JUDGMENT D.S. Mathur, J. - This is a revision under Section 115, C.P.C. by the Managing Committee of Krishak Higher Secondary School, Raisi, and two others against the order dated 21-9-1964 of the District Judge of Saharanpur, dismissing their appeal and thereby maintaining the order of the Civil Judge of Roorkee at Saharanpur whereby their objection to the award was dismissed and the award was made a rule of the Court. 2. The material facts of the case are that the opposite-party, Isham Singh, was the Principal of the Krishak Higher Secondary School, Raisi. With the disputes between the parties we are at present not concerned. The opposite-party submitted his resignation from the post of the Principal, but he withdrew it before it could be accepted by the Management of Krishak Higher Secondary School, Raisi. Even then, on 9-2-1955, the Executive Committee of the said School accepted the resignation with immediate effect and directed the Vice-Principal to take over charge from the opposite-party and to relieve him. It appears that the opposite-party was paid three month's salary in lieu of the notice. The opposite-party thereupon moved the Deputy Director of Education with the prayer that he be ordered to be reinstated on the post of the Principal with effect from the date he had been forcibly relieved and for payment of the salary and the amount of the T.A. bills. The Deputy Director of Education, who was the Chairman of the Standing Regional Arbitration Board, fixed a date for hearing, gave intimation of this date to the other members of the Arbitration Board and thereupon the Arbitration Board made the award on 11-12-1956. The Arbitration Board gave the direction that the opposite-party be reinstated to his post as Principal with effect from the date of his discharge, viz, afternoon of 10-2-1955, and also directed for the payment of the salary for the month of January 1955 and also of the subsequent months. It appears that the School paid the whole of this amount and also the salary for a few subsequent months, but did not re-instate the opposite-party. He moved the State Government who suggested to him to obtain a decree from the Court, whereupon, on 31-5-1961, he moved the present application under Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act with which was filed the award. He moved the State Government who suggested to him to obtain a decree from the Court, whereupon, on 31-5-1961, he moved the present application under Section 14 (2) of the Arbitration Act with which was filed the award. It was mentioned in para 10 of the application that the award was being filed under the direction and authority of the arbitrator. At another place it was further mentioned that no notice of them asking and signing of the award was given to the opposite-party and on this ground also he had the right to move the application even though the award had been made about 41 years earlier. 3. The opposite-parties to the application under Section 14 (2) were the Managing Committee of Krishak Higher Secondary School Raisi, through its Manager, the Krishak Shiksha Prasar Samittee, Raisi, through its Manager, and Sri J. N. Sinha, Manager of both. These opposite-parties are the present applicants. They filed an objection to the award which was dismissed except with the modification that the amount payable under the award was slightly reduced. The appeal preferred by the present applicants was dismissed by the District judge and thus order has been challenged in revision. 4. The order of the District judge is challenged on many grounds and I shall make comments on them one by one. 5. Relying upon the Supreme Court decision in the case of Dr. S.B. Dutt v. University of Delhi, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 1050, it was first of all contended that in view of Section 21 (b) of the then specific Relief Act no suit for declaration based on a contract of personal service was maintainable and hence the Arbitration Board could not give a declaration that the opposite-party, Isham Singh, still continued to be the Principal of the School and was to be re-instated in service. The effect of this decision was considered by the Supreme Court in S.R. Tewari v. The District Board, Agra, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1680. The law on the subject can be said to be beyond any controversy. A suit based on a contract for personal service is not maintainable unless the order of dismissal or discharge is a nullity or there is an infringement of a statutory provision. 6. The law on the subject can be said to be beyond any controversy. A suit based on a contract for personal service is not maintainable unless the order of dismissal or discharge is a nullity or there is an infringement of a statutory provision. 6. The resolution dated 9-2-1955 of the Executive Committee of the School makes it clear that no charge had been framed against the opposite-party and he was simply discharged from service. The decision of the Executive Committee does not amount to dismissal. The acceptance of the resignation after withdrawal was held by the Arbitration Board to be against the law. This view appears to be correct and was not challenged before me. In other words, the opposite-party had not been dismissed from service but was discharged by termination of the agreement. The second part of clause 10 of the agreement executed by the parties at the time of the appointment of the opposite party, Isham Singh, as Principal of the Krishak Higher Secondary School, Raisi, clearly lays down that the notice of termination of the agreement shall be valid only after the Inspector has given his approval. The agreement so executed was on the lines of Appendix VI of the Educational Code of Uttar Pradesh. The agreement in question shall thus have a statutory effect only if the Educational Code can be placed in the category of a statute or a rule made under the rule making power conferred on a statutory authority. 