JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a landlord's second appeal from the decision of the Civil and Sessions Judge Saharanpur dismissing a substantial part of his suit for recovery of rent and compensation for use and occupation and allowing a sum of Rs. 117/12/- only out of a total claim of Rs. 2,910/-. This is an unusual and interesting case involving several questions of law with regard to the interpretation of the various provisions of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act and the extent of obligations of a tenant whose tenancy is created in pursuance of an order under Sec. 7(2) of the Act, commonly known as "allotment order." It also reveals some of the defects and gaps in the Act as it stands today. 2. The facts are these. The plaintiff-appellant Smt. Padmawati is the owner and landlord of a house known as 3, Mohindra Gardens Saharanpur. The house consists of two separate portions to the called accommodation A and B. The former was constructed before the 1st of January 1951 and its tenancy is governed by the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, while the latter was constructed in 1952 and its tenancy is not controlled by the Act. The defendant respondent was at the material time the Rent Control and Eviction Officer at Saharanpur. The plaintiff alleged that till December 1953 one Sri Rai Saheb Khem Chand Malhotra was his tenant on a rent of Rs. 45/- p.m. for accommodation A and Rs, 80 p.m. for B, making a total of Rs. 125/- p.m. She further alleged that on 9th December, 1953, this tenant vacated the premises. At that time the plaintiff-appellant was in British East Africa. The defendant-respondent, taking advantage of his official powers, allotted the accommodation to himself and took possession on 9th December, 1953. The plaintiff further alleged that no terms of tenancy were settled between the parties. She further alleged that the defendant took advantage of his official position and managed to get the rent of the entire accommodation fixed at Rs. 27/- p.m. She contended that this fixation of rent was null and void as against her. According to the plaintiff the defendant occupied the house from 9th December, 1953 till 30th November 1955 and was liable to pay rent for this period for accommodation A at the rate of Rs. 27/- p.m. She contended that this fixation of rent was null and void as against her. According to the plaintiff the defendant occupied the house from 9th December, 1953 till 30th November 1955 and was liable to pay rent for this period for accommodation A at the rate of Rs. 45/- p.m. and compensation for use and occupation of accommodation B at the rate of Rs. 80/- p.m. She claimed from the defendant a sum of Rs. 2,910/- in all but as the latter did not reply to her letters of demand, she filed this suit. The defendant resisted the suit. He admitted that he was the tenant of the appellant but denied that he had taken any undue advantage of his official powers or position. He also denied that he remained in occupation till 30th November 1955 and alleged that he occupied it till 9th February 1954. He further alleged that the reasonable rent of the entire house, including accommodation A and B, was fixed by the District Magistrate at Rs. 27/-p.m., and pleaded that he was liable to pay rent at this rate and only for the period from 9th December 1953 to 9th February 1954. He contended that he was not liable to pay rent after 9th February 1954 as he left the house and gave notice of this fact at the time to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and also to one Brij Mohan Mahendra, a lawyer, who was the nephew of the plaintiffs husband. The defendant also denied that accommodation B was constructed after 1st January 1951 and contended that the tenancy of this portion was also governed by the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act and the District Magistrate had the power both to allot this portion to him and to fix its rent. 3. The trial court held that the two portions were separate accommodations, A having been constructed before 1st of January 1951 and B after that date. It also held that the District Magistrate was competent to pass an order of allotment in respect of portion A but not of B, and therefore the defendant was a tenant of portion A but a trespasser in occupation of B. It further held that the District Magistrate was competent to fix the rent of the entire accommodation under Sec. 3-A of the Act and that the amount of Rs. 27/- fixed by him was proper. It also held that the defendant left the house on 9th February 1954 on being transferred from Saharanpur and was therefore liable to pay rent for portion A and compensation for use and occupation of portion B for this period only. It decreed the appellants suit for Rs. 67/12/- with proportionate costs. 4. On appeal by the landlord, the learned Civil Judge confirmed the trial courts finding that the defendant respondent was in occupation till 9th February 1954 and liable to pay rent and compensation for this period only. He also accepted the finding that portion A was constructed before 1951 and B after that year, and therefore the Act applied to A and not to B and the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to allot B to the defendant. He agreed with the trial court that the defendant was a tenant of A but a trespasser in occupation of B. He also held that the District Magistrate was competent to fix the rent , for A but not of B and therefore the appellant was entitled to compensation for use and occupation of B. He however increased the rate of compensation from Rs. 50/- to Rs, 100/- p m. but left untouched the decree for rent. In the result he increased the total amount decreed from Rs. 67/12/-to Rs. 117/12/-. Dissatisfied with this decision the landlord has come to this court in second appeal. 