Veeraswami, J.- This appeal under the Letters Patent is from an order of Srinivasan, J., dismissing a petition to quash an order of the 1st respondent, dated 30th March, 1963, by which he framed certain additional charges against the appellant and pending enquiry into the charges, appointed the 2nd respondent as a fit person. In making the appointment, the first respondent considered that by reason of the suspension a temporary vacancy had occurred and it became necessary to act under section 54(2) and (3). He was mindful of the claims of the eldest son of the appellant but because he was at the time only 19 years of age and was a student studying in the IX Standard, he was considered to be not capable of managing the affairs of the temple. That is how he appointed the 2nd respondent, a stranger to the family of the appellant, as a fit person to carry on the functions of the hereditary trustee. There is no dispute that the office of trusteeship is hereditary and the administration of the temple ofavaneethakrishnaswami is governed by a Scheme settled by this Court in A.S. No. 165 of 1956. The appellant contended before the learned Judge that the first respondent, acting as he did under section 54(2) and (3) in appointing a fit person, misdirected himself and the order was therefore without jurisdiction. This contention did not find favour with the learned Judge. He was of the view that though the first respondent was not right in citing section 54(2) of Madras Act XXII of 1959, he had power to make the appointment under section 53(4). In the course of his order, the learned Judge also considered that an interim suspension pending an enquiry could not be said to give rise to a temporary vacancy within the meaning of section 54(2) and for this reason also, he considered that the proper section which would be applicable to appointment of a fit person in case of suspension pending an enquiry, was section 53(4). Before us, Mr. Before us, Mr. Vedantachari for the appellant argues that there being no dispute that the office of trusteeship in the temple is hereditary, and though the power to appoint a fit person in a contingency like this is provided for in section 53(4), the manner of making the appointment of a fit person is laid down in section 54(3) and it follows, therefore, that in appointing a fit person, the Deputy Commissioner concerned should have due regard to the claims of members of the family, if any, entitled to the succession. Learned Counsel urges that due regard in this case had not been paid by the first respondent to the claims of the eldest son of the appellant and that the grounds for eliminating him from appointment as a fit person were not tenable. Section 53 of the Act provides for power to suspend, remove or dismiss a trustee of a religious institution. Sub-section (2), while conferring the power, enumerates the grounds on which punishment of one or the other category can be imposed. Sub-section (3) prescribes the procedure to be followed in enquiries under subsection (2). Sub-section (4) reads: “Pending the disposal of the charges framed against the trustee, the appropriate authority may place the trustee under suspension and appoint a fit person to discharge the duties and perform the functions of the trustee.” Section 54 relates to filling up of vacancies in the office of hereditary trustee. The first part of the section is to the effect that when a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the hereditary trustee, the next in the line of succession shall be entitled to succeed to the office. A similar provision is made by sub-section (2) in respect of a temporary vacancy and it says that when such a vacancy occurs under subsection (2) of section 53, the next in the line of succession shall be entitled to succeed. Under these two sub-sections it may be noticed, the next in the line of succession is entitled to succeed as a matter of right. Sub-section (3.) covers filling up of permanent or temporary vacancies arising in certain other contingencies, one of them being when such a vacancy cannot be filled up immediately, and provides for appointment of a fit person to perform the functions of the trustee. Sub-section (3.) covers filling up of permanent or temporary vacancies arising in certain other contingencies, one of them being when such a vacancy cannot be filled up immediately, and provides for appointment of a fit person to perform the functions of the trustee. The subsection has an Explanation which directs that in making an appointment the Deputy Commissioner should have regard to the claims of members of the family, if any, entitled to the succession. The scheme of section 54 appears to be that, where a vacancy arises, whether permanent or temporary, it should be filled up by the next in the line of succession, but, if there is any dispute about succession or the vacancy cannot be filled up for other reasons, instead of filling up the vacancy, power is given for appointment of a fit person, so that the functions of the hereditary trustee may be continued to be discharged pending filling up of the vacancy. Sub-section (2), which as we said relates to a temporary vacancy, covers cases of suspension under sub-section (2) of section 53 and a perusal of sub-section (2) of section 53 shows that a suspension need not necessarily be by way of punishment. Clause (a) of sub-section (2) empowers suspension on the ground that the trustee ceases to profess the Hindu religion. Similarly, clauses (f) and (h) of the sub-section enable suspension in cases of the trustee being of unsound mind or an undischarged insolvent. It is, therefore, clear that sub-section (2) of section 54 not merely covers a temporary vacancy arising from suspension by way of punishment, but also extends to a suspension not by way of punishment. It may be possible, therefore, to assume that sub-section (2) of section 53, because of the power to suspend on enquiry, may include also a power of suspension pending an enquiry. But subsection (4) of section 53 specifically provides for such a contingency, while suspension by punishment is separately dealt with by sub-section (2) of section 53 and also by sub-section (5) of section 53, which provides for appeal against orders made under sub-section (2) of that section. It becomes, therefore, clear that as sub-section (4) makes a specific provision for suspension pending an enquiry, such a power is, therefore, not covered by the other provisions which provide for suspension following an enquiry. It becomes, therefore, clear that as sub-section (4) makes a specific provision for suspension pending an enquiry, such a power is, therefore, not covered by the other provisions which provide for suspension following an enquiry. We are of the view, therefore, that suspension pending an enquiry does not fall within the ambit of section 54 because of the principle that a special provision excludes the general. Sub-section (4), while providing for power of suspension pending an enquiry, gives also power to appoint a fit person to discharge the duties and perform the functions of the trustee. The sub-section does not speak of filling up of a vacancy unlike section 54 (1) and (2). Nor does sub-section (1) prescribe any procedure to be followed in appointing a fit person, as for instance the Explanation to sub-section (3). The statutory provisions, as they stand now, do not require that, when appointing a fit person, the claims of the members of the trustee’s family should be taken into account. But having regard to the scheme of section 54, the policy of the Legislature appears to be that while dealing with a vacancy in a hereditary office, the right of the next in line to succeed is recognised and it is because of this, even where a vacancy cannot be filled up immediately, in appointing a fit person, due regard should be had to the claims of the members of the family of the trustee. On principle, we fail to see any basic distinction between a suspension pending an enquiry and suspension following an enquiry by way of punishment. In either case, a vacancy arises. But section 54 is confined only to cases of suspension and vacancy arising out of it, other than suspension pending an enquiry, and therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of the appellant that, while a fit person is appointed under section 53 (4), the appellant can invoke at the same time the aid of the Explanation to sub-section (3) of section 54. Nevertheless, we are of the view that having regard to the nature of the office of hereditary trustee under the general law, the appellant is entitled to contend that, although sub-section (4) does not provide for it, it is necessary, while appointing a fit person, to have due regard to the claims of the members of the family of such trustee. But that can make no difference to the validity of the order of the first respondent because as a matter of fact the 1st respondent considered the claims of the eldest son of the appellant, and, for reasons given by him, he thought that he was not suitable for the appointment. The power to appoint a fit person is a discretionary power and all that is required for a valid exercise of the power is that, in making an appointment, he must have due regard to the claims of the members of the family and once that requisite is satisfied for reasons stated by the concerned officer, this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by him in that regard. We therefore come to the conclusion that the order of the learned Judge is right, though on slightly different reasons. The appeal is dismissed. No costs. It is represented for the appellant that his eldest son has ceased to be a student and is of proper age and also the manager has since been transferred and the claims of his eldest son should be considered. But that is entirely a matter for the appellant to take up with the concerned authority. V.K. ----- Appeal dismissed.