Judgment :- 1. The five writ applicants executed a document dated 16 71961 in favour of the first respondent, Society. To enforce this document there was an arbitration reference, No. 704 of 1961 on the file of the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the 2nd respondent to this writ application. He passed an award Ex. P-1 in favour of the first respondent that the first respondent shall recover a sum of Rs. 15,281.53 with interest thereon at 71/2 percent per annum from 30 81961 till the date of realisation and costs from the writ applicants and their properties as well as from others who were defendants. There was a revision from this award before the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The revision was dismissed by Ex. P-2 order. 2. It appears that the document on the basis of which Ex. P-1 award was passed came to be executed because a close relation of the executants of the bond who was the Secretary of the Society had suddenly disappeared without the knowledge and consent of the President and without accounting for the amounts which should have been in his custody. The Secretary was therefore suspended and it appears that certain steps were taken against him by the Society. The relevant part of the document dated 16 71961, Ex. A in the Arbitration Proceedings, reads as follows: This document, as I said earlier, was executed on the 16th of July 1961. On the same day, the executants of the document wrote a letter Ex. B in the Arbitration Proceedings to the President of the Society, the relevant part of it is in these terms: 3. The President was examined by the 2nd respondent in the Arbitration Proceedings and he has given evidence that information had been given to the police against the Secretary on 1171961 and that after the Board met on 16 71961 a written communication was sent to the Police Station that no steps need be taken. 4. On the above facts it was contended that the bond is not enforcible as it was illegal and void and violative of S.23 of the Contract Act because the agreement was one for stifling prosecution. This contention has been dealt with in this manner by the 2nd respondent to this writ application in Ex. 4. On the above facts it was contended that the bond is not enforcible as it was illegal and void and violative of S.23 of the Contract Act because the agreement was one for stifling prosecution. This contention has been dealt with in this manner by the 2nd respondent to this writ application in Ex. P-1 award: "As to point 2, it has to be examined if under S.23 of the Contract Act the bond becomes void. The advocate has argued that the bond was executed to stifle a prosecution and compound an offence which is not compoundable by law. He has made an effort to show that in dropping the police complaint against defendant No.1 after the bond was executed by defendants 2 to 7 prosecution has been stifled and a non compoundable offence compounded. The plaintiff has replied to the point that there was no criminal proceedings instituted against defendant No.1 at the time of executing the bond (Exhibit A) and. therefore, no prosecution has been stifled and that there had not been any compounding of any offence also. It has been further shown that prosecution was actually launched against the Secretary (defendant No. 1) at a later stage, but this was after the filing of the arbitration case. The defendants have not been able to establish that the bond was executed as a result of any agreement to discontinue criminal proceedings. The Honourable High Court of Kerala has pointed out that the question whether or not there was an agreement to stifle prosecution in any particular case, will always be question of fact. The burden of proving that Exhibit A was executed pursuant to an agreement that criminal proceedings would be discontinued if the bond was executed, is on the defendants. On an analysis of the facts of the case I find that there has been no attempt to stifle prosecution and. therefore, the case does not come under the purview of S.23 of the Contract Act. In arriving at this decision I am guided by the judgment of the High Court of Kerala reported on pages 777 to 790 of the Kerala Law Times 1959." 5. And the same question has been discussed by the revisional authority, the 3rd respondent to this writ application in Ex. In arriving at this decision I am guided by the judgment of the High Court of Kerala reported on pages 777 to 790 of the Kerala Law Times 1959." 5. And the same question has been discussed by the revisional authority, the 3rd respondent to this writ application in Ex. P-2 thus: "(ii) Another ground alleged is that the bond is not valid as it is executed for "withdrawing a criminal prosecution". On a perusal of the bond it is found that the only mention regarding a withdrawal of any action against the defendant No,1 is that the executants say "they are aware of action being taken against him departmentally and that they feel it their duty to save him from the same". But the bond is not executed for withdrawing any prosecution of criminal action, and the Society or the President have not agreed in the bond to withdraw the prosecution. I therefore find that this objection will not stand." 6. Counsel on behalf of the petitioner on the above facts has raised two contentions in support of his argument that this Court is entitled to interfere with the findings entered by the Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies in Ex. P-6 and by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies in Ex. P-2. The first of these is that the Arbitrator and the Revisional Authority have mis-conceived the law relating to an agreement to stifle prosecution and the second is that the findings have been entered by the two authorities by ignoring material evidence before those authorities. 7. The first of these points is sought to be supported by the reasoning of the Arbitrator as can be seen from Ex. P-1. Counsel particularly relied on the portion in the award Ex. P-1 wherein it is stated: "The plaintiff has replied to the point that there was no criminal proceedings instituted against defendant No.1 at the time of executing the bond (Exhibit A) and, therefore, no prosecution has been stifled and that there had not been any compounding of any offence also ". And the further portion in "The defendants have not been able to establish that the bond was executed as a result of any agreement to discontinue criminal proceedings 8. The Revisional authority, it is said, proceeded on the basis that the agreement to stifle prosecution must be seen from the face of the agreement. And the further portion in "The defendants have not been able to establish that the bond was executed as a result of any agreement to discontinue criminal proceedings 8. The Revisional authority, it is said, proceeded on the basis that the agreement to stifle prosecution must be seen from the face of the agreement. This also, it is said, is a clear mis-conception of law. I am inclined to accept this argument and I am supported by very high authority in coming to the conclusion that there is mis-conception of law. