ORDER S.N. Singh, J. - This writ petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of a suit u/s 229B of the UPZA and LR Act. 2. The Petitioners filed a suit u/s 229B of the UPZA and LR Act for a declaration that they were the sirdars of the land in suit and that the Defendants had no right in the land in suit. Their case was that they had obtained the land in July 1950 from the Zamindars by virtue of a written lease deed executed on 5th November 1950 and since the Defendants were unnecessarily interfering with their possession proceedings u/s 145 Code of Criminal Procedure were started and the property stood attached u/s 146 Code of Criminal Procedure. They were directed to get their rights declared; hence they filed the suit in the civil court but since the civil court was of opinion that the Petitioners could get relief from the revenue court they instituted the present suit. 3. The suit of the Petitioners was contested by the Respondents Nos. 3 to 7 on the ground that the contesting Defendants were tenants on Batai rent from before the alleged lease in favour of the Plaintiffs. They alleged that their names were wrongly not entered in the patwari's papers owing to the collusion of the Patwari and the Zamindar. They further claimed the right of a hereditary tenant u/s 180 Sub-clause (2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act and they asserted that the alleged lease said to have been executed by the Zamindar in favour of the Plaintiffs was collusive and fictitious which conferred no rights on the Plaintiffs Petitioners. 4. The trial court held that the Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 4 were the sirdars of the plots in suit and granted the said declaration in favour of the Plaintiffs Nos. 1 to 4. The contesting Defendants preferred an appeal before the lower appellate court and the lower appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the suit on the following findings: (1) That the lease in favour of the Plaintiffs was not legally proved because one Mulla witness was tendered to prove the lease and the witness being an illiterate person could not prove the document as such the Plaintiff's title to the land in dispute was not proved. (2) That the cause of action as alleged in paragraph 9 of the plaint arose" on 28th June 1952 as such a suit u/s 229B could not be filed in respect of a cause of action that had accrued before the date of vesting. (3) That whether the Defendants contesting were sajhidars or Bataidars of the Khudkasht land of the plaintifs they became hereditary tenants with the result that the Zamindar could not confer tenancy right on the Plaintiffs Petitioners. The Petitioners preferred an appeal before the Board of Revenue and the Board dismissed the appeal and confirmed the decision of the lower appellate court on the second and third points but did not decide the first. 5. The Petitioners have filed the present writ petition and have contended that the findings of the learned Additional Commissioner on all the three points are patently wrong on the face of the record and the Board of Revenue has also committed the same mistake in confirming the judgment and the two findings as mentioned above. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties on the aforesaid points and in my opinion the contentions of the learned Counsel for the Petitioners have force and must be accepted. 7. It has been contended on behalf of the Petitioners that the view of the opposite party No. 2 that Mulla being an illiterate person could not prove the lease in their favour is erroneous in law and he has relied on Ram Chandra and Anr. v. Jaith Mal and Ors. (1) (1934 (4) AWR 676) and Bheek Chand and Others Vs. Parbhuji, AIR 1963 Raj 84 . The submission of the learned Counsel is right and is well supported by the authorities relied on by him. In order to prove the writing of a person it has been held that it is not necessary that the person must know the language in which the document has been written. If he has deposed that execution has been made in his presence and he had seen the executant putting his signature in his presence it has been held that the document stands proved. On the same reason it a person is an illiterate and has seen some body putting his signature on a document in his presence in my opinion he has proved that document. On the same reason it a person is an illiterate and has seen some body putting his signature on a document in his presence in my opinion he has proved that document. The learned Counsel for the opposite parties has not seriously contested this proposition and has not cited any authority to the contrary, in my opinion the opposite party No. 2 has committed a patent mistake on this point. 