JUDGMENT S.C. Manchanda, J. - This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution directed against the order of review dated the 28th of March 1963 of the D. S. O. and Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Agra, modifying the permission granted by his predecessor D. S. O. dated 6-12-1961 under Sec. 14(1) of the U.P. Cantonments Control of Rent and Eviction Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to file a suit for ejectment against the opposite party after the lapse of one year the period of one year was given so as to enable the opposite party to find an alternative accommodation. 2. The facts leading up to this petition are these. The petitioner is the owner of the accommodation in dispute. It is a double storeyed house. On the ground floor of the said house the petitioner runs a grocery business. The first floor has been in the occupation of opposite party No. 2 for a couple of decades. The opposite party No. 2 is in the service of the Central Government serving as a labour supervisor in C. O. D., Agra. The petitioner applied for permission under Sec. 14 of the Act to file a suit for ejectment against opposite party No. 2. After hearing the parties and considering the materials on the record the application was filed on the 28th March 1960 with liberty to the petitioner to move again after one year. Accordingly, the petitioner again moved an application on 18-4-196l and permission was granted by the D. S. O. by his order dated the 6th December, 1961. In that order it was observed:- "The grounds taken by the applicant and the objections advanced by the opposite parties are almost the same as in the old file which have been dealt with in my order dated 28-3-1960 .....The fact however remains that he has no other property at present to fall back upon except the house in question the lower storey of which is being used by him for his grocery business and the upper storey of which is in the tenancy and occupation..... of opposite party. of opposite party. The S. I's report dated 19-9-1961 shows that the accommodation with the applicant at present is no better than the .accommodation in dispute....I however feel that there is nothing to prevent him to use his constitutional rights to use his property in the way he likes. I, therefore, hold that his need is bona fide. The opposite party is a Central Government servant of essential services and has been in occupation of the premises in dispute....Giving proper consideration to the difficulties and hardship on the opposite party that are likely to be caused to him in the event of his ejectment, I give him one years time to vacate the premises in dispute, failing which the permission would be deemed to have been granted against him and the landlord applicant would have the authority to file a suit for his ejectment." 3. Just when the year of grace granted under the order dated 6-12-1961 was about to expire the opposite party filed an application for review of that order. This matter, however came up before the successor D. S. O. who, though he was satisfied that the grounds which were being taken now before him in the review application had already been taken before his predecessor, and in spite of these facts, the need of the landlord was held to be genuine and permission to file a suit for ejectment was granted and even though he noticed that no new facts existed, nevertheless, because of the national emergency, he took the view that as the opposite party could not find time to look for an alternative accommodation he was entitled to some more time and proceeded to modify the order of his predecessor. The operative portion of this order runs : "While I do not see any ground for review of my predecessors order of 6-12-1961 but at the same time in the changed circumstances of national emergency due to the Chinese aggression and the applicant being a member of the essential services, I order that the landlord shall not file a suit for ejectment against the applicant in pursuance of the permission granted by my predecessor till the period of emergency is over. The order of my predecessor dated 5-12-1961 shall therefore be deemed to have been modified to the above extent only." 4. The writ petition is directed against this order. The order of my predecessor dated 5-12-1961 shall therefore be deemed to have been modified to the above extent only." 4. The writ petition is directed against this order. The first contention sought to be raised by learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was no jurisdiction to review an order passed under Sec. 14 of the Act. Mr. Swami Dayal objects that this is a new ground not specifically taken and it should not therefore be entertained. The objection is unsustainable. In the writ petition, which is supported by an affidavit though no challenge as such to the maintainability of the review application was 14 made it was stated that the D. S. O. had himself conceded that there was no ground for review but yet he had proceeded to modify the order in such a way that the permission to sue was made subject to an unreasonable and indefinite condition i.e. the lifting of the emergency. Ground No. 5 of the petition is - "5. Because the application for review though termed as such was in fact an application for cancellation or revision of the earlier order and was as such not maintainable in law. As this ground was not very specific on the question of jurisdiction to review a formal application, to add a ground that there was no jurisdiction to review the earlier order granting permission to file the suit for ejectment, was moved and was allowed by