JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - The landlord (Appellant) obtained an ex-parte order from the House Rent Controller for delivery of possession of the disputed house from the tenant (Respondent) on 1-5-1963. The ex-parte order dated 1-5-1963 was set aside by the Rent Controller on 16-10-1963. On 18-10-1963, the tenant filed an application for restitution u/s 144 CPC before the First Munsif, Cuttack who allowed it. An appeal by the landlord was dismissed on 4.7-1964. Against the appellate order, the Miscellaneous Second Appeal has been filed. 2. Mr. Dasgupta advanced two contentions: (i) There is no provision in the House Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) for restitution. The lacunae in the Act cannot be made good by the court. (ii) Even if an application for restitution is maintainable, the power and jurisdiction to grant restitution vests in the Rent Controller and not in the Munsif, the executing court as an application for restitution is not an application in execution. Both the contentions are closely interconnected and require careful examination. 3. The proposition that, if the Statute has no provision to grant restitution courts cannot supply the defects, is well founded. It is not competent to any court to proceed upon the assumption that the Legislature has made a mistake. It must proceed on the footing that the Legislature intended what it has said. Even if there is some defect in the phraseology used by the Legislature the Court cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of an Act or add and amend or, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left in the Act See Nalinakhya Bysack Vs. Shyam Sunder Haldar and Others. It is therefore necessary to examine if the Act makes no provision for restitution. It is not disputed that there is no provision in the Act vesting the power to grant restitution in the Rent Controller. The only point for consideration is whether u/s 13 of the Act, the Munsif can grant restitution. Section 13 runs thus: The Order of the Controller made under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, shall be deemed to be a decree and executable as such in the Court of the Munsif within whose jurisdiction the house is situate. Section 13 runs thus: The Order of the Controller made under Sub-section (1) of Section 7 directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house, shall be deemed to be a decree and executable as such in the Court of the Munsif within whose jurisdiction the house is situate. The plain language of the section indicates that the order of the Controller shall be deemed to be a decree and is executable as a decree in the court of a Munsif. It does not say that the order of the Controller shall be deemed to be a decree of the Munsif. That, however, makes no difference. Though it is not a decree of the Munsif, Statute directs that it shall be executed in the court of a Munsif as a decree. Mr. Dasgupta contends that Section 13 of the Act mainly empowers the Munsif to direct the tenant to put the landlord in possession and that there is no corresponding power given to the Munsif to direct the landlord to put the tenant in possession by way of restitution. On a plain reading, the contention appears to be attractive. It has, however, been held in Lakshman v. Binapani 29 C.L.T. 594 : L.R. 1963 Cutt 905 that the CPC would apply to proceedings in execution before the Munsif u/s 13 of the Act. Reliance had been placed in that case on AIR 1948 12 (Privy Council) and National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. Vs. James Chadwick and Bros. Ltd. (J. and P. Coats Ltd., Assignee). That decision concludes the matter. 4. The next question for consideration is whether an application for restitution is an application in execution or whether such application is entertainable only by the trial court and not by the executing court as Mr. Dasgupta contends. There is some conflict of authority on this point. The controversy was settled by a Full Bench decision in Nanhu Prasad Singh Vs. Nandan Missir and Others. It overruled a previous Full Bench decision in Balmukund Marwari Vs. Basanta Kumari Dasi and Another. Their Lordships held by majority that an application for restitution is an application in execution. This decision holds the field for over 30 years so far this State is concerned. With great respect I accept this decision as lying down sound principles. The Munsif and not the Rent Controller is the executing Court. Basanta Kumari Dasi and Another. Their Lordships held by majority that an application for restitution is an application in execution. This decision holds the field for over 30 years so far this State is concerned. With great respect I accept this decision as lying down sound principles. The Munsif and not the Rent Controller is the executing Court. An application for restitution being an application in execution is maintainable only in the Court of the Munsif and not before the Rent Controller. 