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had occasion to consider both these aspects as to whether at the time of the execution of an agreement there should have been a prosecution in existence in order that the mischief of S.23 of the Contract Act may be attracted and also the further question as to whether it must be seen from the agreement itself that it was for stifling prosecution. The decision is in Kamini Kumar Basu and others v. Birendra Nath Basu and another (reported in AIR. 1930 Privy Council 100) and the relevant passage is this: "It may quite well be that a prosecution only commences after a summons is issued, and that before that stage is reached a complainant cannot be said to have dropped a prosecution under the Code: see Golap Jan V. Bholanath (191138 Cal 380). Their Lordship are not called upon to express any opinion on this point, nor are they doing so. The real question involved in this appeal on this part of the case is whether any part of the consideration of the reference or the ekrawama was unlawful, and not whether any prosecution within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Code had been started or dropped. If it was an implied term of the reference or the ekrarnama that the complaint would not be further proceeded with, then in their Lordships' opinion the consideration of the reference or the ekrarnama as the case may be, is unlawful: see Jones v. Merionethshire Permanent Benefit Building Society (1892) 1 Ch. 173) and the award or the ekrarnama was invalid, quite irrespective of the fact whether any prosecution in law bad been started." 9. 173) and the award or the ekrarnama was invalid, quite irrespective of the fact whether any prosecution in law bad been started." 9. In regard to the other aspect as to whether an agreement to compound a non-compoundable offence or an agreement to stifle prosecution must be seen from the face of the agreement, Their Lordship observed: "In a case of this description it is unlikely that it would be expressly stated in the ekrarnama that a part of its consideration was an agreement to settle the criminal proceedings. It is enough for the defendants to give evidence from which the inference necessarily arises that part of the consideration is unlawful." To the same effect is the observation of this Court in Catholic Union Bank Ltd., v. Poulo (reported in 1959 KLT. 777). "Remembering that such an agreement will seldom be set out on paper and perhaps will more often than not be only an implied one, the Court will always have a difficult task in arriving at a decision on the point." Justice Raman Nayar termed a case in which such an agreement is seen on the face of the document'a very rare one'. "This is one of those very rare cases where an agreement to stifle prosecution is set out on paper, for, the very mortgage deed on which the claim is based expressly states that the mortgage was executed by the 1st respondent for the sum of Rupees 2,400/-misappropriated by his son, the 3rd respondent, and as a compromise of the police prosecution pending against the latter." (1960 KLJ.111). 10. It is therefore clear that there has been a complete mis-conception of the law so far as the authorities who decided this matter are concerned. Though the question as to whether there was as agreement to stifle prosecution or to compound a non-compoundable offence is a question of fact, the determination of that question of fact must be on the basis of established principles of law. If the authorities decided disregarding, ignoring or misunderstanding the law they had mis-guided themselves and in the case of arbitrators, it will amount to mis-conduct, and the error being apparent, it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record entitling this Court to interfere. 11. If the authorities decided disregarding, ignoring or misunderstanding the law they had mis-guided themselves and in the case of arbitrators, it will amount to mis-conduct, and the error being apparent, it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record entitling this Court to interfere. 11. Apart from this I am also of the view that the above misconception had led to a non-consideration of important and material evidence. There has not been any advertence to Ex. B which is not only material but appears to me to afford conclusive proof that the purpose for which the bond was executed was that police to whom information had been given should be told not to proceed with any investigation. It is stated in Ex. B specifically that the bond be accepted and a communication be sent to the police that no further action need be taken. And the President who has been examined in the case has stated in his deposition that the very next day after the bond was executed viz., on 17th July, 1961, he wrote to the police station saying that no further steps need be taken, These are material factors which should have been taken into account. In cases where a conclusion has been reached by a judicial or a quasi judicial authority which no person properly instructed in law and acting judicially could have reached the court may proceed on the assumption that misconception of law has been responsible for the wrong decision. In such circumstances the High Court will be entitled to interfere under Art.226 of the Constitution. A passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in Provincial Services v. State Industrial Court, Nagpur and others (reported in AIR. 1963 S. C. 114) will make this clear: "While it would certainly have been better if the Enquiring Officer had also put his signature on the paper containing the statements, that omission cannot possibly be a ground for thinking that he did not hold the enquiry. The conclusion of the Assistant Labour Commissioner that 'there are sufficient grounds to doubt whether an enquiry was really made' must therefore be held to be perverse. The conclusion of the Assistant Labour Commissioner that 'there are sufficient grounds to doubt whether an enquiry was really made' must therefore be held to be perverse. It has often been pointed out by eminent judges that when it appears to an appellate court that no person properly instructed in law and acting judicially could have reached the particular decision the Court may proceed on the assumption that misconception of law has been responsible for the wrong decision". 12. In the light of the above, I have no alternative but to quash Exts. P.1 and P. 2. I do so. The 2nd respondent will take back the Arbitration Proceedings in his file and write a fresh award after considering the materials in the case and in the light of what is stated in this judgment. 13. This writ application is ordered on the above terms. There will be no direction regarding costs. Allowed.