JUDGMENT Jagdish Shahai, J. - In these cases common questions of law are raised. We are, therefore, disposing them of by a common judgment. 2. The applicants in these revision applications are the Pragice and Oil Mills, Aligarh. The Firm filed suits in the court of the Judge Small Causes for the recovery of certain amounts of money on the allegations that the goods in dispute were sent to Hathras for despatch out-station by rail from Hathras and the defendant, which was entitled to realise fee and security money equal to the toll tax, is liable to refund the same. The trial Judge framed the following issues: "1. Is the suit barred by Section 146 if the U. P. Municipalities Act? 2. Whether the plaintiff gave declaration to the effect that the goods were meant for immediate export by rail as alleged ? 3. Whether the goods were actually exported out of the limits of Hathras Municipality by rail as alleged ? 4. To what amount if any, is the plaintiff entitled." 3. The trial judge decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff mills and decreed the suits. 4. The Municipal Board, Hathras, filed revision applications in the court of the District Judge, Aligarh, under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The revision applications were heard by the Additional District Judge, Aligarh, Sri Chandra Prakash. Before him only one submission was made on behalf of the Board, the same being that the suits were barred by the provisions of Section 164 of the U. P. Municipalities Act. The learned Additional District Judge held that they were so barred and allowed the revision applications by means of the judgment dated 23-4-1963. 5. Against the decision of the learned Additional District Judge the Mills have filed these revision applications before us. 6. Section 164 of the U. P Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) reads: "164. Bar to jurisdiction of civil and criminal courts in matters of taxation: (1) No objection shall be taken to a valuation or assessment, nor shall the liability of a person to be assessed or taxed be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided in this Act. (2) The order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying an order in respect. (2) The order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying an order in respect. of valuation or assessment or liability to assessment or taxation to assessment or taxation shall be final; provided that it shall be lawful for the appellate authority, upon application or his own motion, to review any order passed by him in appeal by a further order passed within three months from the date of his original order." 7. Mr. Radha Krishna, who has appeared for the Mills has submitted that the view taken by the learned Additional District Judge that the suits giving rise to these revision applications were barred by the provisions of Section 164 of the Act is incorrect. He has contended that in the suits giving rise to these revision applications what was pleaded was that the Municipal Board if Hathras had no jurisdiction to charge the tax from the applicants. We have seen the plaints and the written statements filed by the parties in the cases giving rise to these revision applications. It appears that the case set up by the parties was that the tax was one contemplated by Section 128 (viii) of the Act. That provision reads: "128. Subject to any general rules or special orders of the State Government in this behalf, the taxes which a board may impose in the whole or any part of a Municipality are . . . . . . . . . . (viii) an octroi on goods or animals brought within the Municipality for consumption or use therein; . . . . . . . . " 8. The allegations in the plaint were that the goods were not brought for consumption, use or sale within the Municipal limits of Hathras, consequently the applicants were entitled to refund of the amount deposited by them. It was contended by Mr Radha Krishna that the amounts deposited were not in the nature of tax paid, but only by way of security so that if the goods were consumed or old or used within the limits of Municipality of Hathras the charge under Cl. It was contended by Mr Radha Krishna that the amounts deposited were not in the nature of tax paid, but only by way of security so that if the goods were consumed or old or used within the limits of Municipality of Hathras the charge under Cl. (Viii) of Sec 128 of the Act might be made We have alrealy pointed out that all the four issues framed in the suits were decided in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant and the only submission that was before the learned Additional District judge was that the suits stood barred by the provisions of Section 164 of the Act. 9. Having given the matter our I anxious consideration we are of the opinion that the suits were not so barred. In the first place the valuation for assessment was not challenged in the suits nor was the liability i to be assessed or taxed questioned. What was questioned was the