S. K. Kapur ( 1 ) THIS Civil Revision under section 35 of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952 (Act XXXVIII of 1952) is directed against the judgment of the Senior Subordinate Judge, ( 2 ) BHAGAT Duli Chand, who is now represented by his legal representatives, brought a suit on December 11, 1954, against Hukam Singh respondent for recovery of possession of two rooms and a kitchen on the ground floor of house No. 11038 situate in Muqeem Pura Subzi Mandi, Delhi. Evivtion of Hukam Singh was sought on the ground of (a) non payment of rent, (b) unauthorised sub-letting and (c) bona fide requirement of the land lord for his own use and occupation. Hukam Singh defendant- respondent pleaded inter alia for the fixation of the standard rent. The Trial Court rejected the claim of the plaintiff for ejectment. He, however, fixed the standard rent at Rs. 8. 00 per mensem with effect from January 4, 1955. There was appeal by the landlord and cross-objections by the tenant. The Senior Subordinate Judge accepted the landlord s appeal and held that standard rent ought not to have been fixed as there was no sufficient material to do so. Both the landlord and the tenant filed revision petitions in this court and the matter was remitted to the court of the Senior Subordinate Judge for fixation of standard rent. The Senior Subordinate Judge in turn sent the matter back to the Subordinate Judge for recording further evidence and for determining the standard rent. By judgment dated December 26, 1960; the Trial Court found (a) that the premises were first let after June 2, 1944, (b) that the rent agreed was unreasonable and (c) that standard rent had therefore, to be fixed by the court. The Trial Court returned the case to the court of Senior Subordinate Judge with the record of evidence produced by the parties. His finding regarding the standard rent was that it ought to be Rs. 25. 00 per month with effect from January 4, 1955. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge reconsidered the entire evidence and found that (a) the demised premises were first let out in July 1944, that is, after June 2, 1944; (b) having regard to -the rents that are being paid by tenants of other houses in the vicinity the agreed rent of the demised premises at Rs. 45. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge reconsidered the entire evidence and found that (a) the demised premises were first let out in July 1944, that is, after June 2, 1944; (b) having regard to -the rents that are being paid by tenants of other houses in the vicinity the agreed rent of the demised premises at Rs. 45. 00 per month is unreasonable; (c) there is no evidence regarding the standard rent of any premises situate in the vicinity of the demised premises; (d) no reliable evidence is available on the record on the basis of which reasonable cost of construction of the premises can be determined; (e) reading of clause (b) of sub-section 1 (A)2 of section 6 and sub-section (2) of section 9 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 shows. that standard rent of a premises can be fixed at any reasonable amount subject to the maximum calculated on 7 per cent per annum of the aggregate amount of the reasonable cost of construction and the market price of the land comprised in the premises on the date of the commencement of construction, and (f) in the absence of evidence as to reasonable cost of construction standard rent can still be fixed under section 9 (2) of the Act. The plaintiff not having produced evidence showing the reasonable cost of construction has himself to blame if the said cost is not taken into consideration while fixing the standard rent. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge then examined the rents of other premises similar to the demised premises in the locality and fixed the standard rent at Rs. 300. 00 per annum with effect from January 4, 1955. ( 3 ) MR. Hardy submits that provisions of 1958 Act have to be applied for determining the standard rent, which are paractically the same as of 1952 Act. According to Mr. Hardy the Court below were wrong in holding that the premises were first let after June 2, 1944, and this finding, which ostensibly is a finding of fact, is liable to be reviewed by me since it has been arrived at in disregard of very material evidence. The argument proceeds that it was common ground between the parties that the premises was first let to one Santosh Kumar. A lease deed purporting to have been executed by Santosh Kumar (Ex. The argument proceeds that it was common ground between the parties that the premises was first let to one Santosh Kumar. A lease deed purporting to have been executed by Santosh Kumar (Ex. P. W. 1/1) on May 1, 1944, was relied upon by the landlord. In the lease deed the name of Santosh Kumar s father is stated to be Surrinder Kumar. Santosh Kumar appeared as a witness and stated that he took the premises on lease in the month of July or August 1944. He denied having executed the lease deed but admitted that receipt for rent of the premises, being Exhibit D. W. 1/1, dated July 1944 was issued by the landlord in his favour. In this receipt also name of Santosh Kumar s father is Surrinder Kumar. According to Santosh Kumar, however, his father s name is B. C. Bose. Plaintiff-appellants made an application that specimen signatures of Santosh Kumar might be taken and got examined and compared with the signature appearing on the lease deed by an expert. This request was turned down by the trial Court on the ground of delay and the Senior Subordinate Judge held the rejection justified. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge considered the entire evidence including the said receipt and came to the conclusion that it was difficult to say that Santosh Kumar was the very person who executed the lease deed Exhibit P. W. 1/1. He believed the categorical statement of Santosh Kumar in preference to all other evidence in concluding that the demised premises were first let in July 1944. In this view, it is not open to me to revise this finding of fact, based as it is not only on evidence but proper consideration of the entire material on the record: The two Courts below also having properly exercised their discretion in refusing to permit a party to produce handwriting expert on the grounds of delay, I would be travelling far bevond the limits of my jurisdiction under section 35 if I agreed with Mr. Hardy in his submission that I should reverse their decision and send back the matter for evidence of some handwriting expert. ( 4 ) MR. Hardy in his submission that I should reverse their decision and send back the matter for evidence of some handwriting expert. ( 4 ) MR. Hardy next raises the question of construction of section 9 (2) and submits that the learned Senior Subordinate Judge was in error in holding that notwithstanding the fact that there was no proper evidence showing the reasonable cost of construction he could still proceed to fix reasonable standard rent. The learned Senior Subordinate Judge was of the opinion that "the reading of the provisions of section 6 (A) (2) (b) and section 9 (2) together points out that the standard rent of a premises let out