5. Mr. B. R. Awasthi learned counsel for the appellant stated at the outset that he accepted the finding of the courts below that the defendant respondent was in occupation of the accommodation till 9th February 1954. He also conceded that on this finding the appellant was entitled to compensation for the use and occupation of the house for this period only. He however contended that the assessment of the rate of the compensation by the lower appellate court was erroneous. As regards portion A of the accommodation, learned counsel accepted the finding of the lower court that the tenant vacated it on 9th February, 1951, but he contended that his liability to pay rent till 30th November, 1955 when the appellant was put in possession. 6. On the other hand it was argued by Mr. As regards portion A of the accommodation, learned counsel accepted the finding of the lower court that the tenant vacated it on 9th February, 1951, but he contended that his liability to pay rent till 30th November, 1955 when the appellant was put in possession. 6. On the other hand it was argued by Mr. M. P. Mehrotra for the respondent that he was not liable to pay rent after he vacated the accommodation, and that the fixation of rent by the District Magistrate was both legal and reasonable. 7. The first question is whether the defendant-respondent is liable to pay rent for the period between 9th February 1954 and 30th November 1955 when he was not in occupation. It is not the case of the respondent that he put the appellant in possession or even that he informed him that he was vacating the accommodation. But he relied on the fact that he gave notice of vacating the accommodation to the District Magistrate and contended that this Act was quite sufficient to relieve him of any further liability in respect of the accommodation. The learned Civil Judge accepted to, is plea and held that the respondent was not liable to pay rent for the period after 9-2-1954 as he had informed the District Magistrate at the time that he was leaving it. He relied on Sec. 7(1) (b) of the Act which enjoins that "every tenant occupying accommodation shall within 7 days of vacation of such accommodation or ceasing to occupy it give notice thereof in writing to the District Magistrate." Holding that the respondent had personally informed the then Town Rationing Officer that the accommodation had fallen vacant, the learned Judge observed "It will thus be clear that the defendant-respondent had complied with the requirements of law and his statutory tenancy which was created by the order of allotment had come to an end and a fresh tenancy was created in (favour of Sri Sheo Bali Singh. The notice of this fresh allotment was given to the plaintiff appellant though it could not be served upon her for want of a correct address. Her husbands nephew, who is a lawyer here and probably who used to manage the premises, had refused to take the notice. The notice of this fresh allotment was given to the plaintiff appellant though it could not be served upon her for want of a correct address. Her husbands nephew, who is a lawyer here and probably who used to manage the premises, had refused to take the notice. In these circumstances, the respondent could not have done anything else to communicate his intention to vacate and to save himself from the liability to pay rent. Hence ever in respect of the accommodation A, the respondent could not be made liable for rent after 9-2-1954." 8. In my opinion the learned Judge was in error, as he overlooked Sec. 108 (q) of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that "on the determination of the lease, the lessee, is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property. Commenting on the effect of this clause, Sri Dinshaw Mulla, in his Transfer of Property Act, 4th edition, writes, "when a tenant leaves the premises without placing the landlord in the possession thereof, that may entitle the landlord to claim rent or profits from him." In my opinion the respondent was under an obligation to put the landlord in possession when he vacated the accommodation on 9-2-54, and as he did not do so, he is liable to the (landlord ?) for rent or compensation. 9. Mr. Mehrotra argued that the obligation imposed by Sec. 7(1) (b) of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act to inform the District Magistrate absolves the tenant of his liability under Sec. 108 (q) of the Transfer of Property Act to put the landlord in possession. Learned counsel contended that Sec. 7(1) (a) of the former Act must be deemed to have modified Sec. 108 (q) of the latter Act as regards accommodation to which the former Act applies. I cannot agree. 10. The U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act was passed to achieve a limited purpose - namely, "to control the letting and the rent of" accommodation in Uttar Pradesh "and to prevent the eviction of tenants therefrom." As the preamble states., there was shortage of accommodation in the State and it was considered expedient to protect the tenants against any attempt by the landlord from taking advantage of this shortage by providing safeguards against arbitrary eviction or increase in rent. Sec. 7 imposes a restriction on the landlords right to let the accommodation to whomsoever he likes and empowers the District Magistrate to select a tenant for a vacant accommodation and require the landlord to let out to the person selected by him. Sec. 3 imposes restrictions on the landlords right to evict the tenant; Secs. 3-A to 6 provide for restrictions on the landlords power to increase the rent; Sec. 7-D prohibits the landlord to cut off or withhold any of the amenities enjoyed by the tenant; Sec. 7-E binds the landlord to keep the accommodation wind-proof