JUDGMENT The petitioner, Pentala Kotayya, has filed this petition praying for quashing the proceedings in the Court of the learned Sixth City Magistrate in Crl. M.P.No.182 of 1965 on his file. The relevant facts are as follows : An authority duly empowered to act under the Payment of Wages Act, passed an order on 26th October, 1963, in File No. 2437 of 1963 (Case No. 29 of 1963) directing that the respondent, Pentala Kotayya, should pay an amount of Rs. 1,125 as retrenchment compensation to the petitioner, Boggavarapu Ammayya (an ex-employee of the petitioner herein) who was employed in a tobacco shop of which the petitioner, Pentala Kotayya was the owner. At the instance of the said authority, the learned Sixth City Magistrate registered Crl. M.P. No. 182 of 1965 and issued a notice to the petitioner, Pentala Kotayya directing him to deposit the sum of Rs. 1,125 on or before 13th August, 1965. Obviously, the learned Magistrate was proceeding under section 15(5)(b) of the Payment of Wages Act (Central Act IV of 1936). The Petitioner, Pentala Kotayya appeared by an advocate before the learned Magistrate and filed a petition contending that the amount sought to be recovered from him was not an amount which could be collected under section 15(5)(b) of the Act and that only wages could be collected by resort to that provision. On behalf of the petitioner, it was contended before the learned Magistrate that the matter involved a question of jurisdiction and that it should be decided either by the learned Magistrate himself or that a reference might be made to the High Court. The learned Magistrate issued a warrant on the some day for attachment of the movables in the residence of the said Pentala Kotayya. There upon the petitioner herein filed the present petition in this Court under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code. The correctness of the order passed by the authority dated 26th October, 1963, is not challenged before me. No appeal was filed against that order as provided for in the Act. The only contention raised before me is that the amount concerned is not an amount which can be recovered under section 15(5)(b) of the Act. The order of the authority shows that the amount is awarded as retrenchment compensation. It is not contended before me that the amount is not due as retrenchment compensation. The only contention raised before me is that the amount concerned is not an amount which can be recovered under section 15(5)(b) of the Act. The order of the authority shows that the amount is awarded as retrenchment compensation. It is not contended before me that the amount is not due as retrenchment compensation. I proceed on the basis that the amount of retrenchment compensation has been awarded by the authority and can be lawfully collected from the petitioner. Section 15 of the Act runs as follows : 1. The State Government may………………appoint any Commissioner for Workmens Compensation or other officer…………….to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of…………….delay in payment of the wages……………. 2. Where contrary to the provisions of this Act……any payment of wages has been delayed, such person…………..may apply to such authority for a direction under sub- section (3). (3) When any application under sub- section (2) is entertained, the authority shall……..and, alter such further inquiry (if any) as may be necessary, may……..direct……the payment of the delayed wages. * * * * * * (5) Any amount directed to be paid under this section may be recovered………. (b) if the authority is not a Magistrate by any Magistrate to whom the authority makes application in this behalf, as if it were fine imposed by such Magistrate.” Section 2 runs as follows : “In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in subject or context,– (vi) ‘Wages’ means all remuneration……….expressed in terms of money or capable of being so expressed which would, if the terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed…………and includes………. (d) any sum which by reason of the termination of employment of the person employed is payable under any law, contract or instrument which provides for the payment of such sum……but does not provide for the time within which the payment is to be made.” Section 4 runs as follows : “(1) Every person responsible for the payment of wages under section 3 shall fix periods in respect of which such wages shall be payable………. (2) No wage period shall exceed one month.” Section 5 runs as follows: “………………… 5. (2) No wage period shall exceed one month.” Section 5 runs as follows: “………………… 5. (2) Where the employment of any person is terminated by or on behalf of the employer the wages earned by him shall be paid before the expiry of the second working day from the day on which his employment is terminated.” Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. (XIV of 1947) runs as follows : “ No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until……………….. (b) the workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment compensation, which shall be equivalent to fifteen days’ average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months:” The retrenchment compensation which had been awarded by the authority in his order dated 26th October, 1963, is obviously an amount which comes under section 25-F(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Such compensation satisfied the conditions mentioned in section 2(vi)(d) of the Payment of Wages Act viz., that the sum is payable under a law by reason of termination of employment of the person employed and that the law should be one which provides for the payment of such sum. Section 2(vi)(d) also requires that the law should be one which does not provide for the time within which payment is to be made. Section 25-F(b)provides for the payment of the sum but also in a way provides for the time within which the payment is to be made that is, not beyond the time of retrenchment. In B.N. Elias & Co. v. Authority under Payment of Wages Act, A.I.R. 1960 Cal. 603. the question whother retrenchment compensation payable under section 25-F(b) will be covered by section 25(vi)(d)of the Payment of Wages Act, though the former contains a provision, as to the time of payment, came up for consideration. The learned Judge (P.N. Sinha, J.) observed as follows (at page 607) : “………He (Mr. Ginwalla) argues that in order to come within the definition of ‘wages’ under the amendment, it must come within clause (d), and any sum which is payable under any law by reason of the termination of employment would only come within the definition if the time within which it should be paid has not been provided. Ginwalla) argues that in order to come within the definition of ‘wages’ under the amendment, it must come within clause (d), and any sum which is payable under any law by reason of the termination of employment would only come within the definition if the time within which it should be paid has not been provided. He points out that the time within which compensation under Section 25-F(b) should be paid has been provided in the section itself, namely, at the time of retrenchment. In my opinion, it is too narrow a construction of the amended definition. Clause (d) in the amended definition of ‘wages’, is merely illustrative of what constitutes wages and is not exhaustive. The definition starts by saying that ‘wages’ would mean all remuneration (whether by way of salary, allowance or otherwise) expressed in terms of money or capable of being so expressed, which would, if the terms of employment, expressed or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment. As I have held, payment of compensation under section 25-F(b) must be taken to be an implied terms of the contract and would thus come within the definition of ‘wages. ‘This result cannot be cut down by an illustration which follows, as is contained in clause (d). Upon this point, a decision of the Supreme Court must be cited- Divisional Engineer, G.I.P. Rly. v. Mahadeo Raghoo, (1955) S.C.J. 358 : (1955) 1 MLJ. (S.C.) 209 : (1955) 1 S.C.R. 1345 : A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 295. I respectfully agree with the Calcutta view that retrenchment compensation come under section 2(vi)(d). Beyond doubt, the amount has not been paid at the time of retrenchment. Therefore, the claim of the employee was a claim arising out of ‘delay in payment of the wages’ for the purpose of section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. Consequently, the order of the authority is the proper order coming under section 15(3) of the Act. The result is, that the learned Magistrate is competent to proceed under section 15(5)(b) for recovering the amount. In the end, I dismiss this petition. A.B.K.-----Petition dismissed.