JUDGMENT S.C. Manchanda, J. - This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution directed against the order passed under Sec. 7-B of the U.P. (Temp.) Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) dated the 3rd November 1960 and 27th November 1962. 2. The material facts are these. The petitioner is the landlord of the accommodation. This was in the tenancy of opposite party No. 2. The petitioner filed an application under Sec. 7-B against opposite party No. 2 on the ground that he was in arrears of rent for full three years i.e. 2-7-1959 to 2-7-1962 totalling Rs. 2,880/- and prayed for his ejectment from the aforesaid premises. A registered notice as required by Sec. 7-B (3) of the Act was sent and the same was served on opposite party No. 2 on the 10th July 1962. On the 14th July 1962, the opposite party No. 2 moved an application pointing out to the court that Rs. 500/- as rent had already been paid; that a further sum of Rs. 500/- was being deposited as balance of rent and further that he proposed to file an objection. "But as it is necessary to file security before filing the objection, I do hereby file a security for Rs. 2,400/-. I, therefore, request you to kindly accept the security and permit me to file the objection." On the 16th the Munsif passed the following order:- "Security is accepted. Objection and receipts for deposits are to be filed. Put up for orders after ten days." 3. Thereafter, on the 24th July 1962, the petitioner filed an objection to the acceptance of this security on the ground that in the affidavit along with the surety bond filed by Qudrat Ullah he had mentioned that he was standing surety for Ram Chandra s/o Harish Chandra instead of Lal Chandra (the tenant) which was the real name of the petitioner, and further that the affidavit purports to be sworn by Qudrat Ullah but actually it had been signed as Qudrat Khan. On these objections the court directed the opposite party No. 2 to produce the title deeds of the surety, on 25-8-1962. The statutory period of 15 days for compliance with the notice under Sec. 7-B (3) was to expire on the 26th July 1962. On these objections the court directed the opposite party No. 2 to produce the title deeds of the surety, on 25-8-1962. The statutory period of 15 days for compliance with the notice under Sec. 7-B (3) was to expire on the 26th July 1962. Therefore, upto that date the learned Munsif had not withdrawn his earlier order of acceptance of the surety and there was no opportunity for the opposite party to have filed another security within the period of limitation. It was only on the Ist October 1962 that the learned /Munsif decided that the security bond which was furnished by the opposite party was not a legal security and was, therefore, not valid. Thereafter, on 3-11-1962 the opposite party asked for permission to file another security bond. This no doubt was some what belated, but nevertheless permission was granted. It was pointed out by the very Munsif who had passed the earlier order dated 1-10-1962 holding the earlier security bond to be invalid: "The order sheet dated 16-7-1962 shows that the security was accepted and the opposite partys objection was entertained. Hence in the circumstances the objection of the opposite party cannot be thrown out and it is a fit case in which opposite party may be allowed to file sufficient security by 19-11-1962." 4. On the 5th of November 1962, the petitioner filed an application requiring the Munsif to recall his order dated 3-11-1962. This application was rejected by an order dated 27-11-1962, where it was reiterated: "The aforesaid order of my learned predecessor clearly reveals that the security of the opposite party was accepted on 16-7-1962. Once the security is accepted it is done so as sufficient. Afterwards I held on 1-10-1962 that the security filed is not sufficient, that order may be uncalled for but even then to safeguard the interest of the applicant landlord another security in place of the previous security was taken. It is not a fresh security and no period of filing the security has been extended. The court has always the inherent power to set aside its own orders which are passed by mistake." 5. The security having been accepted the petitioner was given time to file it but in the meanwhile the present petition was filed. The stay order was obtained from this Court and all the proceedings have remained stayed. The court has always the inherent power to set aside its own orders which are passed by mistake." 5. The security having been accepted the petitioner was given time to file it but in the meanwhile the present petition was filed. The stay order was obtained from this Court and all the proceedings have remained stayed. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the scheme of the Act was that in proceedings under Sec. 7-B the interests of the landlord had to be protected against any dilatory tactics by the defaulting tenant and it was for that reason that the proviso to Sec. 7-B (7) was introduced, whereby the condition precedent for the filing of an objection by the tenant was that he should first deposit in court "the amount mentioned in the notice" or furnish security to the satisfaction of the court. Such undoubtedly was, the intention of the legislature but that does not help the petitioner in the present case. Some kind of security was filed within the period prescribed under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 7-B of the Act. As already observed, the security for whatever it was worth was filed on the 14th of July 1962 in response to the notice under Sec. 7-B, sub-Cl. (3). That security subsequently turned out to be not a sufficient or valid security. But the question however, is that if the security so filed has been accepted by the court wrongly would it deprive the opposite party of his right to have his objections which were filed within limitation from being entertained ? A provision somewhat similar, though not in pari materia