JUDGMENT These appeals are directed against the order of the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Chingleput, permitting the respondents to withdraw the compensation deposited by the Government in respect of Panambakkam ‘B ‘Block, which stood abolished on 9th December, 1950. The respondents are the mortgagees of this village and they obtained a final decree for Rs. 6,590 in the Sub-Court, Chingleput, which was finally affirmed by this Court on 28th August, 1953. They withdraw 15/16 share in the advance compensation deposited by the Government in regard to this village. When the final compensation was deposited by the Government on 27th June, 1959, the respondents applied for payment of Rs. 2,764-70 P. out of this amount. This was opposed on the ground that before applying to the Tribunal the Respondents-mortgagees-decree-holders did not put their decree in execution and that the decree was barred by limitation. Neither of these contentions appealed to the Tribunal in view of section 59 of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXVI of 1948). In the result the Tribunal allowed the claim of the respondents. It is this view of the Tribunal that is assailed before us. It is argued before us by both Mr. Krishnamachari and Mr. Appu Rao for the appellants that there being no obstacle in the way of the mortgage-decree-holders (respondents) executing the decree and their decree having been barred by limitation, the Tribunal ought not to have recognised the claim of the respondents. We do not find any substance in this contention. It is clear from a reading of section 42 of the Act that the only remedy which is available to the person having a claim against an estate is to apply to the Tribunal within six months from the date on which the amount was deposited and within such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow. Indisputably the respondents have applied within the prescribed time. Thus they have availed themselves of the remedy contemplated by section 42 of the Act. Indisputably the respondents have applied within the prescribed time. Thus they have availed themselves of the remedy contemplated by section 42 of the Act. At this stage, it is useful to refer to section 3(g) of the Act which says that “any rights and privileges which may have accrued in the estate to any person before the notified date against the principal or any other land-holder thereof shall cease and determine and shall not be enforceable against the Government or such land-holder, and every such person shall be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are recognised or conferred on him by or under this Act.” Thus, the rights a person acquired under a decree are wiped out and in their place, a new right is given and that is the right to apply to the Tribunal under section 42 of the Act. There is no substance in the argument of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the Act does not enact any obstacle in the way of persons like the respondents executing the decrees. The answer to that contention is furnished by section 59 of the Act. Section 59 reads : “(1) No claim or liability enforceable immediately before the notified date against the principal or any other landholder of an estate, or against any other person whose rights stand transferred to the Government in pursuance of section 3, clause (b), shall, on or after that date, be enforceable against the interest he had in the estate; and all such claims and liabilities shall after the date on which the deposit in pursuance of section 54-A is made be enforceable; (a) against the interim payments or the compensation or other sums paid or payable to him under this Act, to the same extent to which such claims and liabilities were enforceable against his interest in the estate immediately before the notified date; and (b) against his other property, if any, to the same extent to which such claims and liabilities were enforceable against such property immediately before the notified date. (2) No Court shall, on or after the notified date, order or continue execution in respect of any decree or order passed against the principal or any other landholder or any other person aforesaid against the interest he had in the estate; and execution shall be ordered or continued in such cases in conformity with the provisions of sub- section (1) only as against the interim payments or against the compensation or other sum or sums paid or payable to him as aforesaid, or against his other property, if any…….” It is manifest from this section that claims or liabilities enforceable against the estate can only be enforced in the manner indicated therein and that execution in respect of any decree or order passed against the principal or any other landholder or any other person aforesaid against the interest he had in the estate, should not be entertained or continued and the execution will be ordered or continued only against the interim payments or against the compensation or other sums paid or payable to the landlord as aforesaid or against his other property, section 59 makes it abundantly clear that the claim can be enforced as laid down in that section and not by resorting to a civil Court under the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. The only requirement is that the claim should not have been barred on the date on which the estate was taken over. Admittedly in this case the decree was alive in 1950 when the estate was abolished. Munuswamy Pillai v. Lakshmamma Garu, (1959) 2 An.W.R. 117., is of no avail to the appellants as that dealt with a personal claim. This view of ours gains strength from a Division Bench of this Court in Chokkalinga Chettiar v. Marudappa Pandayan, (1964) 1 MLJ. 340 . For all the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the decision reached by the Tribunal is correct and cannot be successfully challenged. In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs in one appeal (S.T.A. No. 51 of 1964). V.K.-----Appeal dismissed.