JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is by the tenant and it arises out of a suit for ejectment the suit was brought on February 8, 1957. It is, admittedly, governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and the grounds, taken under that Act, were (i) requisite defaults in payment of rent, (ii) unlawful subletting and (iii) damages to the disputed property. In the course of the suit, there was a proceeding under Sec. 17 (3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 for striking out the defence against ejectment. That proceeding ended in favour of the landlord after the matter had been taken up to this Court in Civil Rule No. 3508 of 1957 and the tenant's defence against ejectment was struck out. Thereafter, it appears on the date of hearing, the tenant filed his hazira but, possibly, he did not take any further steps with the result that the matter was heard exparte and, on the exparte evidence of the plaintiffs, the learned trial Judge decreed the plaintiffs' suit. From this decree, the present appeal has been preferred by the tenant defendant. In support of the appeal, Mr. Sinha urged first that the notice of ejectment (Ext. 1) is defective in law as it is not a notice of suit as required under sec. 13 (6) of the above Act. On a reading of the said notice, however, we are unable to uphold Mr. Sinha's contention. The last paragraph of the said notice apprises the tenant as follows: "You are therefore called upon to quit, vacate and deliver up peaceful vacant possession of the above premises No. 26 Machuabazar Street, Calcutta, to my clients- your landlords, on the expiry of 31. 1. 1957, or else the instructions are to adopt legal proceedings against you without further reference and to hold you liable for all costs and damages that may be incurred and suffered by my client. " 2. IT is abundantly clear from this passage that the legal proceedings contemplated, therein, in the context of what precedes the threatened adoption o3 such legal proceedings and also what fallows, cannot be anything else than a suit for eviction. The demand was for delivery of possession and the legal proceedings, as threatened, were to be in default of compliance with the said demand. The demand was for delivery of possession and the legal proceedings, as threatened, were to be in default of compliance with the said demand. The legal proceedings contemplated involved, again, a claim for costs and damages which obviously excluded criminal proceedings, if any such procedings would have been otherwise relevant or available, with the result that, by necessary implication, a suit for eviction was contemplated by the landlords or, in other words, that there was the necessary threat of suit for eviction, as required under sec. 13 (6) of the above Act. We accordingly, overruled the submission of Mr. Sinha on the point of alleged defects in the notice of ejectment. Mr. Sinha then urges that, on the materials before the Court, the finding on the question of service of this notice on the appellant ought to have been in the negative. The notice appears to have been served by registered post and the acknowledgment or acknowledgments have all come back, though two of them are signed by one Abdul Latif on behalf of the appellant and the third purports to bear the signature of the appellant himself. 3. ON the authority of the decision of the Judicial Committee, reported in (1) Harihar Banerjee and others v. Ramsashi Roy and others, 45 I. A. 222, the above must be accepted as sufficient proof of service on the appellant. A grievance was made before us by Mr. Sinha that his client, if he had an opportunity, could have proved that the above Abdul Latif had no authority to receive notice or notices on his behalf and the appellant's purported signature on the third acknowledgment was not his. As we have said, however, the appellant's written statement was struck out and, although a hazira was filed by him on the date of hearing, no step was taken by him and no attempt was made on his behalf to place any materials before the Court. We do not know whether his prayer in that behalf would have been accepted by the court below but, as no such prayer was mode before the court at the date of hearing, we cannot soy that the proceedings before the court below were in any way defective. We do not know whether his prayer in that behalf would have been accepted by the court below but, as no such prayer was mode before the court at the date of hearing, we cannot soy that the proceedings before the court below were in any way defective. We would, accordingly, hold that the learned trial Judge was justified, in the circumstances of this case, in finding in favour of due service of the notice of ejectment on the appellant and Mr. Sinha's contention to the contrary must be overruled, mr. Sinha then argued that, if the suit is to be decreed only on the ground of default, his client would be entitled to relief against forfeiture under sec. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act and his client was prepared to avail himself of that opportunity in this Court. For this purpose, he relies on the recent decision dated 16'17th November, 1964, of our learned brother P. B. Mukharji, J. in C. R. 1158 of 1963 (Deo Chand Singh v. Shah Mohammad) for entitling his client to the above relief. 4. IN the instant case, however, it is not necessary for us to decide the point whether relief against forfeiture under Sec. 114 of the Transfer of Property Act would be available in a case like the present if the decree is to stand only on the ground of default in payment of rent, as the instant decree purports to be based not only on the ground of default of rent but also on the ground of unlawful subletting and damages to the demised property. There is some evidence in support of the latter grounds and it cannot be said that the decree on these grounds is based on no evidence, in the circumstances, the above question as to applicability of sec. 114 to cases of decrees for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, need not be considered by us, although we may record that Mr. 114 to cases of decrees for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, need not be considered by us, although we may record that Mr. Sircar, appearing on behalf of the respondents, has drawn our attention to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of (2) Mangilal v. Sugan Chand Rathi (Deceased) and after him his heirs and legal representatives and another, A. I. R. 1956 S. C. 101 at p, 106, which apparently at least, may militate against the grant or availability of such relief, that is, of relief under sec. 114 of the Transfer of Properly Act in the above type of cases of ejectment. In the above view, we would uphold the decree of the learned trial Judge and dismiss this appeal but, having regard to the circumstances, now prevailing in the city in the matter of residential accommodation, we would give the defendant appellant time in the first instance unconditionally until April next to quit and vacate the disputed premises, to be enlarged to a period, ending with the expiry of April, 1956 on condition that the appellant petitioner deposits in the trial court to the credit of the decree-holder respondents a sum of Rs. 2,250/- (Rupees two thousand two hundred and fifty) only on account of arrears of rents or mesne profits, as the case may be, and the decretal costs within November next and also goes on depositing, in the same court, to the same credit, month by month, regularly, according to the English Calendar, on account of current mesne profits, a sum of Rs. 67/- per month, within the 15th of the next succeeding month according to the same calendar and, in default of either the above deposits of Rs. 2,250/-, as directed hereinbefore, or any two of the monthly deposits mentioned above, this decree for eviction will become executable at once and the above provision for the beyond April, 1965, will automatically lapse. There will be no order for costs in this Court.