Judgment :- 1. In this second appeal, on behalf of the 34th defendant appellant, Mr. Mohammed Naha, learned counsel challenges the concurrent decisions rendered by the subordinate courts As against the appellant, ignoring his claim to have the transaction under Ext. B 106 recognised, and rejecting the claim made by him for dismissal of the plaintiff's suit for partition. 2. It is necessary to state a few facts leading up to this litigation. One Malu was possessed of the suit properties, which are 6 in number. She died in 1938. Her husband is the 3rd defendant, and she left three sons and three daughters. The three sons are defendants 4 to 6, and the three daughters are Sarojini, Subhadra and the 1st defendant. We are particularly referring to the names of the two daughters because it is necessary to advert to and deal with the contention that has been raised by Mr. Naha, learned counsel for the appellant that the plaint has not been properly verified and signed according to law. The present suit was instituted on 16th July 1954 by Sarojini, one of the daughters of Malu. The suit itself was for partition and separate possession of her 1/3 share in the suit properties. Her claim was that the suit properties belonged to her mother Malu and they are her Sthreedhanam properties, and that the heirs to the said properties are herself and her two sisters, who were then defendants 1 and 2 to the action. That is, according to the plaintiff, neither her father, the 3rd defendant, nor her brothers, defendants 4 to 6, have any right or title to these properties left by her mother. 3. After the suit was filed by Sarojini, it is seen that the original 2nd defendant, namely Subhadra, filed an application, I. A. 2167/56, for transposing her as additional plaintiff to the action. The prayer in the said application appears to be very losely worded, and the application itself purports to be one under O. XIII, R.7, which is obviously a mistake, and it can only be an application under O. I, R.10. But whatever it is notwithstanding certain objections that appear to have been raised by the other parties, the application filed by Subhadra, the 2nd defendant, to transpose her as plaintiff was ordered by the court. But whatever it is notwithstanding certain objections that appear to have been raised by the other parties, the application filed by Subhadra, the 2nd defendant, to transpose her as plaintiff was ordered by the court. In particular, it is seen that the original plaintiff, namely Sarojini, does not appear to have had any objection to the application filed by her sister Subhadra being allowed. But ultimately, as the plaint as it now stands, it is seen that Subhadra has been transposed as plaintiff, and the original plaintiff who instituted the suit, namely Sarojini, was transposed as the 2nd defendant. As to how exactly it happened, we are not able to find out from the records. Therefore, as it is, the suit is now continued by Subhadra, by. virtue of the order passed in I. A. 2167/56. 4. The 3rd defendant, namely the father of the plaintiff, and the brothers of the plaintiff, namely defendants 4 to 6, raised a contention that according to customary law applicable to Thiyyas of South Malabar, the properties of Malu devolved on her male heirs, and that the daughters are not entitled to any share is those properties. The 34th defendant, who is the appellant in this Second Appeal, claims to be an alienee of item 2 from defendants 3 to 6, by virtue of the transaction Ext. B 106 dated 29101947. The appellant appears to have also raised another contention that the suit itself is barred by limitation and adverse possession and therefore the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief whatsoever. 5. Both the subordinate courts have considered these aspects; and ultimately, based more or less on the admissions made by the 3rd defendant, the father of the plaintiff, as D. W.1, came to the conclusion that the 3rd defendant was in possession and management of the properties of Malu even during her life time, and that even after her death, till 1946 the 3rd defendant was utilising the income accruing from the properties for the maintenance and marriage expenses of his daughters, namely the plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2, and that according to the evidence of D. W.1, prior to 1946 the daughters had confidence in him that he would not act adverse to their interest. On these admissions, both the subordinate courts came to the conclusion that, if at all, the very first act of the 3rd defendant, which can be considered to be adverse to the interest of the daughters, must be considered to have been done by the father, only in 1946 when he executed a mortgage in favour of one Karappan, which is recited in the transaction Ext. B 106 of 1947 in favour of the present appellant. Therefore, the plea of adverse possession raised by the appellant was negatived by both the subordinate courts. The appellant appears to have resisted the claim for mesne profits. So far as that is concerned, both the lower courts have again, made the appellant liable to pay mesne profits in respect of item 2, which is in his possession, from the date of purchase. The appellant also appears to have made a claim for value of improvements; but that again was not accepted by the subordinate courts. 6. Mr. Mohammed Naha, learned counsel for the appellant no doubt contested all the findings recorded as against his client by both the subordinate courts. But before we discuss the attack levelled by the learned counsel as against those findings, it must be pointed out that incidentally the counsel pointed out that after Subhadra, the present plaintiff, was transposed as a defendant, there has been no proper verification of the plaint by that party. We do not propose to embark on an enquiry into this aspect, because the claim made and the reliefs asked for by any of the daughters of Malu, are identically the same. Further, we find that the appellant does not appear to have raised this contention before the lower appellate court where he was the appellant. Therefore we do not propose to permit the appellant to raise this contention for the first time, which must be considered to have been abandoned before the lower court. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that in this case there is evidence to show that the 3rd defendant, along with his sons, has been executing leases and utilising the profits accruing from the properties exclusively for themselves and those acts must be considered to be hostile to the interest of the daughters. 