JUDGMENT Shah, J.- 1. The appellant a medical practitioner has been occupying as a tenant, the ground-floor of a house Block No. 732 at Lordganj, Jabalpur, for his dispensary for the last more than thirty years. On a family partition Block No. 732 was allotted to the share of the respondent Nemi Chand, S/o Ballolal and he has since August 1956 been occupying the upper-floor of the house for his residence, With the sanction of the Additional Collector. Jabalpur, granted under S, 13(i), (v) and (vi) of the C. P. and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order 1949, the respondent served a notice upon the appellant terminating the tenancy and commenced an action in the Court of 2nd. Civil Judge, Class II, Jabalpur, for a decree in ejectment against the appellant and for mesne profits from April 1, 1958 till the date of evicton. The appellant resisted the suit. During the pendency of the suit, the Madhya Bharat Accommodation Control Act, 23 of 1955, was extended to the whole of the Madhya Pradesh State, with effect from January 1, 1959 and the title of the Act was altered and it was entitled the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act. By S. 4 of that Act no suit lay in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any "accommodation" except on one or more of the grounds specified in the section, and in S. 17 it was provided that in all suits for eviction of tenants from any "accommodation" pending on the date of the commencement of the Act, no decree for eviction shall be passed except on One or more of the grounds mentioned in S. 4 of the Act. The respondent then amended his plaint by adding paragraph I-A averring that the premises in suit were suitable for residential purposes, and that the premises were let for residential purposes, though the appellant used the premises for non-residential purposes. 2. The trial Court decreed the suit holding that the action had to be tried and disposed of as if the new act did not apply thereto. In appeal the District Court set aside the decree and remanded the action for decision on the following two issues:- "(i) Whether the accommodation is residential or non-residential; and (ii) If the accommodation is residential whether the plaintiff genuinely requires the accommodation for his residence etc. In appeal the District Court set aside the decree and remanded the action for decision on the following two issues:- "(i) Whether the accommodation is residential or non-residential; and (ii) If the accommodation is residential whether the plaintiff genuinely requires the accommodation for his residence etc. as cotemplated by S. 4(g) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act." 3. The respondent thereafter again amended the plaint by averring that the premises in suit were suitable for business purposes and as he the respondent could "not effectively and profitably run his business" in Sarees, "it was essential for him to require the premises in suit for business purposes also", that he required the premises for the purpose of running his business, and that he had no other premises in his occupation for that purpose. The trial Court framed to additional issues directed to the questions whether the respondent genuinely required the suit premises for his residence and whether the respondent genuinely required the suit premises for running a cloth shop. 4. At the trial the respondent abandoned his case that the required the permises for use as residence and on a consideration of the evidence led by the parties the Court recorded a negative answer on the second additional issue and dismissed the suit. In appeal the district Court agreed with the view of the trial Court that the respondent's alleged requirement was not, genuine, and dismissed the appeal. But in second appeal the High Court of Madhya Pradesh reversed the decree passed by the District Court. The High Court held that the finding of the District Court on the question of genuineness of the requirement was not conclusive, because the District Judge had not "correctly understood the legal connotation of the terms regarding which he was expected to give his finding" In the view of the High Court it was for the landlord to decide, arid not for the Court, how much space he required, that the landlord was the best Judge of his genuine requirements, and his assertion that he genuinely required the accommodation in question for his business "should not lightly be ignored", unless there was evidence to prove that his assertain on the point was demonstrably false or mala fide. The High Court then observed: "To Judge the question of his genuine requirements on the anvil of the Court's personal opinion of what it considered reasonable for hit needs was an unauthorized encroachment on his rights and unjustified under the provisions of the Act." With special leave, the appellant has appeared to this Court. 