5. The only other question for consideration is whether the Munsif can grant restitution u/s 144, Code of Civil Procedure. It is settled law that power of a court to direct restitution is inherent in the court itself. It rests on the fundamental principle that a court of justice is under a duty to repair the injury done to a party by its act. In Jai Berham and Ors. v. Kedarnath and Ors. AIR 1922 P.C. 269 , their Lordships approved the following passage in L.R. 3 P.C. 465: One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors and when the expression 'the act of the Court' is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary Court or of any intermediate Court of Appeal, hut the act of the Court as a whole from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the Highest Court which finally disposes of the case. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether restitution can be granted by the Munsif in terms of Section 144, Code of Civil Procedure. On the admitted fads the executing Court can grant restitution under its inherent powers. K.P.S. Thangaswamy v. Banoe Sahib AIR 1951 Mad. 364, directly applies to the facts of this case. This decision was distinguished by Mr. Dasgupta on the sole ground that Madras Act had a provision that the order of the Rent Controller shall be executed by the Subordinate Judge as if it were a decree passed by him. Madras Act XV of 1946 referred to in K.P.S. Thangaswamy v. Banoe Sahib AIR 1951 Mad. 364, was not available to see the exact wordings used in the section. Madras Act XV of 1946 referred to in K.P.S. Thangaswamy v. Banoe Sahib AIR 1951 Mad. 364, was not available to see the exact wordings used in the section. Section 9 of the Madras Act XXV of 1949 uses the expression "as if it were a decree passed by him". The difference between the expression in the Madras Act and that in Section 13 of the Act has however no significance. If Mr. Dasgupta's contention is accepted then the Rent Controller himself could have I also power to grant restitution. Merely because by the deeming provision, the order of the Rent Controller is treated as a decree of the Munsif, it does not take away the effect of his order being a decree by itself. On his contention, there would be two decrees Bide by side in respect of the same matter and both the Rent Controller and the Civil Court would have power to grant restitution. I find no force in this contention and the distinction pointed out by him in the two Acts is without any difference. Mr. Dasgupta's contention must therefore be repelled. K.P.S. Thangaswamy v. Banoe Sahib AIR 1951 Mad. 364, lays down the correct law. 6. Mr. Dasgupta placed strong reliance on Ram Prosad Rajgharia Vs. British Insulated Callender's Cables Ltd. to show that the Rent Controller can exercise the powers of restitution u/s 144 Code of Civil Procedure. This decision is clearly distinguishable. The question whether the power of restitution lies with the Rent Controller or with a civil court which had been vested with the statutory power of execution was not discussed in the judgment. It might be that under the Bengal Act referred to in the judgment the Rent Controller would have been the executing court. Further the Calcutta view seems to be that an application for restitution is not an application in execution See Tahsinuddin Ahmad and Others Vs. Emperor. Zakeria Suleman Vs. The Collector, Yeotmal and Others, ., relied upon by Mr. Dasgupta is also distinguishable. That case did not relate to execution at all, but was one relating to dismissal of the proceeding before the Rent Controller and the restoration thereof. Emperor. Zakeria Suleman Vs. The Collector, Yeotmal and Others, ., relied upon by Mr. Dasgupta is also distinguishable. That case did not relate to execution at all, but was one relating to dismissal of the proceeding before the Rent Controller and the restoration thereof. Their Lordships referred to the following passage from Craies on Statute Law 5th Edition Page 105: If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great importance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the statute has in contemplation, the Courts are at liberty to infer that the statute by implication empowers that detail be carried out. The correctness of this principle cannot be questioned and it is not in conflict with Nalinakhya Bysack Vs. Shyam Sunder Haldar and Others. This relates only to the details of working of the express provisions in the Act or of those to be inferred by necessary implication. 7. On the aforesaid discussion I am satisfied that the application for restitution is an application in execution. The Munsif had jurisdiction to entertain it and had powers to grant restitution. He rightly granted restitution in exercise of his inherent powers, if not u/s 144 Code of Civil Procedure. 8. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Final Result : Dismissed