JUDGMENT G.D. Sahgal, J. - The petitioner and opposite party No. 12 are brothers. Opposite party No. 12 resides in village Mohari, Pargana and Tahsil Dhampur in the district Bijnor and though the petitioner, according to the allegations in the petition, also belongs to that village, he is in service as Kamdar in the Cane Society of Sitapur and resides in village Hathia Kasimpur, Pargana, Tahsil and District Sitapur. The dispute before the Consolidation authorities related to the Khata No. 12 consisting of 41 plots of which the petitioner and opposite party No. 12 are the co-tenure holders. Opposite party No. 12, it is said, is deaf, illiterate and imbecile and is not capable of watching his own interests or representing the petitioner for his interests. The Consolidation operations started in the village during the absence of the petitioner sometime in March, 1960, according to the allegations made in paragraph 4, and by March or April, 1961 when the petitioner came to know about them, they had crossed stages upto sections 20 and 21 meaning thereby that chaks had already been formed and the period of filing objections had also expired. According to the petitioner, when he came to know that chak No. 55 had been allotted to him for which no notice had been served on him, he moved an objection under Section 20(2) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953, along with an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act but the Consolidation Officer, opposite party No. 4, dismissed the objection under Section 22(3) of the Act saying that it was not maintainable. A copy of the order is contained in annexure 4 though no copy of the application for condonation of delay or the objection has been filed. The petitioner then made an appeal to the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, opposite party No. 3, but the Settlement Officer. Consolidation, also dismissed the appeal, vide annexure 6. He then went up in second appeal to the Deputy Director which appeal also was time-barred and was filed two days after the expiry of the period of limitation and in which also an application was moved under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act for the condonation of delay. The delay was not condoned and as such the appeal also was dismissed vide annexure 8. The delay was not condoned and as such the appeal also was dismissed vide annexure 8. Then he preferred an application in revision and the Joint Director also dismissed the application in revision vide annexure 10. It is in these circumstances that this writ petition has been filed praying for the quashing of the orders of the Joint Director, the Deputy Director, the Settlement Officer and the Consolidation Officer, opposite parties Nos. 1 to 3 contained in annexures 4, 6, 8 and 10. There is a prayer that a writ of mandamus be issued against opposite parties Nos. 1 to 5 to allot the chak to the petitioner according to law. 2. A preliminary objection has been raised in the case to the effect that this Bench of the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition in as much as the case relates to the district of Bijnor and under clause 14 of the Amalgamation Order, the High Court at Allahabad only could entertain the writ petition. As against this it is pointed out that as the Office of the Deputy Director as also the Joint Director was at Lucknow, the records are kept at Lucknow and as such the Bench at Lucknow has jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The orders sought to be quashed have merged in the order of the Deputy Director and the Joint Director and as these both officers had their office at Lucknow and records are kept at Lucknow, the Bench at Lucknow had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. The preliminary objection, therefore, is overruled. 3. Let us now examine the case on the merits. Let us now examine the case from the order of the Joint Director downwards. So far as the order of the Joint Director is concerned, it is contained in annexure 10. It points out that the Deputy Director did not condone the delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act and gave reasons for it. Against such an order no revision was entertain able. It was within the jurisdiction of the Deputy Director to condone the delay or not to condone the delay in the filing of the appeal. He considered reasons given before him and he came to the conclusion that the reasons given by the petitioner were not convincing. It is, therefore, not a case of the failure of the exercise of the jurisdiction. He considered reasons given before him and he came to the conclusion that the reasons given by the petitioner were not convincing. It is, therefore, not a case of the failure of the exercise of the jurisdiction. Had he entertained a time-barred appeal or refused to entertain an appeal which was within time, then it would have been a case of his exercise of jurisdiction where he had not or refusing to exercise jurisdiction where he had but when the appeal was admittedly time barred and an application was made for condoning the delay, it was within his jurisdiction to condone the delay or not to condone delay. By not condoning the delay it cannot be said that he refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law. The order of the Joint Director, therefore, was correct and it cannot be said that he refused to exercise jurisdiction which he had. On that ground, therefore, the order of the Joint Director cannot be quashed. 4. The order of the Deputy Director was passed on January 15, 1962. No revision was maintainable against this order as the Deputy Director had exercised jurisdiction vested in him by law. Therefore, the petitioner ought to have come to this court after that order and not gone to the Joint Director in revision. The delay, therefore, cannot be condoned and on grounds of laches alone the writ petition should be dismissed. Even on the merits the order of the Deputy Director cannot be quashed. The Deputy Director states in his order that the appellant before him i.e. the petitioner before this court sought condonation of delay on the plea that he being in service at Sitapur could not send timely instructions to his brother in the village for filing a second appeal. This reason assigned for the delay has been held by the Deputy Director as not convincing. No doubt, the Deputy Director has also added that it is not convincing particularly on the background that the first appeal was also dismissed on point of limitation. This is, therefore, a misstatement of fact but his saying that the reason assigned for the delay was not convincing amounts to a finding on his part that he did not think it to be a good ground for condoning the delay that the petitioner had given. The petitioner after all fought the first appeal. This is, therefore, a misstatement of fact but his saying that the reason assigned for the delay was not convincing amounts to a finding on his part that he did not think it to be a good ground for condoning the delay that the petitioner had given. The petitioner after all fought the first appeal. There is no reason why he should not have fought a second appeal in time and as the delay has not been condoned and that the Deputy Director refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in him by law, on this ground, therefore, the order dated January 15, 1962, passed by the Deputy Director also cannot be quashed. 5. When the order by the Deputy Director cannot be quashed, there is no occasion for examining the orders of the Settlement Officer and the Consolidation Officer which have merged in this order for this order only dismissed the application for condonation of delay, it dismisses the appeal also. 6. Altogether, therefore, the petition is dismissed with costs.