is Sec. 17 of the Small Cause Court Act. Under that section the judgment debtor is permitted to have an ex parte decree set aside on the condition that at the time of making of his application either the decretal amount has been deposited in the Court or he has given such security as the court may, on a previous occasion on an application made by him in this behalf may have directed. A Full Bench of this Court in Ram Bharose v. Ganga Singh, AIR 1931 Allahabad 727 observed at p. 733, that if security was filed within the period of limitation" and accepted by the court expressly or impliedly by the issue of notice the application is a good application..." Again at p. 734 it was observed "that an application cannot be presented after the prescribed period, nor can cash or security be deposited after the expiry of that period. "The Court is not given any discretion at all to extend the time. If the security deposited within the time is discovered afterwards to be defective or unsatisfactory in any way, the Court has no power to direct a fresh security to be substituted for it after the expiry of the period." At page 735 again it was observed that "the question whether the security is sufficient and satisfactory, need not be finally determined during the period of 30 days. Indeed the plaintiff decree holder may come in afterwards and challenge its sufficiency. The mere fact that it was found afterwards that the security was insufficient, would not make the deposit of the security within the time in any way defective." 6. In Kiran Koomar Banerji v. Baijnath, AIR 1928 Allahabad 607 Sulaiman Ac. C.J. observed that "in the present case however no sufficient security was as a matter of fact deposited within the time, that the fixed deposit receipt tendered by the applicant was accepted by the Court as a sufficient security ....". I therefore agree with the court below that sufficient security was not as a matter of fact deposited within limitation. At the same time I cannot ignore the circumstance that the court had as a matter of fact accepted as sufficient security the fixed deposit receipt coupled with the applicants statement that the attached money should be treated as such. On that date the time according to the allegation in the application had not expired. Had the court rejected the security there and then it would have been possible for the applicant to make it good in cash. The acceptance undoubtedly misled the applicant and he was by virtue of that acceptance deprived of an opportunity to make good the amount before the limitation expired. Had the court rejected the security there and then it would have been possible for the applicant to make it good in cash. The acceptance undoubtedly misled the applicant and he was by virtue of that acceptance deprived of an opportunity to make good the amount before the limitation expired. I therefore think that in this case it cannot be said that the applicant failed to furnish security to the satisfaction of the court. The security was really insufficient but the court was satisfied that it was adequate. 7. In Hardwar Singh v. Satyendra Kumar Gupta, 1957 ALJ 196 which is a decision under Sec. 7-B it was held by Chaturvedi, J. that as no security bond was actually filed but only a draft had been filed within the period of limitation, the requirements of the proviso to sub-Sec. (7) of Sec. 7-B had not been complied with and further that the period of filing the security could not be extended. This authority which was strongly relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is of little or no assistance as in the present case some security was in fact filed within the period of limitation but that was subsequently found to be invalid or insufficient. 8. The decision of Dhawan, J. in Jagannath Prasad v. City Munsif, C.M. Writ No. 859 of 1957. D/d. 8.10.1958, was in respect of a case where by the security bond the Sanad Bhumidhari was pledged. The draft was approved by the court within the statutory period under Sec. 7-B (3). But as the bond required to be registered and this formality could not be completed within the prescribed period of 15 days it was held that the provisions of sub-Sec. (7) of Sec. 7-B had not been complied with. This decision also is of little or no assistance to the petitioner in the present proceedings as no objection was raised on the ground of want of registration of the security bond. This decision also is of little or no assistance to the petitioner in the present proceedings as no objection was raised on the ground of want of registration of the security bond. In view of the principles laid down by a Full Bench of this Court in Ram Bharose v. Ganga Singh, AIR 1931 Allahabad 727 and by Sulaiman A. C.J. in Kiran Koomar Banerji v. Baijnath, AIR 1928 Allahabad 607 it is quite clear that a party cannot be made to suffer for the mistake of the court in accepting the security bond and a locus paenlentiae would be available to it to make good the deficiency. In the present case it is manifest that the Munsif did not at all apply his mind before accepting the security bond filed by the opposite party. The Act imposed upon him a duty to do so as it was his satisfaction which had to be expressed before the Security bond was accepted. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the security bond was filed within the period of 15 days and before the expiry of 15 days that acceptance had not been cancelled or recalled so as to have enabled the opposite party to furnish another security bond within the prescribed period of limitation. The successor Munsif took the view that his predecessor ought never to have accepted such a security but nevertheless the opposite party cannot be made to suffer for the mistake of the court. It cannot be said that this view is patently erroneous in law so as to justify interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 9. For the reasons given above, the petition is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.