Research › Browse › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

1965 DIGILAW 364 (ALL)

Jagdish Prasad v. Allah Dia

1965-09-15

B.DAYAL, D.D.SETH

body1965
JUDGMENT B. Dayal, J. - This election petition has been referred to this Division Bench by a learned single Judge of this Court. The petitioner Jagdish Pd. was elected Sarpanch of the Nyaya Panchayat Amanabad in the elections held on the 29 the of August, 1962. Respondent No. 1 Allah Dia was the rival candidate. After the elections, Allah Dia filed an election petition on the 15th of October, 1962. The petition was thus made more than thirty days after the elections which took place on the 29th of August, 1962 but within 45 days of such elections. An objection was taken that the election petition was beyond time as the time for making such petitions was 30 days under Rule 26 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Rules, The contention of the respondent was that the election petition was within time as under Rule 24 of the said Rules 45 days was prescribed for making a petition. This contention of the respondent was accepted by the Sub-Divisional Officer and hence this petition. 2. The whole argument depends upon an interpretation of Sec. 12-D and 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act read with Rules 24, 26 and 83-B of the Rules framed thereunder. Sec. 12-C merely prescribes for applications challenging election petitions of a Pradhan of the Gaon Sabha or as a member of the Gaon Panchayat including the election of a person appointed as a Panch of the Nyaya Panchayat. Sec. 12-D, however, applies for election of Up-Pradhan, Sarpanch and Sahayak Sarpanch. The present one being the case of the election of the Sarpanch, Sec. 12-D is applicable. The provisions of Sec. 12-D of the said Act are as follows: "The provisions of Sec. 12-C shall mutatis mutandis apply to the election of a person as Up-Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha or as Sarpanch or Sahayak Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat." 3. Therefore, for challenging the elections of a Sarpanch the provisions of Sec. 12-C have been applied with necessary changes. The relevant part of Sec. 12-C, so far as the question of limitation for making an application is concerned, is as follows: "The election . .shall not be called in question except by an application presented to such authority within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed on the grounds that.........." 4. The limitation, therefore, depends upon the rules prescribed for that purpose. .shall not be called in question except by an application presented to such authority within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed on the grounds that.........." 4. The limitation, therefore, depends upon the rules prescribed for that purpose. Rule 24 says that an application under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 12-C of the Act shall be presented before the Sub-Divisional Officer within whose jurisdiction the Sabha concerned lies within 45 days after the day on which the result of the election in question is announced. Rule 24, therefore, is a general rule applicable to an application made under Sec. 12-C. We think that the present application was under section 12-D and not 12-C. Rule 83-B, however, is the specific rule and provides:- "In any dispute regarding election of a person as Sarpanch or Sahayak Sarpanch the provisions of Rule 26, shall mutatis mutandis apply." 5. Rule 83-B being a specific rule for challenging election of a Sarpanch must have precedence over Rule 24. Thus rule 26 which prescribes 30 days for an application challenging the election is made applicable. 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent was that Rule 83-B had been framed before the Amendment of Sec. 12-D which completely recast it and Sec. 12-C had been made applicable by implications. Therefore, this rule must be deemed to be redundant now. We are unable to accept this contention. The rule having been regained and being not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, as it now stands, must have been retained with a purpose and we, therefore, see no force in the argument that it has become redundant. We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion that 30 days rule prescribed under Rule 26 is applicable to the present election petition. The election petition was, therefore, barred by time. 7. The petition is accordingly allowed, the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated the 7th of February 1963 is quashed and all proceedings under the election petition are also quashed. Petition allowed.