and water-proof and to carry out the other repairs which he is bound to make by law, contract or custom. These restrictions have a sanction behind them, for Sec. 8 provides that any person contravening the provisions of the Act or any order made under it is liable to be punished with simple imprisonment not exceeding six months or with fine not exceeding Rs. 5,000/- or both. The Act also contains provisions to protect the legitimate rights of the landlord. Sec. 7-B confers upon him the right to apply to the Munsif for the ejectment of the tenant who is in arrears of rent and Sec. 3 enables him to eject the tenant after obtaining the District Magistrate permission. Thus the entire scheme of the Act is to impose restrictions on the ordinary rights of the landlord in the matter of letting, ejectment, and increase of rent. To the extent of these restrictions, the ordinary law of landlord and tenant must be deemed to have been modified by the Act, but outside these restrictions that law still prevails and governs the rights and liabilities of the landlord and tenant. For example, Sec. 7 by requiring the landlord, on pain of imprisonment to let the accommodation to any person selected by the District Magistrate modifies the ordinary law of contract which requires that all agreements enforceable at law must be made with the free consent of the parties. It is obvious that a law which requires the landlord to let the accommodation to a person not of his choice modifies Sec. 10 of the Contract Act requiring his free consent to this limited extent. It is obvious that a law which requires the landlord to let the accommodation to a person not of his choice modifies Sec. 10 of the Contract Act requiring his free consent to this limited extent. Again, Sec. 3 of the Act: which provides that the landlord cannot file a suit for the ejectment of the tenant without the permission of the District Magistrate (except in a few specified cases) must be deemed to have modified Secs. 106 and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act which confer on the landlord the right to determine the tenancy and then eject the tenant. Thus the Act by restricting the power of the landlord under the ordinary law must be deemed to have modified the law to the extent of the restrictions provided in the Act. 11. But outside the restrictions, the rights and obligations of the parties continue to be governed by the ordinary law of landlord and tenant which includes the Transfer of Property Act. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that the Act leaves untouched the fundamental principle of law that a tenancy is created by an agreement between the parties. In fact, it confirms this principle, for Sec. 7 of the Act which controls the letting of the accommodation, merely authorised the District Magistrate to order the letting of the accommodation to a person of his choice and gives him no power to let the accommodation himself. The tenancy is still created by the landlord though under compulsion. This is further confirmed by Sec. 5(1) which provides that the rent payable for any accommodation to which the Act applies shall be such as may be agreed upon between the landlord and the tenant. 12. All this indicates that, except to the extent that the rights and obligations of the parties have been modified by the Act, expressly or by necessary implication, they continue to be governed by the law of landlord and tenant. One of the obligations of a tenant is to put the landlord into possession of the property on the determination of the lease. It is imposed by Sec. 108(q) of the Transfer of Property Act and there is no provision in the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act modifying or reducing this obligation. One of the obligations of a tenant is to put the landlord into possession of the property on the determination of the lease. It is imposed by Sec. 108(q) of the Transfer of Property Act and there is no provision in the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act modifying or reducing this obligation. Therefore, an "allottee" - that is, a tenant to whom the accommodation has been let in pursuance of the order of the District Magistrate - must carry out this obligation when his tenancy comes to an end and he vacates the accommodation. Mr. Mehrotra relied on Sec. 7(1) (b) which provides, "Every tenant occupying accommodation shall within seven days of vacation of such accommodation or ceasing to occupy it gives notice hereof in writing to the District Magistrate." In my opinion, the obligation to give notice to the District Magistrate is quite independent of the obligation to deliver possession of the accommodation to the landlord. The purpose of giving notice to the District Magistrate is to enable him to keep himself informed of accommodations which fall vacant from time to time so that he can exercise his powers of control over letting effectively. But for these provisions, it will be easy for landlords and would be tenants to evade the provisions relating to the control of Rent and Eviction Act particularly in large towns where an accommodation may be vacated by one tenant and occupied by another without the District Magistrate being aware of the vacancy. But Sec. 7 (1) imposes an obligation on both the landlord and the tenant to inform the District Magistrate as soon as the accommodation is vacated, and failure to inform has been made punishable under Sec. 8. Therefore, the purpose of the provisions, requiring the giving of notice to the District Magistrate is to make the powers of that officer more effective and not to relieve the tenant of his obligation to deliver possession of the accommodation to the landlord when he vacates it. If learned counsels argument is accepted the result will be gross injustice