S. K. Kapur, J. ( 1 ) THESE appeals (Criminal Appeals Nos. 163-D of 1962, 164-D of 1962 and 202-D of 1962) against acquittal shall be disposed of by this judgment as a common point of law is involved. ( 2 ) IT is necessary to state the facts in Criminal Appeal No. 164-D of 1962 only.- By a complaint dated 29th August 1960, Shri Sham Sunder Mathur, Municipal Prosecutor of the Minicipal Corporation of Delhi, filed a complaint in the court of Shri Balbir Singh, Magistrate Ist Class, against Jagdish Lal respondent under section 7/16 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter to be called the Act) for selling adulterated grounded dhania. In the complaint Shri Sham Sunder Math or stated that he was competent to file the case under section 20 of the Act in accordance with a resolution passed by the Corporation in the meeting held on 23rd December 1958. The learned Magistrate, by an order dated 30th April 1962, acquitted the respondent. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi sought special leave under section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code to appeal against the order of acquittal which was granted on 3rd September 1962. The preliminary objection, which has been raised by Mr. Bipen Behari Lall, counsel for Jagdish Lal respondent, is that the only person competent to file the appeal was the complaiant, namely, Shri Sham Sunder Mathur and since leave had not been sought under section 417 (3) of the Criminal Procedure Code orgrantedtohim,theappealmnstbe dismissed. It is pointed out that under that provision it is only the complainant who can present such an application to this Court and then present an appeal after special leave has been granted and the complainant is Shri Sham Sunder Mathur and not the Municipal Corporation. In this connoction reference may be made to section 20 of the Act. Sub-section ( 1) of that section provides that no prosecution for an offence under the Act shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of the State Government or a local authority or a person authorised in this behalf by the State Government or a local authority. The submission of Mr. Bipen Behari-Lall is that the prosecution was not instituted by the Municipal Corporation and it had been instituted by a person authorised by it. The submission of Mr. Bipen Behari-Lall is that the prosecution was not instituted by the Municipal Corporation and it had been instituted by a person authorised by it. He agrees that if the prosecution had been instituted by the Municipal Corporation, then the appeal would not be defective in any manner and could have been filed. by the Corporation but according to him the complaint itself is clear that by a resolution the Corporation had authorised Shri Sham Sunder Mathur to institute it. For that reason the complaint must be deemed to have been made by Shri Sham Sunder Mathur and n of by the Municipal Corporation. ( 3 ) THE essential question that has to be determined is whether the complaints was instituted by the Municipal Corporation. . Now, it could be said to have been instituted by it only if the complaint had been made and signer by the person or authority competent under the Delhi Munich pal Corporation Act, 1957 to exercise the powers of the Corporation in the matter of institution of legal proceedings. The only provision, which confers, powers with regard to institution of legal proceedings is section, 476 of that Act which empowers the Commissioner to institute and prose cute any suitor other legal proceedings. Assuming that" other legal proceedings would include the power to institute acomplaint before a Magistrate, it is the Commissioner alone who could exercise that power as there is no other provision which has been brought to our notice by the learned counsel for the parties which confers any such power on any else in the aforesaid Act. The Commissioner could, of course, delegate his functions by an order made under section 491 but it is common ground that the Commissioner did not delegate his power to Shri Sham Sunder Mathur. In Ballabdas Agarwala v. J. C. Chakrmarty where section 537 of the Calcutta Municipal Act, 1923 conferred certain powers on the Commissioners it was held that the conviction of the accused on the basis of a complaint filed by the Health Officer of the Municipality, who was not duly empowered as the delegated authority to institute criminal proceedings under the Act on the date he made the complaint, could not be sustained. In the present case it is the Commissioner who could not on behalf of the Corporation in the matter of institution of legal proceedings. In the present case it is the Commissioner who could not on behalf of the Corporation in the matter of institution of legal proceedings. He did not delegate his powers to Shri Sham Sunder Mathur and, therefore, it cannot be said that the complaint, which was filed by him, was on behalf of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. It is true that the complaint was given that heading but the heading itself would not and cannot alter the substance of the matter. ( 4 ) THE real position thus is that the complaint was filed by Shri Sham Sunder Mathur under the author by given to him by the resolution passed by the Municipal Corporation. This he could validly do under section 20 of the Act since the requirement is that the complaint should be instituted by the local authority or by any person authorised by it. Since the Municipal Corporation of Delhi is a local authority within the meaning of that section and because it authorised Shri Sham Sunder Mathur to file complaint under section 20, the complaint was properly filed but the complainant was Shri Sham Sunder Mathur and since he did not either seek leave to appeal or institute the appeal against acquittal, the appeal must be regarded as having been filed by a person other than the complainant which the law does not permit. ( 5 ) MR. K. K. Raizada, who appears for the appellant, has relied on certain observation made by Falshaw C. J. in Rain P er shad v. The State Criminal Revision No. 129-D of 1961, decided on 5th January 1962, to the effect that the complainant in such cases was the Corporation of Delhi. That observation wag made in a wholly different context and the point that has been raised before us was never argued before the learned Chief Justice. In another Bench decision in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Jawala Pershad. Criminal Appeal No. 162-D of 1961, decided on 12th May 1964 Dua and Mahajan, JJ. , a complaint had been dismissed and the accused had been acquitted because the Municipal Prosecutor failed to appear on the date on which the case up for hearing. Some observations ware made in that case came that the Municipal Prosecutor had merely signed the complaint in his official capacity on behalf of the Municipal Corporation. , a complaint had been dismissed and the accused had been acquitted because the Municipal Prosecutor failed to appear on the date on which the case up for hearing. Some observations ware made in that case came that the Municipal Prosecutor had merely signed the complaint in his official capacity on behalf of the Municipal Corporation. The question there was entirely of adifferent nature and the point, which we are called upon to decide, never came up for consideration of the learned Judges. ( 6 ) FOR the reasons given above, there is no escape from the conclusion that all the appeals suffered from the same infirmity viz. they have been filed not by the complainant but by the Municipal Corporation which cannot be regarded to be the complainant in these cases. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.