JUDGMENT :- If the facts of this case are properly understood, the question involved will automatically resolve itself; and then it will be clear that the decision of the lower courts is erroneous. 2. The suit property was sold by the plaintiff-appellant and her husband, now deceased, in 1103 to the father of defendants 2 to 6. There were then two encumbrances on the suit property and another property remaining in the possession of the vendors. They were the decree debt in O.S. No. 305 of 1104 and a mortgage debt to an Itty Mathai. The vendee was directed under the document to discharge both the debts; but, he did not discharge the second encumbrance, the mortgage debt. To discharge the first encumbrance, the decree debt, the vendee executed another mortgage to Iype Koshi, Iype Koshy filed O. S. No. 737 of 1108 and obtained a decree. Itty Mathai assigned his mortgage to a Koruthu Varkey; and he filed O.S. No.849 of 1109. To the former suit neither the appellant, nor the subsequent encumbrancer, nor his assignee was a party. In execution of that decree the suit property was brought to sale, sold and taken delivery by Iype Koshy. His son is the first defendant, who is the contesting respondent in the second appeal; and he got the suit property from his father. The decree in O.S. No. 849 of 1109 was naturally against the suit property and the other property remaining in the possession of the appellant; and in execution of that decree the property in the possession of the appellant was sought to be proceeded against, when she paid off the decree debt to save her property. Thereafter, she brought the suit giving rise to the second appeal for contribution. 3. The trial court granted a decree against the assets of their father in the, hands of defendants 2 to 6. In other words, the trial court dismissed the suit against the suit property in the hands of the first defendant, which was the subject-matter of the sale by the appellant and her husband. This decree has been confirmed in appeal by the lower appellate court. 4. In other words, the trial court dismissed the suit against the suit property in the hands of the first defendant, which was the subject-matter of the sale by the appellant and her husband. This decree has been confirmed in appeal by the lower appellate court. 4. It is clear from the facts stated above that the appellant and her husband transferred the suit property to the father of defendants 2 to 6 directing by the document itself that the vendee should discharge both the encumbrances existing on the suit property and the property in the possession of the vendors. It was that property with the said liability to discharge the encumbrances that was purchased by the first defendant's father in court auction. It is obvious that in a case where the mortgagor transfers a part of the mortgaged properties, subject to the mortgage, and retains the rest, the prima facie rule is that the mortgage debt, as between the transferor and the transferee, should be borne rateably between them. If the mortgagee, who is not bound by the agreement between the mortgagor and his vendee, proceeds against the remaining property still in the possession of the vendor (the mortgagor), the mortgagor is, entitled to claim contribution from the other item sold to his vendee with the specific direction that the vendee should discharge the encumbrances. Therefore, it is clear that the appellant is entitled to get contribution from the item sold to the father of defendants 2 to 6. 5. The only further question is whether the suit property is liable to contribute only rateably or to pay the entire amount. That depends on the contract between the parties, as is evident from S. 82 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with contributions. In the case before me the vendee was directed to discharge both the liabilities; and therefore, the agreement between the parties was that the vendee should discharge the entire liability. It follows that the appellant is entitled to get the entire money paid by her from the property in the possession of the first defendant. It is only equitable that it should be so, because the appellant and her husband took only a portion of the price leaving the rest with the vendee to discharge the encumbrances. It follows that the appellant is entitled to get the entire money paid by her from the property in the possession of the first defendant. It is only equitable that it should be so, because the appellant and her husband took only a portion of the price leaving the rest with the vendee to discharge the encumbrances. It cannot also be said that the purchaser at the court auction is a bona fide purchaser for full value, because the liability to discharge the encumbrances was mentioned in the document of sale itself. 6. A dispute is raised regarding the interest claimed by the appellant. But, it appears from the written statement of the first defendant that the rate of interest was not disputed. Therefore, there is no substance in this contention either. 7. I may in conclusion mention that the propositions applicable in such cases are laid down in the English case In re, Mainwaring; Mainwaring v. Verden, 1937-1 Ch. 96. The third proposition therein applies to the present case. I may also say that I had occasion to consider this question in Cheeru Elayachi v. Seemon Chacko, S. A. No. 671 of 1961: (AIR 1966 Ker 139). 8. The second appeal is allowed, and the decision of the lower courts is modified. A decree against the assets of their father in the hands of defendants 2 to 6 and also against the suit property with, costs throughout is granted in favour of the appellant. Appeal allowed.