to the landlord in many cases. An accommodation let out may be furnished, or it may include a garden containing a valuable orchard or trees or it may have expensive fittings like electric fans and sanitary equipment, and so on. If learned counsels argument is accepted the result will be gross injustice to the landlord in many cases. An accommodation let out may be furnished, or it may include a garden containing a valuable orchard or trees or it may have expensive fittings like electric fans and sanitary equipment, and so on. If the tenant is relieved of his obligation to deliver possession to the landlord on vacating the accommodation the landlord may find that valuable assets have been removed and he yet have no remedy against any one. On the other hand, there is no injustice done to the tenant if he is required to hand over possession of the accommodation to the landlord or some one authorised on his behalf. 13. Learned counsel argued that the enforcement of the obligation under Sec. 108(q) will cause hardship to the tenant in a case where the landlords address is not known at the time when the tenant vacates the accommodation. He pointed out that in the present case the landlords address was not known to the tenant even at the time when he occupied the accommodation as the former was in East Africa and the tenant was never informed of her address. I am not much impressed by this argument. The problem of ascertaining the address of the landlord does not become more acute for a tenant under an allotment order than under an ordinary agreement of tenancy. It is the duty of the tenant in every case to approach the landlord for the purpose of paying rent during the tenancy and delivering possession of the accommodation on its conclusion. A tenant cannot enjoy the benefits under the tenancy and repudiate its liabilities. If a tenant thinks at the time of occupying the accommodation that it might be difficult for him to deliver possession on the determination of the tenancy, the proper course for him is not to accept the accommodation at all; but if he accepts it, he does so with all the liabilities and obligations of a tenant. 14. Mr. Mehrotra then contended that the accommodation had been allotted to other Government officers after the defendant respondent had vacated it and the appellant should have recovered the rent from these officers. There are two short answers to this argument. First, the appellant was in East Africa while her house was being occupied by one official after another. 14. Mr. Mehrotra then contended that the accommodation had been allotted to other Government officers after the defendant respondent had vacated it and the appellant should have recovered the rent from these officers. There are two short answers to this argument. First, the appellant was in East Africa while her house was being occupied by one official after another. She came to know for the first time in November, 1955 that one Mr. Joshi and not the defendant respondent was in occupation. Therefore, she is entitled to claim rent or profits for the period between his vacating and Mr. Joshi's occupying it. 15. Mr. Mehrotra then argued that it would be unfair to make the defendant respondent pay rent while other officials enjoyed the benefit of the accommodation. This argument does not appeal to me. The appellants right to claim rent from these officials is time-barred. On the other hand, the defendant respondent can ask the Government to direct these persons to reimburse him for any payment which he may be compelled to make to the appellant under the decree of the Court. I have no doubt that, the Government will consider his application with sympathy and ask those officers to conduct themselves in a manner becoming of Government servants. 16. Learned counsel then contended that the defendant-respondent must be deemed to have fulfilled his obligation under Sec. 108 (q) of the Transfer of Property Act, when he delivered possession of the accommodation to the subsequent allottee. I cannot agree. Sec. 108 (q) says that on the determination of the lease the lessee is bound to put the lessor into possession of the property. A delivery to a subsequent tenant who was not selected by the landlord and of whose existence he was not aware is not delivery to the lessor. If learned counsel's argument is accepted, it will result in injustice to the landlord in many cases, particularly where an accommodation is reserved by the District Magistrate for officials. As the officials are liable to be transferred, if an official is permitted to treat delivery of possession to the next, official as delivery to the landlord, the latter may remain ignorant of the identify of successive tenants and lose his right to recover rent from all or any of them. This is precisely what has happened in this case. 17. This is precisely what has happened in this case. 17. For these reasons I am of the opinion that the defendant respondent having failed to deliver possession of the accommodation to the appellant on the determination of his tenancy is liable to pay rent or profits for the period between 9-12-1953 and 30-11-1955. 18. The next question is: What should be the rate of rent in this case ? As stated above, the accommodation consists of two separate accommodations A and B, and the Control of Rent and Eviction Act applies only to A. The District Magistrate fixed the rent for both A and B at Rs. 27/- per month, but the appellate Judge held that he had no power t.o fix the rent for accommodation B. Nevertheless he accepted the rate of rent fixed by the District Magistrate as a standard for making his own assessment separately for A and B. I am afraid he was in error. 