8. So far as the second point is concerned a Division Bench of this Court has held that after the passing of the UPZA and LR Act a suit for declaration u/s 59 of the U.P. Tenancy Act could not be filed vide Shital Prasad v. Board of Revenue (3) (1962 AWR 96). After the passing of the U.P. ZA and LR Act when a suit is filed for the declaration of ones right it should be filed under the provisions of UPZA and LR Act. On the date of the present suit the Plaintiffs could not have prayed for a declaration of their rights under the U.P. Tenancy Act in view of the above authority. As such in my opinion the suit could not be thrown out on this ground as well. 9. Now this brings us to the third finding of the Addl. Commissioner. He has found that whether the Defendants were Sajhidars or Bataidars they had become hereditary tenants of the khudkasht land. In my opinion this finding may be correct if the Defendants were held to be Bataidars but it cannot be accepted to be correct in case the Defendants are held to be Sajhidars. A Sajhidar is defined in paras A 72 of the Land Records Manual as follows: A Sajhidar is a person who by an arrangement with a tenureholder is entitled to a right merely to share in the produce grown on the land in consideration of such person assisting or participating with the tenureholder in the actual performance of the agricultural operations. The Sajhi is, therefore, a partner in cultivation with a right to share in the produce grown on the land. He has no right of occupancy in the land itself. So far as user of the land is concerned for the purposes of carrying on the business of partnership by means of cultivation, he is merely a licensee and has no interest in the land. He has no right of occupancy in the land itself. So far as user of the land is concerned for the purposes of carrying on the business of partnership by means of cultivation, he is merely a licensee and has no interest in the land. If such is the right of the Sajhidar he cannot be called a lessee, for a lessee has an interest in the property. If a person takes another as a Sajhi in his khudkasht land the Sajhidar by no stretch of imagination can be held to be a tenant of that plot. A tenant is a person by whom rent is payable. A Sajhidar is not a person who pays rent. On the other hand a Sajhidar gets a portion of the produce raised. I am further of opinion that merely because in an existing Khudkasht land a person takes another man as a Sajhi his khudkasht right does not come to an end. But it is quite different in the case of a Batai tenant. If a person has given his Khudkasht land on Batai rent a Batai tenant becomes a hereditary tenant by virtue of Section 29 of the U.P. Tenancy Act. Therefore the finding of the learned Addl. Commissioner that whether the Defendants were Sajhidars or Bataidars of the khudkasht land they became hereditary tenants of the disputed land cannot be upheld. 10. It is very necessary in this case to give a definite finding as to whether the Defendants on the evidence on the record could be held to be Bataidars or Sajhidars. If they were held as mere Sajhidars the decision of the trial court could not be set aside. It is only when they are held Bataidars that they acquire hereditary tenancy rights. The Addl. Commissioner has relied on Pratap Singh v. Matru Mal and Ors. (4) (1949 R.D. 32). The facts of that case were entirely different. It was specifically held in that case that the land was given to the Defendants on payment of half the produce and to the fact of that case it was held that the person who was entered as a Sajhi was a real tenant on payment of half the produce. This decision was rightly distinguished in a subsequent decision of the Board in Shadi and Ors. v. Ahmad Husain and Ors. This decision was rightly distinguished in a subsequent decision of the Board in Shadi and Ors. v. Ahmad Husain and Ors. (5) (1951 AWR (Rev) 117) But if it is taken that the Board has held as a broad proposition of law that a Sajhi of a Khudkasht land becomes a here ditary tenant I have no hesitation in bolding that the view is incorrect and cannot be accepted. The Board has clearly committed a mistake in upholding the decision of the opposite party No. 2 on this point. It is very necessary for the opposite party No. 2 to have decided as a fact whether the Defendants contesting were Bataidar tenants of Sajhidars before disposing of the appeal on merits. Consequently I have No. option but to quash the orders of opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 and to direct the opposite party No. 2 to restore the appeal to its original number and decide it in accordance with law bearing in mind the observations made above. 11. Accordingly this writ petition succeeds and is hereby allowed. The orders of opposite parties Nos. 1 and 2 dated the 31st of August, 1961 and the 4th of June 1959 respectively are quashed. The result of this quashing is that the appeal before the opposite party No. 2 will be deemed to be pending and opposite party No. 2 will decide the appeal on merits after deciding the status of the Defendants as observed above. In the circumstances of this case I make no order as to costs.