JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - The petitioners, Hiralal and others, are according to their case owners of premises no. R. T. 16 (old) 133/241 (new) and No. 28 (old) 133/238 (new), situate in Juhi Ratoopurwa, Kanpur. According to them the value of premises no. R. T. 16 (old) 133/241 (new) is Rs. 2,94,950/- and that of premises no. R. T. 28(old) 133/238 (new) is Rs. 1,98,080/-. It is also alleged that the market value of the land is Rs. 50/- per square yard.' In the year 1920 the Improvement Trust, Kanpur, framed a city expansion scheme called the "Southern City Expansion Scheme No. 1I", under the provisions of the U. P. Town Improve meat Act 1919 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This scheme was notified under Section 36 of the Act in the U. P. Gazette dated 17th, 24th and 31st July 1920. The notification under Section 40(3) of the Act was published in the U. P. Gazette dated 25th of December 1920 and 1st January 1921. It was stated in this notification that the scheme had been submitted to the State Government for sanction. In the U. P. Gazette dated 8-1-1921 a notification dated 7-1-1921 was issued to the effect that the scheme had been sanctioned under Section 42(l) of the Act. Thereafter on 19-10-1956 the Land Acquisition Officer, Kanpur Development Board, issued a notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of the aforesaid premises. In respect of premises no. R. T. 16 (old) 133/241 (new) case no. 332/1954-55 was registered and in respect of R. T. 28 (old) 133/238 (new) case no. 344/1954-55 was registered. On receipt of the notice under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act the petitioners made an application to the Administrator, Kanpur Development Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board) under Section 71(2) (a) of the Kanpur Urban Area Development Act, 1945, (hereinafter referred to as the Development Act) for abandonment of the acquisition of the premises. The petitioners also submitted to the Board for its approval a lay-out for the development of the aforesaid premises prepared by themselves. On 18-8-1958 the Land Acquisition Officer made an order which reads: "Put up today. As almost all the proceedings have been completed, write to the Development Board, to deposit estimated cost in Treasury within 15 days, failing which the case will be closed and consigned in the record room. On 18-8-1958 the Land Acquisition Officer made an order which reads: "Put up today. As almost all the proceedings have been completed, write to the Development Board, to deposit estimated cost in Treasury within 15 days, failing which the case will be closed and consigned in the record room. Put up file on 8-9-1958 for further hearing." 2. It appears that the Board did not deposit the cost with the result that on 8-9-1958 the Land Acquisition Officer passed an order that, the costs not having been deposited, they cases be consigned to the recorder room. But soon thereafter notices for the hearing of claims under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act were again issued to the petitioners. The material on the record does not clearly show as to whether or not the petitioners appeared before the Land Acquisition Officer on receipt of the notice mentioned above. The Land Acquisition Officer has now given his award. 3. The prayer in the petition is that all proceedings pending before the Land Acquisition Officer as also the award made by him in respect of the aforesaid premises be quash ed. There is also a prayer for the issue of a writ, direction or order in the nature of writ of mandamus "restraining the opposite parties from acquiring the aforesaid premises of the petitioners Nos. R. T. 16 (old) 133/241 (new) and R. T. 28 (old) 133/238 (new) situate in Juhi Rat, toopurwa, Kanpur or from inter) inferring with the possession of the petitioners on the said premises in any way". In addition there is the usual prayer for the grant of any other relief which this Court may, in the circumstances of the case, deem fit and proper. 4. Mr. S. C. Khare, the learned counsel,for the petitioner, has made the following two submissions before us : 1. That the scheme not having been executed forthwith must be deemed to have lapsed or to have been abandoned. 2. That the provisions relating to the payment compensation in the Act, the Development Act and the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam (here in after referred to as the Adhiniyam) arc ultra vires, being hit by Articles 14 and 31 of the Constitution of India. We will take the submissions seriatim. 5. Admittedly the scheme is known as the "Southern City Expansion Scheme No, 11". We will take the submissions seriatim. 5. Admittedly the scheme is known as the "Southern City Expansion Scheme No, 11". Section 42(l) of the Act provides that "except in the case of a deferred street scheme, development scheme, or town expansion scheme, the Trust shall forthwith proceed to execute the same". The present scheme, being a city expansion scheme, is excepted from the provisions of Section 42 of the Act. Consequently the learned counsel for the petitioners is not justified in submit in a that the Board should have proceeded forthwith to execute the scheme. No other provision either in the Act or the Development Act r the Adhiniyam has been brought o our notice which requires the board to proceed forthwith to execute the scheme. Besides there is nothing to show that there has been any unnecessary delay in the execution of the scheme. We, therefore, overrule the first submission of the learned counsel. 