right of the Municipal Board to appropriate by way of tax under Cl. (viii) of Section 128 of the Act amounts which had only been deposited by way of security. Mr. Radha Krishna has I placed reliance upon Munna Lal v. Municipal Board, Cawnpore, 1936 A.L.J. 879 In that case a Full Bench consisting oi : Sulaiman, C. J. Niamatullah, and Bennet, JJ. held that "a suit brought I for remission or refund of certain house and water taxes charged by a I Municipal Board for the period during which the plaintiff alleges the premises to have remained vacant I and claims remission under Section 151 of the Municipalities Act, is not bar-j red by Section 164 of the Act." In Munna Lal v. Municipal Board the observation of Sulaiman, C. J. with regard to the bar created by Section 164 (1) of the Act is as follows:- "It, therefore, seems to me that what is prohibited is an objection to the valuation or assessment of tax on buildings and land and not liability to pay it; and what is also prohibited is the liability of a person to be 1 assessed or taxed, and not his right i to claim a refund or remission." 10. Niamatullah, J. held that Section 164(1) of the Act* did not bar a suit for the refund of an amount on the ground that the Board was not legally entitled to that amount. Niamatullah, J. held that Section 164(1) of the Act* did not bar a suit for the refund of an amount on the ground that the Board was not legally entitled to that amount. To the same effect are the observations of Bennet, J. In view of the Full Bench decision it is not necessary for us to look for other reported cases. But we would like to point out that the same view has been taken by this Court in Jaswant Singh v. Executive Officer, Municipal Board, Meerut, 1940 A.L.J. 330, The Municipal Board Benaras v. Jokhun, 1939 A.L.J. 183, Municipal Board, Jaunpur v. Banwari Lal, 1939 A.L.J. 897 & Municipal Board, Mau Nath Bhanjan v. Raghunath Prasad, AIR 1954 Allahabad 121. 11. Mr. Chaturvedi, who appears for the Municipal Board, Hathras, has placed reliance upon Messrs. Dyer Meakin Breweries Ltd. v. The Municipal Board, Lucknow, A.I.R. 1949 Oudh 14, District Board of Farrukhabad v. Prag Dutt and others, AIR 1948 Allahabad 382 and Municipal Board, Benaras v. Krishna and Co., AIR 1935 Allahabad 760 12. The case reported in District Board of Farrukhabad v. Prag Dutt, AIR 1948 Allahabad 382 is not on Section 164 of the Act, but on the provisions of the U. P. District Boards Act relating to the imposition of tax on circumstances and property. That case is clearly distinguishable, but certain observations made therein support the contention of the applicants rather than those of the Municipal Board Messrs Dyer Makin Breweries Ltd. v. The Municipal Board, Lucknow does not deal with the question raised before us. That was a case where the jurisdiction of the Municipal Board to impose the tax was not challenged. What was contended was that the Municipal Board had irregularly imposed a tax which it had jurisdiction to impose. That case is, therefore, clearly distinguishable. In Municipal Board Benares v. Krishna any Co.' the Division Bench of this Court held that "no suit for a refund of octroi which has been assessed by the Municipal Board on goods imported lies in a civil court on the ground that the goods were not in fact assessable or that the amount of assessment was excessive."; but this case cannot be considered to be good law in view of the subsequent Full Bench decision of this court in Munna Lal v. Municipal Board, Cawnpore'. 13. In the end Mr. 13. In the end Mr. Chaturvedi placed reliance upon Firm Seth Radha Krishna v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana, A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 1547. That case is clearly distinguishable because in that case "the only dispute was as regards the rate of tax payable in respect of the salt brought by the appellant into the limits of the Municipal Committee." That was not a case where the right of the Municipal Committee to make the assessment itself was challenged. 14. For the reasons mentioned above, we are satisfied that the suits giving rise to these revision applications were not barred by the provisions of Section 164 of the Act. The revision applications must, therefore, succeed. 15. Mr. Chaturvedi, however, requested that the question as to whether amounts deposited in connection with a tax imposed under Cl. (vii) of Section 128 of the Act would or would not be refundable may be left open. We are not called upon in these cases to decide that question. No such question was raised in the courts below. Mr. Chaturvedi had also to concede that there was no material before us on the basis of which this question could be decided. 16. These revision applications are allowed with costs, the judgments and decrees passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Aligarh "A. I. R. 1963 S. C. 1547 dated 23-4-1963 are set aside and those passed by the learned Judge Small uses Court Aligarh, dated 30-3-1961 are restored.