me for the reason that the question is one of jurisdiction requiring no evidence and it had already, in substance, been raised and determined by the D. S. O. 5. The question, therefore, that falls for consideration is whether the order passed under Sec. 14 of the Act granting permission could be reviewed, in the sense of its being subsequently modified by imposing an onerous condition, by the successor D. S. O. ? Mr. The question, therefore, that falls for consideration is whether the order passed under Sec. 14 of the Act granting permission could be reviewed, in the sense of its being subsequently modified by imposing an onerous condition, by the successor D. S. O. ? Mr. Swami Dayal the learned counsel for the opposite party has contended that the provisions of Sec. 14 of the Act are not in parimateria with the provisions of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act (Act III of 1947) and therefore though it may have been held in Sri Bhagwan v. Ram Chandra, 1965 ALJ 353, 358-359 that the orders passed under Sec. 3 (3) of Act III of 1947 are quasi-judicial acts, the same would have no application to Sec. 14 of the Act. It is contended that it was in view of the existence of a provision in Sec. 3(3) of the Act III of 1947 whereby a revision to the Commissioner is provided that the Supreme Court had come to the conclusion that the order passed under Sec. 3 was a quasi-judicial order. It is true that under the Act there are no provisions such as that of sub-Clauses (2), (3) and of Act III of 1947. But that is not the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court. The word "also" at page 358 used by the Supreme Court, when considering the second aspect indicates that that was only a factor taken into consideration to support the conclusion already arrived at that an order tender Sec. 3 contemplates a judicial approach and is not merely a ministerial act. After the decision of the Supreme Court that orders under Sec. 3 and 7-F of Act III of 1947 are quasi-judicial orders there cannot be much doubt that the approach in such matters even under the Act will have to be a judicial or quasi-judicial one. If the order so passed is a quasi-judicial order then it is well settled that an order once passed cannot be reviewed or modified in any manner unless there is a specific provision in the Act. Admittedly there is no provision for a review in the Act as such and the order modifying the earlier order by way of review would be wholly without jurisdiction. Admittedly there is no provision for a review in the Act as such and the order modifying the earlier order by way of review would be wholly without jurisdiction. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the order under Sec. 3 was a purely ministerial order to be passed according to the whims and fancies of the D. S. O. then too if the procedure adopted by him was such as would give rise to a lis between the parties it would, when passed become a quasi-judicial order. A division bench of this Court in Property Agents v. Shamsher Bahadur, 1964 ALJ 752, 756 basing its conclusion on decisions of the Supreme Court has laid down that if any one of the following three conditions are satisfied the order made by an administrative or executive authority would be a quasi judicial order- (1) Where there is a lis between the parties; (2) When the authorities are required by the statute or by the rules to act1 in a judicial or quasi judicial manner; and (3) When the nature of the duties and functions to be exercised by the authorities are such that they cannot but be exercised in a judicial or a quasi judicial manner. That was a case merely of an allotment order and not permission to sue for ejectment and yet on the facts and circumstances of that case it was held that the order passed after hearing the parties was a quasi-judicial order which could not be reviewed in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect. 6. On the facts, as set out earlier in the instant case and as noticed by the D. S. O. himself it is clear that there was a lis. The objections of the parties were invited, report of the allotment inspector was obtained, parties heard and then only was the permission to file a suit for ejectment of the opposite party given. That certainly constituted a lis between the parties which was formally adjudicated upon by the D. S. O. and as such the order so passed was nothing but a quasi-judicial order which could not have been reviewed or modified without an express provision in the Act to that effect. 7. That certainly constituted a lis between the parties which was formally adjudicated upon by the D. S. O. and as such the order so passed was nothing but a quasi-judicial order which could not have been reviewed or modified without an express provision in the Act to that effect. 7. It was next contended that there was no manifest error of law or jurisdiction and there was no injustice as the conduct of the petitioner showed that he had some other houses which he had sold. These contentions are also without force. The finding of fact by the D.S.O. which is binding on this Court is that the need of the petitioner was genuine and this finding was given after taking into consideration the whole conduct of the petitioner. There is a clear error of jurisdiction in reviewing an order when no review was provided. The injustice to the owner is also manifest. 8. For the reasons given above the order of the D.S.O. dated 28-3-1963 is directed to be quashed. Six months time however is allowed to the opposite party to find an alternate accommodation. The application is allowed. No order as to costs.