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1965 DIGILAW 365 (ALL)

Tarif Elahi v. Lal Dei

1965-09-15

B.DAYAL, D.D.SETH

body1965
JUDGMENT B. Dayal, J. - This second appeal has been referred for decision to a Division Bench by a learned single Judge of this Court as an important question of interpretation of Section 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was involved. The facts are not in dispute and may be stated shortly as follows. 2. The Plaintiff Respondent purchased a house on 3rd March 1958. The tenant of the house at that time was Ehsan Elahi on Rs. 30/- per month. He fell into arrears from the 1st of June 1958 to the 28th of February 1959 and a notice u/s 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was served upon him early in March 1959. Thereafter on the 22nd of October 1959 a notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was served upon his son Taril Elahi as in the meanwhile Ehsan Ilahi died on the 8th or 9th of September 1959 and Tarif Elahi his son had inherited the tenancy. This notice was served on the 28th of October 1959. Two money orders were sent by Tarif Elahi but were refused. The present suit was then filed for the ejectment of Tarif Elahi Defendant on the ground of the default having been made by his father Ehsan Elahi, inspite of service of notice u/s 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. 3. The contention raised by the Defendant was that no notice u/s 3 having been served on Tarif Ilahi, who was being ejected for default made by his father, he was entitled to protection u/s 3 of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act. The learned single Judge, who heard the case, was also doubtful whether the Defendant inherited any tenancy rights in the property and could be called a tenant of the property. This question was further elaborated by the learned Counsel for the Respondent in this Court and it was contended that there was no heritable tenancy in Ehsan Ilahi and, therefore, Tarif Elahi, did not inherit any tenancy lights. Reli ance was placed on Raman Lal Vs. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1950 All 583 . 4. Two points, therefore, are to be considered in this case: (1) whether Tarif Elahi inherited tenancy rights from his father Ehsan Elahi ? Reli ance was placed on Raman Lal Vs. Bhagwan Das, AIR 1950 All 583 . 4. Two points, therefore, are to be considered in this case: (1) whether Tarif Elahi inherited tenancy rights from his father Ehsan Elahi ? and (2) whether he was entitled to a fresh notice u/s 3 of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act or he was bound by the default made by his father and no fresh notice was necessary to be served upon him ? 5. On the first question we have given careful consideration to the observations of the learned Judges who decided the case mentioned above but we are unable to come to the same conclusion. It was held in that case that a person who could be ejected by service of a month's notice terminable on any day (not necessarily the last day of tenancy) was a tenant at will and that tenancy could not be inherited. We think that a person whose tenancy has to be terminated by service of a formal notice for whatever period it may be is not a tenant at will. A tenant at will under the English law is nothing more than a licensee under the Indian law. It is a personal relationship between a landlord and the tenant and that relationship can be terminated either by the landlord or by the tenant by a mere expression of intention. It may be oral or even implied. We, however, need not elaborate this point any further beyond referring to Woodfall on Landlord and Tenant, 25th Edn. page 303, paragraph 740 and page 306, paragraph 747. It will also be useful to look into Wheeler v. Mercer (2) (1956 (3) All ER 631) in which the House of Lords had to consider whether a tenant at will was included within the terms of the particular Act which they were considering and they particularly distinguished a tenant at will on the ground that under the Act a notice was necessary to terminate the tenancy, while the relationship of landlord and tenant in a tenancy at will was a only personal relationship and no notice was necessary to bring to an end that relationship. We would have had to refer this matter to a larger Bench if it were necessary to decide this point finally but in the present case the view which we are taking on the second point makes it unnecessary to do so. 6. We, therefore, come to the next question for consideration. The important words of the section are as follows: No suit shall...be filed in a civil court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds: (a) that the tenant is in arrears of rent for more than three months and has failed to pay the same to the landlord within one month of the service upon him of a notice of demand. 7. On a consideration of the scheme of the Act it is quite clear that this temporary Act was passed in order to protect tenants and to curtail the general right of the landlord to evict tenants given to him under the Transfer of Property Act This restriction on the right of the landlord to get possession over his property and to terminate tenancy is, therefore, to be construed strictly. If a landlord has found the tenant to be in arrears of rent and he has served him with the notice required by Sub-section (a) of Section 3 quoted above the bar against the landlord bringing a suit for his ejectment is removed and the landlord and tenant are relegated to their original position under the Transfer of Property Act as if the temporary Act was not applicable to them. If after the removal of this bar that tenancy is inherited by the present Appellant then there is no good reason in principle to hold that although the bar had been removed in favour of the landlord against the ejectment of his tenant yet the bar was re-imposed even though the heir who inherited the tenancy rights can only step into the shoes of the last tenant and a fortiori the bar having already been removed he would not be entitled to a further protection under this temporary Act. 8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant mainly was that the Act requires service of notice upon the tenant who is to be ejected and he particularly emphasized the words "service upon him" used in the last phrase quoted above. 8. The contention of the learned Counsel for the Appellant mainly was that the Act requires service of notice upon the tenant who is to be ejected and he particularly emphasized the words "service upon him" used in the last phrase quoted above. "Him" here naturally refers to the tenant who is in arrears and it does not necessarily refer to the individual person against wham the suit is ultimately filed. We are, therefore, of opinion that the bar having been removed against Ehsan Elahi it is not reimposed in favour of Tarif Elahi and he is bound by the default of his predecessor. A very similar point arose for decision in R. Dayal v. Smt. Mohania (3) (1963 AWR 175). In that case permission to eject a tenant had been obtained by the landlord. After the permission had been obtained he filed a suit against the tenant but that suit was dismissed upon the ground that the tenancy had not been terminated by a valid notice u/s 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The landlord then filed a fresh suit. By that time the previous tenant had died and the second suit was filed against the heir. A question was then raised that the permission having been obtained against the previous tenant was not available against his heir who was the tenant when the second suit was filed. The learned Judges, who decided the case, held that there was no sub stance in this contention. The bar created by Section 3 of the Temporary Act having been removed in favour of the landlord he was entitled to file a suit against any body who succeeded to the tenancy and stepped into the shoes of the previous tenant. We think that the same principle is applicable to the removal of bar by default also. The bar having once been removed the heir cannot claim a better right than his predecessor. 9. We, therefore, see no force in this appeal and dismiss it with costs. The stay order is vacated.