5. In our view the decree passed by the High Court cannot be subtained. It is common ground that even though the action was commenced before the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1955, was ex-tended to the area in which the premises in dispute are situate, it had to be heard and disposed of according to the provisions of Act 23 of 1955 and no decree could on that account be passed against a tenant of premises to which the Act applies, except on one or more of the grounds specified in S. 4. The respondent by his amendment made in the plaint pleaded in the first instance that the premises were "residential accommodation, and that he genuinely required the accommodation for his own residence". By the second amendment he pleaded that the premises were "non-residential accommodation" and that he genuinely required the accommodation for continuing or starting his own business and that he was not in occupation of any other accommodation for that purpose. At the hearing of the suit after remand, the respondent conceded that he did not require the premises for his residence and asserted that they were required by him for carrying on his business. This the appellant denied, and on a consideration of the nature of the business carried on by the respondent, the accommodation at his disposal for that business, and the varying pleas made by him from time to time, the learned trial Judge held that the respondent failed to prove that he genuinely required the suit premises for carrying on his business, and with that view the District Court agreed. 6. We agree with the High Court of Madhya Pradesh that the word 'genuinely' used in S. 4 (h) which "speaks of the State of mind," means honestly or in good faith:" see Damodar Vs. Nandram, 1960 JLJ 473 -AIR 1960 M. P. 345. 6. We agree with the High Court of Madhya Pradesh that the word 'genuinely' used in S. 4 (h) which "speaks of the State of mind," means honestly or in good faith:" see Damodar Vs. Nandram, 1960 JLJ 473 -AIR 1960 M. P. 345. The District Court considered the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining whether the respondent honestly or in good faith required the premises and held that the respondent failed to establish the case pleaded by him. This finding of the District Court was based on appreciation of evidence and was binding upon the High Court, and the High Court had no power to reverse that finding. The criticism made by the High Court that the District Court's finding was vitiated "due to very imperfect understanding of the meaning of the expression 'genuinely requires' occurring in clauses (g) and (h) of section 4 of the Act," and that the District Court had "arrived at a finding which is totally unrelated to the legal connotation of the phrase 'genuinely requires' and almost orders on perversity", does not appear to be merited. In our judgment, the District Court committed no error in the examination of the evidence in tile light of the Full Bench judgment in Damodar's case, 1960 JLJ 473 -AIR 1960 M. P. 345. The opinion expressed by the High Court that under S. 4(h) of the Act genuineness of the alleged requirements of tile landlord must be determines in the light of the assertions made by him and the case of requirement of accommodation by the landlord may be negatived only if there be evidence to prove that the assertion was demonstrably false or mala fide, cannot be accepted as a correct statement of the law. A tenant of "accommodation" disentitles himself to protection in a suit in ejectment if the case falls within any of the clauses of S. 4 of the Act. The Legislature has imposed a restriction upon the jurisdiction of the Court to pass a decree against the tenant in a suit in ejectment by the landlord; and the onus of proving the conditions, on proof of which alone the protection may not be claimed, lies upon the landlord. The burden of proving that he genuinely requires non-residential accommodation within the meaning of S. 4(h) therefore lies upon the landlord. The burden of proving that he genuinely requires non-residential accommodation within the meaning of S. 4(h) therefore lies upon the landlord. Whether in a given case, that burden is discharged by the evidence on the record is a question of fact. It must however be observed that mere assertion by the landlord that he requires for his use the premises in the occupation of his tenant raises no presumption that he genuinely requires the premises for his use. The District Court held that the respondent failed to establish that he genuinely required the premises in suit primarily on two grounds-(i) that he had in the first instance claimed that he required the premises for his residence and after the suit was remanded to the trial Court, he set up the plea that the premises were required for business purposes and abandoned his earlier case; and (ii) that the nature and extent of the business carried on by the respondent were such that no additional accommodation could have been honestly claimed by him. The inference of fact raised by the District Court was pre-eminently reasonable. In any event the High Court had no jurisdiction in second appeal to set aside the conclusion reached by the District Court based on that inference of fact. It has also to be noticed that the trial Courts and the District Court held that the respondent, for conducting the business on the very small scale, had other accommodation. Section 4 (h) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation control Act requires not only that the accommodation is genuinely required for continuing or starting the landlord's business, but that the landlord is not in occupation of any other accommodation in the city or town for that purpose. On the finding recorded by the District Court, the second condition was also not satisfied, and the respondent's claim was bound to fail. 7. This appeal must therefore be allowed and the decree passed by the High Court set aside and the decree passed by the District Court, Jabalpur, restored with costs in this Court and the High Court.