19. The District Magistrate purported to act under Sec. 3-A(l) of the Act when he fixed the rent of the accommodation. This sub-section runs thus : "The District Magistrate on the application of a person who has been allotted any accommodation to which sub-Cl. (1) of Clause (f) of Sec, 2 applies declare an annual reasonable rent payable therefor. The District Magistrate likewise on the application of a person who has been allotted any accommodation or of the landlord determine the reasonable annual rent of the accommodation to which any of the remaining provisions of the said clause may be applicable." 20. It is conceded by both the parties that the District Magistrate, in the present case, could only exercise his powers of fixing the rent under the second paragraph of this sub-section. But this power was quasi-judicial. The relevant words are "The District Magistrate may - on the application of a person who has been allotted any accommodation or of the landlord determine the reasonable annual rent of the accommodation........"The word "determine"clearly indicates that the District Magistrate must issue notice of the application to the other party and then decide what the reasonable annual rent should be. In this case, the District Magistrate fixed the rent without issuing any notice to the appellant. Indeed, he could not have issued any such notice because - this is admitted - the appellant was in East Africa at the time. In this case, the District Magistrate fixed the rent without issuing any notice to the appellant. Indeed, he could not have issued any such notice because - this is admitted - the appellant was in East Africa at the time. Therefore, the order fixing the rent was illegal and the court was not justified in adopting the rent fixed by the District Magistrate as a standard for its own assessment. At the very outset I would like to dispose of the argument of learned counsel that this Court has no jurisdiction to fix the rent if none has been settled by the parties themselves. According to learned counsel, the Court must hold in such a case that the contract of tenancy itself is void and no rent is payable. I cannot agree. It is common ground that; there was a contract of tenancy between the parties and the only question is whether this court h,as the jurisdiction to award a decree for rent for the period during which the accommodation was in the possession of the tenant and for the subsequent period when it was not delivered to the landlord. There is a distinction between an agreement of tenancy which has not been performed, and one under which the tenant has already entered possession of the accommodation. In the former case, if no rent is fixed, the agreement is void for uncertainty and neither party can enforce the agreement. But in the latter case the agreement having been performed by the landlord and the tenant taken possession of the accommodation, the Court has the jurisdiction to compel the tenant to pay reasonable rent. Sec. 70 of the Contract Act provides that where a person lawfully does anything for another person or delivers anything to him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and such other person enjoys the benefits thereof, the latter is bound to make compensation to former in respect of, or to restore, the thing so done or delivered. The words of the Section are wide enough to cover a case where a landlord delivers possession of the accommodation to the tenant under an understanding that the latter shall pay rent. In such a case if the tenant refuses to pay rent or offers rent which is reasonably low, the Court can award reasonable compensation under this Act. 21. The words of the Section are wide enough to cover a case where a landlord delivers possession of the accommodation to the tenant under an understanding that the latter shall pay rent. In such a case if the tenant refuses to pay rent or offers rent which is reasonably low, the Court can award reasonable compensation under this Act. 21. Therefore, the duty of fixing the rent for both portions falls on this Court. It has been established by the appellant that the previous tenant was paying Rs. 45/- per month for accommodation A and Rs. 80/-per month for accommodation B. asked learned counsel for the defend ant respondent to give any reason why this rate should not be adopted as reasonable. He was unable to do so. The question is not of any great significance as regards the accommodation B, because the appellants counsel has conceded that she is entitled to compensation for use and occupation for two months and the lower appellate court has already awarded her a sum of Rs. 100/- - in respect of accommodation B. Therefore, if I fix the rate of compensation at Rs. 80/- per month, the difference will be of Rs. 60/- only. I hold that the appellant is entitled to Rs. 160/- as compensation for the use and occupation of the accommodation B. 22. As regards accommodation A, the appellant claims rent at the rate of Rs. 45/- per month and she claimed not only for the period of two months when the defendant respondent was in occupation but also for the subsequent period till 30-11-1955 on the ground that he did not deliver possession to her. The accommodation consists of two living rooms and the house is situate in the Civil Lines area of Saharanpur. The previous tenant was paying Rs. 45/- per month for this accommodation, and I think this rate is reasonable. I, therefore, hold that the appellant is entitled to claim rent for portion A from the defendant respondent for the period from 9-12-1953 till 30-11-1955 at the rate of Rs. 45/- per month. 23. I allow this appeal in part and decree the appellants suit for Rs. 160/- as the compensation for use and occupation in respect of accommodation B and Rs. 1,068/- as rent for accommodation A from 9-12-1953 till 30-11-1965. The appellant shall be entitled to proportionate costs throughout.