JUDGMENT B. Dayal, J. - This case has been referred to this Bench by a learned Single Judge. The facts of the case are that the Town Area of Sonkh imposed a tax of one anna in the rupee on the hire from the passenger buses and annas four per motor carrying load to Sonkh and this was called a licence fee. This licence fee having been demanded from the plaintiffs respondents. They filed a suit for declaration that it was illegal and could not be charged. The trial court dismissed the suit. The lower appellate court decreed it and the question for consideration is whether this tax was legally imposed. 2. The facts which are not in dispute are that a piece of land in the town of Sonkh was previously a police out post. The land was vacated by the police and was taken on lease by the town area and the town area set up a bus and motor stand upon that land. It prohibited the parking of buses and motor at places other than the fixed motor parks and any body who came to use this park was made liable to 'pay this tax. The lower appellate court held that this land was a private property as it was owned by the Government and, therefore, the town area had no right to impose the tax for the use of this land. 3. In this second appeal learned counsel appearing for the town area has argued that such an imposition can be justified both under Section 293 and 298 (2) List I, E (b) of the Act. Sec. 293 is as follows: "(1) The Board may charge fee to be fixed by bye law or by public auction or by agreement, for the use or occupation (otherwise than under a lease) of any immovable property vested in, or entrusted to the management of the Board, including any public street or place of which it allows the use and occupation whether by allowing a projection thereon or otherwise." 4. Under this Section the Board is authorised to levy a fee for the use of land which is either vested in it or was entrusted to the management of the Board. The present land neither vests in this town area nor has been entrusted to it for management. Under this Section the Board is authorised to levy a fee for the use of land which is either vested in it or was entrusted to the management of the Board. The present land neither vests in this town area nor has been entrusted to it for management. Therefore, the provisions of the section do not authorise the imposition of the tax for the use of this land. The further phrase used in the section "including any public street or place" does not extend the scope of the section. It merely makes it clear that the land vested in or entrusted to the management of the Board may be a public street or a public place. But even such public street or public place must either vest in or be entrusted for management to the Board. Section 293 is, therefore, not applicable to the present land. 5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the town area in this case was in any case authorised under List I, E (b) of Section 298(2) to impose the fee. This sub-section is as follows: "Permitting, prohibiting or regulating the use or occupation of any or all public streets or places by itinerant vendors or by any person for the sale of articles, or for the exercise of any calling or for the setting up of any booth or stall and providing for the levy of fees for such use and occupation." In the first place this paragraph applies only to public streets and public places. The present land is admittedly not a public street. The contention is that it is a public place. Public place has been defined under Section 2 (18) as a space, not being private property, which is open to the use or enjoyment of the public whether such space is vested in the board or not. The place, therefore, must be open to the enjoyment of the public before the board can make regulation regarding it under the sub-section quoted above. This place now in question was never open for the enjoyment of the public and, therefore, cannot be called a public place. The sub-section, therefore, does not apply to it on this ground. Moreover, the sub-section refers to certain kinds of uses for which refer fee, can be charged. This place now in question was never open for the enjoyment of the public and, therefore, cannot be called a public place. The sub-section, therefore, does not apply to it on this ground. Moreover, the sub-section refers to certain kinds of uses for which refer fee, can be charged. It enumerates the use or occupation by itinerant vendors or any person for the sale of articles or for the exercise of any calling or for setting up of any booth or stall. We are of opinion that permitting a bus owner to come and stand. upon this land for a short time is not covered by any of these uses mentioned in the subsection and it cannot, therefore, be said that the present levy can be justified under this sub-section. 6. No other section was placed for justifying this levy. We are, there fore, of opinion that the imposition was illegal and the decree passed by the lower appellate court was correct. 7. There is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs.