Judgment Kamla Sahai, J. 1. This appeal by the plaintiffs arises out of a suit for declaration of title to and confirmation or, in the alternative recovery of possession over a house standing on plot No. 43, in Khata No. 46, of village Abdulla Chak. The plaintiffs have also prayed for a declaration that the sale deed executed by Mt. Moti Kuer, defendant No. 7 (who died during the pendency of the appeal in the lower appellate court), in favour of defendants nos. 1 to 3, on the 5th November, 1959, is fraudulent, illegal, without consideration and without legal necessity. 2. The plaintiffs have also alleged that plaintiff No. 1 instituted Title Suit No. 12 of 1945 for declaration that certain alienations made by Mt. Moti Kuer were illegal and were not binding upon the reversioners; and that suit was compromised, one of the terms of the compromise being that Moti Kuer would cease to have any right or title in the suit-house except the right of residence during her lifetime. 3. The defendants raised several pleas including this that the compromise with regard to the suit-house was not binding as the property was worth more than Rs. 100 and the compromise was compulsorily registrable under Sec.17 of the Indian Registration Act. 4. The Munsif, who tried the suit, dismissed it. Before learned Additional Subordinate Judge V/s. Patna, who heard the appeal, the Munsifs findings that the plaintiffs were the nearest reversioners; that they had not come into possession of the suit-house and that there was a genuine compromise between the parties in Title suit No. 12 of 1945 were not challenged. It was also admitted on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants that the suit-house was not the subject-matter of the suit in Title suit No. 12 of 1945. I may also mention that plaintiff No. 1 examined himself as P. W. 5 in the case and, on being cross-examined, ht admitted that the house in question was not Involved in dispute in Title suit No. 12 of 1945. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge held that, since the compromise was not registered, it did not create any right in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the house in dispute. The learned Additional Subordinate Judge held that, since the compromise was not registered, it did not create any right in favour of the plaintiffs in respect of the house in dispute. He further held that; the compromise in respect of the house in question not being binding, Sec.14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, conferred absolute proprietary right in respect of it upon Moti Kuer and she could alienate it in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 5. Hence, he dismissed the appeal. 6. The only point which Mr. Rajeshwari Prasad has argued on behalf of the appellants is that the house in question must be deemed to have been a subject-matter of Title suit No. 12 of 1945, because one of the questions which was in dispute in that case was whether plaintiff No. 1 was the nearest reversioner of Ramprit, the husband of Moti Kuer. In support of this argument, he has relied upon Ramdas Sah V/s. Jagarnath Prasad. AIR 1960 Pat 179 . 7. In my opinion, there is no substance in the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. The question whether plaintiff No. 1 was the reversioner may have been in dispute in Title suit No. 12 of 1945, but the admitted position is that the house in dispute in this case was not a subject-matter of the suit. Sec.17 (1) (b) of the Registration Act lays down, among other things, that all non-testamentary instruments which purport or operate to create, declare, assign, limit or extinguish, any right, title or interest, must be compulsorily registered. There cannot be the slightest doubt that term No. 5 of the compromise petition seeks to limit or rather, to some extent, to extinguish the right of Moti Kuer to the house in suit as part of the Hindu widows estate which she held on the death of her husband. Subsection (2) of Sec.17, Clause (vi) exempts decree or order of a Court from compulsory registration, but it lays down that a decree or order "on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding" will not be so exempted. Subsection (2) of Sec.17, Clause (vi) exempts decree or order of a Court from compulsory registration, but it lays down that a decree or order "on a compromise and comprising immovable property other than that which is the subject-matter of the suit or proceeding" will not be so exempted. As the term in question in the compromise decree relates to the house, which was admittedly not the subject-matter of the suit, it is manifest that the compromise in sol far as the house in question is concerned was compulsorily registrable. Under Sec. 49 (c) of the Registration Act, a document which is required to be compulsorily registered under Sec.17 shall not "be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property or conferring such power". In view of this provision, it is clear that the compromise decree cannot be treated to be evidence in this case of the transaction affecting the house in suit. 8. Ramdas Sahs case, AIR 1960 Pat 179 , is clearly distinguishable. That was a suit for partition. The plaintiff claimed exclusive title to plot No. 2240, but prayed for a decree for partition in respect of other properties. According to the compromise decree, plot No. 2240 was exclusively allotted to the plaintiff. It was argued before their Lordships that plot No. 2240 was not a subject-matter of the suit and that the compromise in so far as it affected that plot was Inadmissible in evidence Their Lordships held that the compromise was admissible in evidence so far as it affected plot No. 2240. They observed: "In the compromise decree there was an agreement between the parties that plot No. 2240 be exclusively allotted to the plaintiff and since the title of the plaintiff to plot No. 2240 was taken as part of the consideration for the compromise entered into between all the parties and since it is an integral part of the compromise it is obvious that title to plot No. 2240 was within the scope of the partition suit and the decree is operative even with regard to plot No. 2240 in the absence of registration." It seems that the ground for their Lordships conclusion is clearly that "plot No. 2240 was within the scope of the partition suit" If that plot was within the scope of the partition suit, it means that that plot was a subject-matter of the suit. That being so, there is nothing in that decision which can lead me to hold that the compromise between the parties, between plaintiff No. 1 and defendant No. 7 of the present case in Title Suit No. 12 of 1945 relating to the house in suit is admissible. 9 As I have already held that the com promise in respect of the house in question is inadmissible, Sec.14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, must be held to have conferred upon Moti Kuer power as full owner of the house as well as the other properties of her husband held and possessed by her. That being so the could certainly alienate the house to defendants Nos. 1 to 3. 10. In the result, I do not see any good ground to Interfere with the judgments and decrees of the Courts below. The appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.