7. The learned counsel for the appellant pointed out that in this case there is evidence to show that the 3rd defendant, along with his sons, has been executing leases and utilising the profits accruing from the properties exclusively for themselves and those acts must be considered to be hostile to the interest of the daughters. Therefore the learned counsel pointed out that inasmuch as the 1st defendant had become a major in 1934 and the 2nd defendant as early as 1937, the suit not having been instituted within three years of their attaining majority even though they were aware that their father and brothers were not recognising any right or title in the daughters must be considered to be barred by limitation. There is considerable difficulty in accepting this contention of the learned counsel. As pointed out by Mr. Sen, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff respondent, it is seen that even according to the admission made by the 3rd defendant as D. W.1, he has categorically stated that till 1946 he was managing the properties on behalf of his daughters, namely the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2, and that he never exhibited any interest adverse to those persons till 1946. The further answer of the witness, which has been extracted by the trial court, is to the effect that up to 1946, the daughters were also affectionate towards him, and he was utilising the income from the suit properties for the purpose of maintaining the daughters and for their marriage expenses. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to satisfy us that the evidence given by D. W.1 has in any manner been misunderstood by the subordinate courts, or that the answers attributed to him have not been actually given by the said witness. If that is so, it follows that even according to the 3rd defendant, who is one of the assignors under Ext. B 106 of item 2 in favour of the appellant, adverse possession, if at all, can be considered to start only from 1946; and the suit has been instituted on 16 71954. If that is so, it follows that even according to the 3rd defendant, who is one of the assignors under Ext. B 106 of item 2 in favour of the appellant, adverse possession, if at all, can be considered to start only from 1946; and the suit has been instituted on 16 71954. If that is so, the burden of proving acquisition of title by adverse possession being on the person who sets up that case, it follows that the appellant has miserably failed to establish that plea; and the hostile title, if at all, having started only from 1946, the suit instituted within 12 years from that date is perfectly within time. Therefore the finding of the subordinate courts that the suit is not barred by limitation and adverse possession has to be confirmed. 8. The learned counsel for the appellant then raised a contention that his client should not be made liable for mesne profits at all. The contention of the learned counsel appears to be that even the plaintiff has stated in the plaint that the appellant is holding some property under the 3rd defendant. Whatever it is, ultimately the evidence in the case discloses that the appellant has purchased item 2 under Ext. B 106 dated 29101947. If that is so, the decree for the period making him liable for mesne profits is, in our opinion, perfectly justified; and that finding also does not require interference at our hands. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant further urged that his client must be considered to be a 'tenant' as that expression is defined in S.2 (d) (iii) of the Kerala Compensation for Tenants Improvements Act, 1958 (Kerala Act XXIX of 1958), hereinafter to be referred to as the Act. In particular, the learned counsel placed reliance on clause (iii) of S.2(d), wherein it is stated that "tenant" will include "a person who comes into possession of land belonging to another person and makes improvements thereon in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements". In this case it is the claim of the appellant that he has come into possession of land belonging to another person, namely the plaintiff and her two sisters, and that he has made improvements thereon in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements. In this case it is the claim of the appellant that he has come into possession of land belonging to another person, namely the plaintiff and her two sisters, and that he has made improvements thereon in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements. It is not possible for us to accept the claim of the appellant to treat him as a tenant. In this case it is not the appellant's case that item 2 has been sold to him by the father, the 3rd defendant, recognising any title in his daughters; but on the other hand, the properties have been sold on the assumption that they are owned by the father, the 3rd defendant, and his sons, defendants 4 to 6; and they have completely ignored the title of the daughters, namely the plaintiff and defendants 1 and 2. On the other hand the finding of the subordinate courts is that the suit properties are Sthreedhanam properties of Malu and the legal heirs to those properties are only her daughters. If that is so, the sale deed purported to have been executed by defendants 3 to 6 in favour of the appellant under Ext. B 106 passes no title whatsoever in favour of the appellant, and it is a totally void sale deed which the appellant has taken at his own risk. Therefore, when a person like the appellant chooses to take a transaction from a person who has no title to it whatsoever, he cannot be considered to be a person who has made any purchase whatsoever. 10. No doubt the learned counsel for the appellant referred us to the decision of Sankaran, C. J., and Govinda Menon, J., reported in Veerasikku Gounder v. Kurian (1960 KLT. 219) wherein the learned Chief justice, speaking on behalf of the Court, has recognised an alienee from a karnavan of a tarwad and which alienation is ultimately set aside at the instance of a junior member, as a person satisfying the definition of 'tenant' in S.2 (d) (iii) of the Act. 219) wherein the learned Chief justice, speaking on behalf of the Court, has recognised an alienee from a karnavan of a tarwad and which alienation is ultimately set aside at the instance of a junior member, as a person satisfying the definition of 'tenant' in S.2 (d) (iii) of the Act. The reasoning of the learned Chief Justice in that case is that such an alienee under a transaction, which could be avoided by parties interested, must be deemed to be in possession of land under another person who continues to be the real owner of the property in respect of the voidable sale which had come into existence. The further reasoning of the learned Chief Justice is that such a vendee, who has to surrender possession of the property under these circumstances, is to be considered a 'tenant' under S.2 (d) (iii) of the Act and any improvements effected by such vendee on the land covered by the sale must be taken to have been effected by him in the bona fide belief that he is entitled to make such improvements because of the existence of the sale in his favour. 11. In our opinion, that decision does not in any manner assist the appellant in this case at all. The appellant, as we have already pointed out is purchaser of property from a person who had no title to it whatsoever, and therefore the possession of the appellant under such a purchase has been without any right what soever. If that is so, the definition of the expression 'tenant' in S.2 (d) (iii) of the Act will not take in a person like the appellant. Therefore this contention of the learned counsel has also to be rejected. 12. The result is that this Second Appeal fails and is dismissed. But there will be no order as to costs. Allowed. Dismissed.