6. The provisions for payment of compensation in the Act, the Development Act and the Adhiniyam are in the same words. It is the admitted position that compensation for The acquisition of property either under the Act or under the Development Act or under the Adhiniyam is to be computed on the basis of the .value of the property on the date of the notification under Section 36 of the Act or the corresponding provisions of the Development Act or the Adhiniyam. There is thus one common yard-stick to measure or cane common principle to determine the compensation payable to all those whose property is being acquired. Mr. Khare's complaint is that ; even though it is true that there is one common yard-stick, yet since the properties of all the persons are not acquired simultaneously, persons like the petitioners, whose property re being acquired in the year 1958 or 1960, should receive higher compensation than those whose proper y was acquired earlier. because during the interval the prices of properties have risen. because during the interval the prices of properties have risen. In other words, the submission of the learned counsel is that the value of the properties in 1958 or 1960 being higher, compensation paid to their on the basis of the value operating on the date of the notification not be adequate compensation and that in any case the petitioners and those like them would be losing property of a higher value than those persons whose property was acquired in close proximity to the date of the notification under Section 36 of the Act or the corresponding provisions of the Development Act or the Adhiniyam. 7. In our judgment, there is no substance in this submission of the learned counsel. All persons whose property is acquired are treated alike. It is obvious that in protracted proceedings for the acquisition of properties in connection with a very large scheme, awards for all the properties cannot be made simultaneously. In cases where no objection are made awards would be made immediately or soon after the notification but in cases where objections are made and evidence produced, the awards can be made only after a considerable passage of time from the date of the notification. There is a rational basis for treating the values operating on the date of notification to be the value of the property acquired, because it is the notification which gives notice to the party that his property would be acquired. In the present case there is a clear uniform and sound rule applicable to all the persons whose properties are being acquired, the rule being that the compensation shall be determined on the basis of the value of the property on the date of the notification. Mr. Khare has placed reliance upon Shri H.P. Khandewal v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1954 A.L.J. 673, Where the provisions of the U. P. Land Acquisition (Rehabilitation of Refugees) Act, 1948, came up for consideration. That Act provided that whatever may be the date of notification and whatever may be the date of the award, the compensation payable would be according to the value of the property on 1st day of September 1939. That Act provided that whatever may be the date of notification and whatever may be the date of the award, the compensation payable would be according to the value of the property on 1st day of September 1939. The submission made before the Division Bench was that inasmuch as under the Land Acquisition Act, which is the principal Act for the purposes of acquiring land in this country, the compensation is determined on the basis of the value of the property on the date of the notification, the provision in the Refugees Act for payment of compensation on the basis of the value operating on Ist of September 1939, which was arbitrarily chosen in order to benefit the Government, was onerous and for that reason there was a clear discrimination. The learned Judges took the view that there was no rational classification between the persons whose property was acquired under the provisions if the Land Acquisition Act and those whose property was being acquired under the provisions of the Refugees Act, and there was discrimination in so far as two yard-sticks were provided for measuring the compensation of persons similarly situated. In the present case we have already said that there are no two yard-sticks. We may point out that in the Land Acquisition Act also the compensation is to be paid on the value of the property operating on the date of the notification under Section 4 of that Act (see Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act). In our opinion, therefore, H. P. Khandewal's case' is clearly distinguishable. 8. Mr. Khare next placed reliance upon Jagdatt Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1962 Allahabad 606, which was a case under Section 9(1) of the Acquisition of Property (Flood Relief) Temporary Powers Act. The question before the Bench was as to whether the compensation provided in the Acquisition of Property (Flood Relief) a Temporary Powers Act was compensation within the meaning of Section 299 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The Bench took the view that the compensation within the meaning of Section 299 of the Government of India Act meant the market value of the property acquired or sought, to be acquired. The Bench took the view that the compensation within the meaning of Section 299 of the Government of India Act meant the market value of the property acquired or sought, to be acquired. The provisions of Section 299 of the Government of India Act 19355 were very different from the provisions of Article 31 of the Constitution of India, as it now stands after the amendment, and whereas under the latter the question of the amount of compensation is no longer justiciable, under the former the courts were free to declare an Ac ultra vires if inadequate