JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a landlord's appeal from the decree of the Civil Judge Kanpur reversing that of the 3rd Additional Munsif Kanpur and dismissing their suit for the ejectment of the tenant. The plaintiff appellants are the landlords of a house in Kanpur which was let out to the defendant respondent Baleshwari Prasad Garg on Rs. 30/- per month. Garg did not pay the rent and some of it became irrecoverable as time-barred. The plaintiffs sent a notice of demand for rent for four months immediately before the notice and also for rent which had become irrecoverable due to limitation. The Courts below have found that the tenant refused to pay rent which had become time-barred, but he tendered four months rent which was refused by the landlord. Thereupon this suit was filed for his ejectment on the ground that he had defaulted in payment of rent. The tenant pleaded that he had tendered all the rent which was due from him and was justified in refusing to pay what was not recoverable at law. The trial court held that the tenant had committed default and decreed the suit. On appeal the learned Civil Judge held that the words "arrears of rent" in.Sec. 3(1) (a) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act refer to rent which is recoverable at law, and there can be no default in respect of rent which cannot be recovered. He allowed the tenants appeal and dismissed the suit for ejectment. The landlords have come here in second appeal. 2. The learned judge was in error. Sec. 3(1) (a) of the Act provides a safeguard against arbitrary ejectment on certain conditions of good behaviour on the part of the tenant which are specified in the Section. One of them is not to be in arrears of rent for more than three months. There is a further safeguard that the landlord must serve notice on the tenant to pay the arrears of rent within one month. The words "arrears of rent" do not mean rent which is legally recoverable from the tenant but that which the tenant should have paid but has not. The tenants failure to pay the rent when it becomes due puts him in arrears, and he remains in arrears even after it becomes irrecoverable. The words "arrears of rent" do not mean rent which is legally recoverable from the tenant but that which the tenant should have paid but has not. The tenants failure to pay the rent when it becomes due puts him in arrears, and he remains in arrears even after it becomes irrecoverable. Limitation means that the rent cannot be recovered through the court, but the debt is not extinguished. 3. It must be borne in mind that the condition under which the safeguard against arbitrary eviction under clause (a) is enjoyed by the tenant, though statutory, is equitable in nature. It imposes a restriction on the landlord's right under the contract to terminate the tenancy provided the tenant pays rent regularly. If he elects to fall into arrears he is deprived of this safeguard, and it is immaterial whether the rent is recoverable through the Court or not. 4. If the view of the learned Judge is accepted it will lead to strange results. A tenant will be deemed to be in arrears of the rent for three years after it has become due, but after that he will cease to be a defaulter. Moreover, a bigger defaulter will enjoy the protection of clause (a) whereas one who is in default for a few months will not. The bigger the default the greater the safeguard against ejectment - this was not the intention of clause (a). 5. My view is in accord with judicial authority. Sohanlal Kharbanda v. Dr. Sri Ram Sinha, 1957 ALJ 503, Mahipal Singh v. Mam Chand, 1963 ALJ 496, Shafatullah v. Mohd. Hasan, 1963 AWR 480 The observations of Upadhyaya, J. in Changu Sahu v. Ratan Sugar Mills, 1958 AWR 486 were obiter and no more than an expression of doubt. The learned Judge thought that the omission of the word any from any arrears of rent in clause (a) by the Amending Act might have meant that after the amendment a tenant will be deemed to be in arrears only if he fails to pay rent which is recoverable under the law. I do not think that the omission of the word any makes any material difference. The unamended section contained the words "if the tenant has failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month". I do not think that the omission of the word any makes any material difference. The unamended section contained the words "if the tenant has failed to make payment to the landlord of any arrears of rent within one month". "Any arrears" meant that even if the landlord was in arrears of rent for one month or one week (in the case of a weekly tenancy), the clause applied to him. The words "any arrears" referred to the quantum of arrears and not to the various clauses of arrears such as recoverable and irrecoverable arrears. But the amending Act substituted the words "arrears of rent for more than three months" for "any arrears". They gave the tenant an additional safeguard by restraining the landlord until he was in arrears for more than three months. When a minimum limit of three months arrears was imposed the entire sentence had to be restricted and the words "any arrears" become out of place. But the amendment made no change in the nature of arrears and no distinction between recoverable and irrecoverable arrears. The test of arrears remained the same-namely that the rent was due and was not paid. 6. I allow this appeal with costs, set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restore that of the trial court with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.