7. The Board of High School and Intermediate Education was constituted under the Intermediate Education Act, 1921, and is consequently a statutory body. Under clause (c) of Section 15 (2) of the Intermediate Education Act the Board has the power to make Regulations to provide for the conditions of recognition of Institutions for the purposes of its examinations. The Regulations so made shall stand in the same category as the law, and breach thereof would amount to an illegality which would make the order a nullity. The Calendar of the year 1955-56 of the Board of High School and Intermediate Eduction, Uttar Pradesh, was produced before me and it is not in dispute that the Calendar for the year 1954-55 was in substance the same. The Calendar contains the Regulations of the Board. Chapter X of the Regulations lays down the conditions under which grants-in-aid may be given to recognised Institutions. The Calendar contains the Regulations of the Board. Chapter X of the Regulations lays down the conditions under which grants-in-aid may be given to recognised Institutions. The grant is given by the State Government, and not by the Board, and consequently the provisions of this Chapter cannot be deemed to lay down the conditions of recognition of an Institution. However, Chapter XVII rule 2 of the Regulations, being a material part of the Regulations, would be binding on an Institution applying for recognition. It can therefore, be assumed that while applying for recognition the Institution undertakes to comply with this rule. Chapter XVII rule 2 of the Regulations runs as below : "The rules of the Educational Code of the Uttar Pradesh, shall apply to all institutions recognised by the Board in so far as they are not inconsistent with these regulations." 8. Appendix VI of the Educational Code forms a part of the Code and it can be treated as one of the rules of the Educational Code. Further, many provisions of Appendix VI are contained in the main Code itself. Consequently, the whole of the Educational Code including Appendix VI shall be a part of the Regulations and disregard thereof shall amount to disregard of statutory provisions. Appendix VI is not in any way inconsistent with the Regulations and hence shall be a part of the Regulations. 9. The learned Advocate for the applicants, however, urged that the rules of the Educational Code should not be treated as a part of the Regulations and, in the eye of law, there was the Intermediate Education Act, the Regulations and thereafter the rules of the Educational Code. It was suggested that the Regulations could be treated as a part of the Intermediate Education Act, but not the rules of the Educational Code. When the rules of the Educational Code were made to apply to all Institutions recognised by the Board, what was meant was that such rules shall be enforceable in the same manner as Regulations and consequently the rules of the Educational Code can also be treated at par with the Regulations which admittedly have the force of law. 10. When the rules of the Educational Code were made to apply to all Institutions recognised by the Board, what was meant was that such rules shall be enforceable in the same manner as Regulations and consequently the rules of the Educational Code can also be treated at par with the Regulations which admittedly have the force of law. 10. Before discharging the services of the opposite party, that is, before terminating the agreement, the Managing (Executive) Committee of the School had not obtained the approval of the Inspector and, consequently, the notice of termination was not valid and had no legal effect. The termination of service of the opposite party thus amounted to the breach of a statutory provision and as laid down by the Supreme Court, I may say, in both the cases quoted above, the Courts of law can grant the declaration that the order of discharge was invalid and, in the eye of law, the person concerned continued to be still in service. The decision of the Board directing reinstatement of the opposite-party, in substance, amounted to a declaration that the order of discharge by which the services of the opposite-party were terminated was illegal and, in the eye of law, he continued to be in service as Principal of the said School. 11. The second point contended before me was that the award of the Arbitration Board was incapable of performance considering that the opposite-party was the 'Principal of the School while it was recognised up to High School only; but from a subsequent period (the year has not come on the record) the School has been recognised for Intermediate Examination also and the status of the Institution has been changed. By virtue of the order of reinstatement the opposite-party was to be re-instated as the Principal of the Krishak Higher Secondary School, Raisi. Whether he continued as Principal of the Institution after its recognition for Intermediate classes also was not a matter in issue and no award has been made on that point. By virtue of the order of reinstatement the opposite-party was to be re-instated as the Principal of the Krishak Higher Secondary School, Raisi. Whether he continued as Principal of the Institution after its recognition for Intermediate classes also was not a matter in issue and no award has been made on that point. It shall be for the Managing Committee to decide whether the opposite-party, who continues as Principal of the Krishak Higher Secondary School, Raisi, could, as a right, continue as the Principal of the Institution after its recognition by the Board for Intermediate classes also, or under the rules he was to be placed in a lower position, or his services were to be terminated. After the Managing Committee takes a decision on this point, it shall be open to the opposite-party to challenge the decision in accordance with the law. The District Judge hearing the appeal had made it clear that the re-instatement of the opposite-party was as Principal of Krishak Higher Secondary School, Raisi. This was a correct view. 12. The third point contended was that reference to the Arbitration Board was made by the opposite-party only and not by both the Managing Committee of the School and the opposite-party. It was thus contended that the arbitrators could not proceed with the arbitration, and the only remedy available to the opposite party was to apply to the Court under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. It may here be mentioned that after the notice was given to the Managing Committee of the School, it participated in the arbitration proceeding right up to the making of the award. It was after the award was given that the Managing Committee thought of challenging the award. The learned Advocate for the applicants conceded before me that the law as laid down by this court is that where the parties not moving the arbitrator for making the