appellant then moved the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Bombay High Court observed at page 41: “............ but where the financial interest of a large number of citizens is left in charge of persons’ who manage the affairs of the companies it would be legitimate to treat such companies and their managers as a class by themselves and to provide for necessary safeguards and checks against a possible abuse of power vesting in the managers. If the relevant provisions of the Act dealing with enquiries and investigations of the affairs of the companies are considered from this point of view there would be no difficulty in holding that Article 14 is not violated either by section 239 or 240 of the new Act.” That decision has no application to the facts of this case. If the relevant provisions of the Act dealing with enquiries and investigations of the affairs of the companies are considered from this point of view there would be no difficulty in holding that Article 14 is not violated either by section 239 or 240 of the new Act.” That decision has no application to the facts of this case. After the new Companies Act was passed, the managing agents of all companies formed a class, liable to the special procedure for investigation by Inspectors under sections 239 and 240 of the new Act and there is no question of discrimination between one set of managing agents of companies and another set. But the contravention of Article 14 of the Constitution by the impugned Regulation lies in the fact that at the present moment, there are two classes of public servants entrusted with simlar duties in relation to the collection of public revenue for the welfare of the people at large, one class of persons covered by the Regulation who are exposed to double set of onerous penalties, and other classes not covered by the Regulation and who are relieved against these additional penalties. There was an argument urged before us from another point of view. It is contended that the Regulation is ultra vires, as it invests arbitrary power in the Collector to take a decision as to whether a particular person should be prosecuted before the criminal Court dealt with under the penal provisions of the Regulation or under both and that a Regulation which leaves unfettered power in the hands of the Collector should be declared void and inoperative. It is conceded by the learned Advocate-General that the proceedings of the present kind have been extremely rare. It is also admitted that the petitioner has approached the Board of Revenue for exercising its power of revision immediately after the present punishment was imposed, but the Board of Revenue has not passed orders on this petition evidently awaiting the decision of this Court. Obviously, this is a test case. But this apart, on the question of an arbitrary power being vested in the Collector it cannot be held that the power is arbitrary one. Obviously, this is a test case. But this apart, on the question of an arbitrary power being vested in the Collector it cannot be held that the power is arbitrary one. The exercise of the power by the Collector under the Regulation is controlled by the power of revision in the Board of Revenue and finally, if the Board refuses to interfere in revision, at the instance of the aggrieved party it is bound to giant a certificate to the aggrieved party to enable him to move the civil Court. Therefore the attack on the Regulation from this point of view appears to be unsustainable. There was also another minor point that the petitioner was detained by the Revenue Divisional Officer in his office between 25th November, 1964 to 27th November, 1964, when he was produced before the District Judge on a petition presented by the Government Vakil and that the intervening period of detention was not covered by any specific order of the Revenue Divisional Officer which is to be kept as part of the order delivered by him on 25th November, 1964. But it appears to us that it is unnecessary to give a decision on the regularity of this detention, because we find that the entire detention of the petitioner under the Regulation is ultra vires the Article 14 of the Constitution. As a result of the foregoing discussion, we allow the petition and hold that section 5, clause (2) and section 13 clause (2) of the aforesaid Regulation under which the petitioner has been detained are void and inoperative, being ultra vires the Article 14 of the Constitution. We direct the petitioner to be set at liberty. The bail bonds are ordered to be cancelled. No costs. K.S. ----- Petition allowed.