Rewa Shankar Bhayal v. P. E. Boyce — 1965 DIGILAW 346 (ALL)

JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, J. - This appeal arises out of a reference under Section 18, Land Acquisition Act (hereafter referred to as the Act). A certain plot was acquired by Government under the Act. Rewa Shankar appellant was the proprietor of the plot. Smt. Boyce filed an objection on the ground that she was the permanent lessee of the land. The Land Acquisition Officer rejected her claim, and decided that she was not entitled to any compensation. She applied for a reference to Court under Section 18 of the Act. The learned District Judge of Jhansi accepted the reference, and held that Smt. Boyce was the lessee of the therefore; entitled to apportionment. Rewa Shanker appeals against that judgment of the learned District dated 22-10-1951. 2. Mr. S N. Verma, appearing for the appellant, has urged before me that the reference under Section 18 of the Act was incompetent, because there was no award under the Act. In order to decide whether this contention is well founded, it is necessary to examine the relevant provisions of the Act. Sec. 11 of the Act provides for enquiry and award by the Collector. Section II states: "On the day so fixed ..... the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections .... . and shall make an award under his hand of (i) the true area of the land, (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land; and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him." Section 18 of the Act provides for reference to Court. Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 18 states: "Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement if the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested." 3. It will be seen that a reference under Section 18 will be justified only 11 there is in existence an award by the Collector. There cannot be any reference under Section 18 without an award under Section 11 by the Collector. It will be seen that a reference under Section 18 will be justified only 11 there is in existence an award by the Collector. There cannot be any reference under Section 18 without an award under Section 11 by the Collector. It may be pointed out that an award issued under Section 11 should dispose of three matters (i) area of the land, (ii) total compensation, and (iii) apportionment of the total compensation. Mr. S. N. Verma, contended that in the instant case there is no award, as contemplated by Section 11 of the Act. On page 14 of the paper-book I find one document, which has been described as an award. That order is dated 13-9-1948. After referring' to the cases of the parties, the decision dated 13-9-1948 concluded thus : "Thus from the above it will appear that Shrimati Endulji Boyce has no claim as a permanent lessee to plot No. 298, and so is not entitled to any compensation. Pt. Rewa Shankar as owner is entitled to full compensation of the plot in question." 4. It will be seen that that order dated 13-9-1948 passed by the Land Acquisition Officer did not decide the basic question of total compensation to be awarded on account of acquisition of the plot. The sole point decided on 13-9-1948 was that Smt. Boyce was not a permanent lessee, and should not, therefore, get any share in the compensation money. That is not an award as contemplated by Section 11 of the Act. The main object of Section 11 is to determine the total compensation to be awarded. In the decision dated 13-9-1948 there is no finding as regards the total compensation to be allowed to the proprietor. So the order dated 13-9-1948 cannot be considered to be an award under Section 11 of the Act. 5. In Prag Narain v. Collector of Agra, A.I.R. 1932 P.C. 102, their Lordships of the Privy Council explained that an award should contain within its four corners the fixing of the value of the land with which it deals, and the apportionment of that value bet. ween the various persons interested, in that land. The decision of the Land Acquisition Officer dated 13.9.1948 does not satisfy that test. 6. The learned District Judge was aware that in the instant case no award was in existence. ween the various persons interested, in that land. The decision of the Land Acquisition Officer dated 13.9.1948 does not satisfy that test. 6. The learned District Judge was aware that in the instant case no award was in existence. Issue No. 1 framed by him was : "Whether the petition is competent ?" The learn. ed District Judge began his discussion under issue No. 1 with the remark that it is a fact that so far no award has been given under Section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. The question now arises whether the learned District Judge could decide the dispute between Rewa Shankar and Smt. Boyce, although no award by the Land Acquisition Officer was in existence. 7. In Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswane, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 340, it was held that a defect o jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured a en by consent of parties. 8. In Hira Lal v. Kali Nath, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 199, it was held that competence of a Court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. 9. In Rajasthan State v. L.D. Silva A.I.R. 1957 Rajasthan 44 there was no award at all. It w held that the very basis of reference under the Land Acquisition Act was lacking. 10. In Sukhbir Singh v. Secretary State of India, AIR 1926 Allahabad 766, an application by a interested party contained no r quest that the matter of the was should be referred for the determination of the District Judge. It was held that the District Judge had no jurisdiction to deal with a reference passed on such an application. 11. In Secretary of State for India v. Bhagwan Prasad. 1929 A.L.J.R. 1136, it was argued for the appellant that the Subordinate Judge should have thrown out the reference under the Act on the ground that the Collector made reference on a belated application. It was held that such a plea could not be entertained. 12. 11. In Secretary of State for India v. Bhagwan Prasad. 1929 A.L.J.R. 1136, it was argued for the appellant that the Subordinate Judge should have thrown out the reference under the Act on the ground that the Collector made reference on a belated application. It was held that such a plea could not be entertained. 12. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Abdul Karim, AIR 1963 Allahabad 556, it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that in a reference under Section 18, the District Judge cannot go into the question whether the application for reference to the Collector was within time or not. 13. It will be seen that the question considered in Bhagwan Prasad's cases and the Full Bench case was whether the District Judge can decline to dispose of a reference on the ground that the Collector made the reference on a belated application. That is not the point raised in the present case. The point raised in the instant case is that there was no award by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act; consequently the District 'Judge had no jurisdiction under Section 18 of the Act. It will be seen that the point that arises for consideration in the present case is some - what different from the point which arose in Bhagwan Prasad's cases and in Abdul Karin'sa case. In Abdul Karim's case Desai, C.J. observed on page 560 thus :- "An order of an authority is a nullity only if the authority lacked inherent jurisdiction to make it ..... The District Judge could ignore the reference only if it were a nullity ......" 14. It is, therefore, necessary to ascertain whether the reference made by the Collector was a nullity. Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 18 states: "Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court ......." 15. It is clear from Section 18 of the Act that the existence of an award is essential to confer jurisdiction on the Collector to make a reference. If no award is in existence, the Collector cannot make a reference under Section 18. The so-called reference by the Collector is a nullity. It is clear from Section 18 of the Act that the existence of an award is essential to confer jurisdiction on the Collector to make a reference. If no award is in existence, the Collector cannot make a reference under Section 18. The so-called reference by the Collector is a nullity. If the reference by the Collector is a nullity, the District Judge cannot have jurisdiction to deal with such a reference under Section 18 of the Act. I agree with 'Mr. S. N. Verma that, on the facts of the present case, the reference under Section 18 of the Act was incompetent; and the learned District Judge should have declined to deal with the reference on merits. 16. The appeal is allowed. The order of the learned District Judge dated 22-10-1951 is set aside. Time reference under Section 18, Land Acquisition Act is discharged on the ground that it was incompetent. The appellant shall get his costs from the respondent n both he Courts.