award submit to his jurisdiction and participate in the arbitration proceeding, the reference shall be deemed to have been made by both the parties and the award, if made against them, cannot be challenged on the ground that at the initial stage only one of the parties had moved the arbitrator for making the award. Even then it was contend. ed that where there was lack of jurisdiction, the parties could not by consent confer jurisdiction on the arbitrator. Even then it was contend. ed that where there was lack of jurisdiction, the parties could not by consent confer jurisdiction on the arbitrator. It was said that where the arbitration agreement had not been signed and executed by all the parties to the dispute and the defect was removed after the making of the award, the award, which was ab-initio void, could not become valid. I agree that in case of an arbitration agreement not being signed by all the parties to the dispute before the arbitrator enters into arbitration the defect cannot be cured by a proper agreement being executed by all the parties at a late stage, say after the making of the award, but this rule cannot be made applicable to a case where parties not executing the arbitration agreement execute such an agreement before the arbitrator takes any effective step for arbitration. In the eye of law, all the parties shall be deemed to have executed the arbitration agreement when the remaining parties sign or execute the arbitration agreement and submit to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator. All the subsequent steps taken by the arbitrator would be at the instance of all the parties, and not only the parties who had executed the arbitration agreement in the first instance. 13. Similary, in a case of the present nature, it can be said that at the initial stage the Arbitration Board could not proceed with the arbitration, but when notice was served upon the present applicants and they put in appearance and participated in the proceeding, it can be assumed that with effect from this date all the parties to the dispute had applied to the arbitrator to proceed with the arbitration. The arbitration proceeding shall be valid from this date. In case the Arbitration Board had recorded evidence exparte or had deliberated before the notice was given to the present applicants and they submitted to the jurisdiction of the Board, it could be said that the award was invalid. In the instant case, however, the Arbitration Board entered into arbitration only after the present applicants had submitted to its jurisdiction to make the award. 14. The next point urged is that the application under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act was made after the expiry of the period of limitation. As already mention. ed above, it was alleged in para. 14. The next point urged is that the application under Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act was made after the expiry of the period of limitation. As already mention. ed above, it was alleged in para. 10 of the plaint that the award was being filed under the direction and authority of the arbitrator. There is nothing to show to the contrary. The legislature had not laid down any limitation for the filing of the award by the arbitrator, and hence an arbitrator can file an award even after the expiry of a long period. Section 14 (2) does not lay down how the arbitrator shall cause the award to be filed in Court. The arbitrator can send the award by post or file in Court personally or through another person. There was thus no legal defect in the arbitrator filing the award through a party to the dispute. 15. It was, however, contended before me that in view of Chapter XXXI rule 8 of the Rules of the Court, which have a statutory effect, the award could be filed by the arbitrator in accordance with this rule, and in no other manner. What Chapter 'XXI rule 8 of the Rules of the Court lays down is that where the award is filed by the arbitrators, they shall send to the Court under sealed cover the award or a signed copy thereof together with any proceedings, depositions or documents which may have been taken and proved before them. It is also necessary for the arbitrators to send with the award a copy of 'the notice given to the parties concerned under Section 14 (1) of the Act. The rule further provides that if a sealed cover is sent by post, it shall be sent under registered cover. To say that the arbitrators cannot file the award in any other manner would lead to absurdity, for example, if the arbitrator himself appears before the Court and files the award, not under a sealed cover, can the Court refuse to accept the award: The Court has the right to see the award and it can accept the award if not contained in a sealed cover. This rule has been incorporated to ensure that there is no possibility of forgery being committed in the award in case the arbitrator does not appear in Court personally for the filing of the award. This rule has been incorporated to ensure that there is no possibility of forgery being committed in the award in case the arbitrator does not appear in Court personally for the filing of the award. I am thus of opinion that Chapter XXXI, rule 8 of the Rules of the Court is merely directory and disregard of this rule cannot invalidate an award which is otherwise valid. 16. The last point contended was that the award was not caused to be filed by the members of the Arbitration Board, who had entered into arbitration, but had been filed by the members of the Standing Regional Arbitration Board as in existence in 1961. This contention is contrary to para. 27 of the written statement. Therein it was pleaded that the members of the Regional Arbitration Board who had entered into arbitration, had no right to authorise Isham Singh to file the present application under Section 14 of the Arbitration. Act. The case of the applicants then was that the Arbitration Board which had made the award had authorised the opposite-party to file the award. It is now contended to the contrary,namely, that the are the present members of the Arbitration Board who had authorised the opposite-party to file the award. No one can be permitted to depart from the pleading and hence any contention against the pleading cannot be permitted to be raised, all the more, in revision. 17. The revision has thus no force and it Is hereby dismissed with costs. Stay order is vacated.