Judgment :- 1. This is an application by a tenant governed by the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1959. The application moved by the respondent under S.11 of the above mentioned Act was dismissed by the Rent Control Court by Ext. P.1 order on the ground that the tenant, the writ applicant before me has been in occupation of the building before 141940. This date, 141940 is mentioned in S.11 (17) which is in these terms: "11(17). Notwithstanding anything contained in this section a tenant who has been in continuous occupation of a building from 1st April 1940 as a tenant, shall not be liable to be evicted for bona fide occupation of the landlord or of the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him provided that a landlord of a residental building shall be entitled to evict such a tenant of that building if the landlord has been living in a place outside the city, town or village in which the building is situated for a period of not less than five years before he makes an application to the Rent Control Court for being put in possession of the building and requires the building, bona fide for his own permanent residence or of the permanent residence of any member of his family or the landlord is in dire need of a place for residence and has none of his own." 2. The explanation to the sub-section is not extracted as no arguments were advanced on the basis of the explanation by counsel and the explanation does not appear to be material for the purpose of this case. 3. The view taken by the Rent Control Court in Ext. P.1 is that even if there is bona fide need the respondent is not entitled to get eviction because the writ applicant has been in continuous occupation of the building from a date before 1st April, 1940. The Rent Control Court did not consider further whether the latter part of the sub-section has been satisfied. P.1 is that even if there is bona fide need the respondent is not entitled to get eviction because the writ applicant has been in continuous occupation of the building from a date before 1st April, 1940. The Rent Control Court did not consider further whether the latter part of the sub-section has been satisfied. The appellate authority, however, framed a point for determination, point (2), in the following terms: "Is the petitioner in dire need of the house." And dealing with the question in Para.4 he came to the conclusion that unless the landlord was able to establish that he was bound to surrender the house that he was in occupation on rent under the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act "it cannot be stated that the petitioner is in dire need of the house". The order dismissing the application for eviction was therefore confirmed by Ext. P. 2 by the appellate authority. The revisional authority considered the applicability of clause (17) of S.11 and came to the conclusion, that'pressing necessity' which, according to the learned District Judge, is equivalent to 'dire need' has been established. He therefore allowed the revision petition and ordered eviction by Ext. F. 3 order. 4. Counsel on behalf of the petitioner has raised two contentions. Firstly he contended that the proper way of reading S.11 (17) is to insist that a landlord who seeks eviction on the ground of 'dire need' of a tenant who has been in continuous occupation from 1st April, 1940 must also satisfy the requirement that he has been living in a place outside the city, town or village in which the building is situated for a period of not less than five years before he makes an application to the Rent Control Court. Secondly it is urged that in any view of the matter, 'dire need' is a more stronger expression than bona fide need. There must be some material at least on the basis of which it is possible for a Court to come to the conclusion that there is 'dire need' and that there is no such material and therefore the conclusion reached by the District Judge in Ext. P. 3 cannot stand. 5. I had occasion to consider the first point urged by counsel on behalf of the petitioner in Janaki v. Madhavan (1964 K. L. T. 891). P. 3 cannot stand. 5. I had occasion to consider the first point urged by counsel on behalf of the petitioner in Janaki v. Madhavan (1964 K. L. T. 891). I held then that eviction can be had by the landlord on the ground of 'dire need' even if the tenant has been in continuous occupation from 141940 though the landlord was not living in a place outside the city, town or village for five years before making the application. This decision, it is submitted, requires reconsideration and counsel on behalf of the petitioner suggested that the requirement that the landlord has been living in a place outside the city, town or village must be insisted on even in cases of 'dire need'. I do not think I can accept this contention. I have given the reasons for my conclusion in Janaki v. Madhavan. 6. The second point urged is certainly not free from difficulty. One thing is clear. A tenant who has been in possession continuously from 141940 can be evicted only if'dire need' of the landlord is established. In the context in which the expression is used, after referring to bonafide need in S.11 (3), it is evident that 'dire need' must be different from and must be a need higher than a 'bona fide need'. The District Judge has termed this 'a pressing necessity' or a 'compelling need'. I am inclined to agree. The question is, was there material which was considered, on the basis of which it was possible to say that there was pressing necessity. 7. It is not for me in these proceedings to assess the evidence in the case and come to my own conclusion regarding the 'pressing necessity' or to consider the question whether the available material is sufficient to reach the conclusion that there was pressing necessity. To this extent I am inclined to agree with the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent. But I feel that the real question arising for determination has not been considered either by the appellate authority or by the revisional authority. Both these authorities proceeded on the basis that the fact that the respondent was staying with his family in a rented house would be a relevant consideration for determining the question whether eviction can be had. But I feel that the real question arising for determination has not been considered either by the appellate authority or by the revisional authority. Both these authorities proceeded on the basis that the fact that the respondent was staying with his family in a rented house would be a relevant consideration for determining the question whether eviction can be had. So the appellate authority took the view that the landlord seeking eviction must establish that his landlord is entitled to evict him (the landlord seeking eviction) from the building which he is occupying on rent before it can be said that there is 'dire need'. The revisional authority has come to a different conclusion. I do not think that the occupation of a building on rent is a relevant consideration in determining the question of 'dire need'. The last part of 8.11(17), which I have held must stand separately, states the conditions that should be established as 'dire need' and the lack of a building of 'his own'. So the occupation of a building on rent is not material. But 'dire need' being defined something in the nature of a 'pressing necessity' or a 'compelling need' must be proved on material on the basis of which it is possible to come to such a conclusion. Since the approach made by the District Judge as well as the appellate authority are clouded by considerations which according to me are not material I think interests of justice require that the matter must be reconsidered in the light of what I have stated above. I therefore set aside Ext. P. 3 and direct the Revisional Authority to reconsider the question. I make it clear that I express no opinion whatever as to whether there is pressing necessity or 'dire need' in this case. If the Revisional Authority feels that the question as to whether there is or there is not 'dire need' has not been in the minds of the parties and there is therefore dearth of material for reaching a conclusion he may remit the case to the appellate authority with a direction to take fresh evidence and submit fresh findings. 8. This writ application is ordered as above. I make no order as to costs. Allowed.