after June 2, 1944 can be fixed at any reasonable amount subject to the maximum calculated on 7 per cent per annum of the aggregate amount of the reasonable cost of construction and the market price of. the land. Similar appears to be the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of section 8. The Senior Subordinate Judge further thought that if 7 per cent of the cost of construction was the maximum, no injustice could be caused to the landlord if cost of construction is not taken into consideration because rent to be fixed is in any event to be a reasonable rent and if, due to the absence of availability ofthe figure of cost of construction, the standard rent fixed happens to be mors than 7 per cent of such cost, it is the tenant who stands to lose and the landlord can make no grievance thereof. The learned counsel also does not dispute that the provisions of 1958-Act and 1952- Act are in this behalf practically the same. Consequently, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in Karam Singh Sobti and another v. Partap Chand and another, and decision of this Court in Jhabar Mal Chokhani v. Jinendra Prashad, the provisions of new Act would apply The premises having been first let after June 2, 1944, the standard rent of the premises would be as provided in S. 6 (2) of the Act. Since S. 6 (2) (a) is not attracted in this case the standard rent would be the rent calculate on the basis of seven and one half per cent per annum of the aggregate of reasonable cost of construction and the market price of the land comprised in the premises on the date of the commencement of the construction. Having thus determined the standard rent the Court has then to fix the same. Of course if it is not possible to determine the standard rent on the principles set forth in section 6 the Court has to resort to section 9 (4 ). In case, however, the standard rent is possible of determination under section 6, the Court is precluded from acting under section 9 (4) and must determine it under section 6. Immediately after it has been so determined sub-section (2) of section 9 comes into play and the Court has to fix an amount which appears to- him to be reasonable having regard to the provisions of section 6 and the circumstances of the case. To give an example if Court is called upon to fix standard rent of two different houses, one situate in a very important locality and the other in a rather out of the way place, the Court will work out the reasonable cost of construction of both the houses. Assuming that the built area in both the houses is the same and so is the price of the land (which is possible where the area of land comprised in the latter premises though cheaper, is much bigger than the area in the former premises), the cost of construction and the market price of the land of both the houses would be the same, yet the Court may consider the nature of locality, the transport facilities and/or other amenities and fix the standard rent at 7 per cent for the house in one locality and less for the other house, but that does not confer a jurisdiction on the Court to fast speculate and fix a reasonable rent in complete disregard of the standard rent determined under section 6. If that construction is accepted a good part of section 9 (2) is reduced to silence. If that construction is accepted a good part of section 9 (2) is reduced to silence. The words "having regard to the provisions of section 6" cannot in the context but mean that the standard rent so determined has to be taken as the basic figure and then the amount adjusted having regard to the various other relevant circumstances. The words have to be given some meaning and cannot just be ignored. If rent was to be fixed in disregard of that figure the legislature would not have created the obligation on the Court to have regard to the provisions of section 6. If I accept the construction sought to be placed by the respondent and accepted by the learned Senior Sub- ordinate Judge, I would be doing violence to the known rule of construction that such a sense is to be given upon a statute that no word shall, except in very exceptional cases, be rendered otiose. The Court was, therefore, in my opinion bound to have regard to the standard rent determined under section 6 (2) (b) and in the absence of such determination could not act under section 9 (2 ). The reasonable figure under section 9 (2) has to be arrfved at in a judicial manner and has not to be merely a subject-matter of guess work. No doubt various other surrounding circumstances of the case have to be taken notice of by the Court but that is as I have already indicated for the purposes of making the necessary adjustment in the standard rent arrived at in accordance with the provisions of section 6. If a tenant applies for fixation of standard rent he is required to lay the foundation for the Court to act under section 9 (2) and is therefore obliged to bring on record sufficient material to entitle the Court to first determine the standard rent under the provisions of section 6. In this case it was for the tenant who had moved the Court for determination of standard rent to supply the necessary material and evidence for the purpose. In this case it was for the tenant who had moved the Court for determination of standard rent to supply the necessary material and evidence for the purpose. Not having done so the Controller should have either considered whether it was a fit case for giving of any further opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence regarding cost of construction or in the absence of evidence the Court should have held that it was not possible to fix the standard rent in the absence of evidence required under section 6. I am not in agreement with the approach of the learned Sneior Subordinate Judge to the problem. It is not a question, as the Senior Subordinate Judge appears to think, of any in justice being caused to the landlord or the tenant but it is a matter of deciding a question in accordance with the provisions of law. I also do not agree that there is no chance of any injustice being caused to the tenants or to the landlord because unless the reasonable cost of construction is known to the Court, the Court cannot be in a position to determine what the reasonable rent under section 9 (2) of the Act should be and it is possible that the standard rent fixed, in disregard of the cost of construction, may be far below 7 per cent while if the reasonable cost of construcion had been known to the Court probably the other circumstances may not have brought the rent down to the figure arrived at in the absence of reasonable cost of construction. The possibility of injustice also therefore cannot be ruled out. It this view the judgment of the learned Senior Subordinate Judge must be set aside and the matter sent back to the trial Court for fixation of standard rent in accordance with the construction placed by me on the various provisions of the said Act. The trial Court should in view of the circumstances of the case give opportunity to the parties to adduce additional evidence regarding the cost of construction. In the result the petition is allowed but there will be no order as to costs.