compensation was contemplated. This case is also, therefore, clearly distinguish able. 9. The learned counsel next placed reliance upon State of West Bengal v. Mrs. Bella Banerjee, A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 170, where the provisions of Section 8 of the West Ben gal Land Development and Planning Act came up for consideration. Under that provision the compensation was to be paid on the basis of the value of the property on the 31st of December 1936, irrespective of the date of notification as also of the date of the award. The learned Judges came to the conclusion that the Act being a 'Permanent enactment and it being possible to acquire land under it many years after it came into force, the fixing of the market value on December 31, 1935 as the ceiling on compensation under the latter part of the proviso to Section 8, without reference to the value if the land at the time of tho acquisition was arbitrary and could not be regarded as due compliance in letter and spirit with the requirement of Article 31 (2) of the Constitution of India. That case was similar to the ones reported in Shri H.P. Khandewal v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Jagdatt Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, in which an arbitrary date afar removed from the date or time of acquisition had been fixed. In the present case an arbitrary date has not been fixed. It is the value. on the date of the notification which would determine the amount of compensation. This is quite rational. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions relating to the determination or payment of compensation in the Act, the Development Act and the Adhiniyam are not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 10. With regard to Article 31 Mr. This is quite rational. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the provisions relating to the determination or payment of compensation in the Act, the Development Act and the Adhiniyam are not hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 10. With regard to Article 31 Mr. Khare had to concede that the quantum of compensation or the adequacy or inadequacy of the compensation was no longer justiciable. He, however, placed reliance upon D. Nanasivaya Iudaliar v. The State of Madras, AIR 1959 Madras 548. The Madras High Court took the view that "the effect of the amendment made to the Constitution in 1955 is to preclude the courts from going into the adequacy of the compensation provided. But, that amendment does not preclude the courts from considering whether what is called compensation is really compensation and whether what are claimed to be principles on the basis of which the compensation is to be computed are really principles of the kind envisaged in Article 31(2) of the, Constitution." We have already said that the principles of awarding compensation in the Act, the Development Act and the Adhiniyam are such to which no exception can be taken, because they provide for the determination of compensation on the basis of the value of the property on the date of notification. Actually Mr. Khare has not argued that the basis is wrong. What he has said is that the result is anomalous inasmuch as the owners of properties acquired soon after the date of notification did not actually suffer to the same extent as the owners of properties acquired long after the date of notification, because in the first case the value of the properties had not risen to the same extent as in the latter case where the value has considerably risen. In our opinion all that the Madras court held was that even after the amendment the Court could go into the question whether some compensation large or small had been paid and whether the provisions relating to compensation were not really illusory. They did not intend to hold that any question relating to the quantum of compensation was justiciable. In our opinion the Madras case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. In any case the Supreme Court in M/s Burrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 954 has held that the provisions of Article 31-A Cl. They did not intend to hold that any question relating to the quantum of compensation was justiciable. In our opinion the Madras case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. In any case the Supreme Court in M/s Burrakur Coal Co. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 954 has held that the provisions of Article 31-A Cl. (1) (e) bar the challenge to the validity of Sections 4 and 5 of the Act on the ground that they infringe the provisions of Article 31(2) of the Constitution, inasmuch as in Section 13 (4) which deals with the question of compensation there is no provision for payment of compensation for the deprivation of the right of a mine owner or a lessee to carry on his business for a period of two or three years. For the reasons mentioned above we are satisfied that there are no merits in the second submission of the learned counsel also. 11. As pointed out earlier under the provisions of Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act compensation is payable on the basis of the value of the property on the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Act. That provision has not been held to be violative either of Article 14 or of Article 31 of the Constitution of India on the ground that some people get their award under Section II of the Land Acquisition Act soon after the date of notification, while in the case of others the award comes long after. No other submission has been made before us. 12. We are satisfied that there are no merits in this' writ petition. It is accordingly' dismissed with costs. The stay order dated 29-1-1965 is vacated.