ORDER G.D. Sahgal, J. - The Petitioner filed objection u/s 20 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to the amendment by Act VIII of 1963. That objection was disposed of by the Consolidation Officer by an order dated the 24th of February, 1963 contained in Annexure 1. The Petitioner went up in appeal and the appeal was decided by the Additional Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on the 16th of March, 1963. The Petitioner was dissatisfied even by this order and he filed a revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation who decided the revision application against him on the 17th of August, 1963. This writ petition has been filed praying for a writ of certiorari for the quashing of the three orders. There is a prayer for a writ of mandamus also which need not be detailed at this stage. A preliminary point has been raised in the case on behalf of opposite parties Nos. 12 and 13, that the writ petition should be dismissed because the Petitioner has not sought the alternative remedy available to him. 2. In the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood prior to the amendment by Act VIII of 1963 there was a second appeal provided against the order of the (Additional) Settlement Officer (Consolidation) to the Deputy Director of Consolidation and from the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation a revision could be filed to the Director of Consolidation. The Petitioner thought that after the amendment of UP Consolidation of Holdings Act by Act VIII of 1963 which came into force on the 8th March, 1963, as the appeal by the Additional Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was decided on the 16th of March, 1963, the provision of the second appeal stood deleted and as such a revision application only was maintainable as provided under the amended provisions of the UP Consolidation of Holdings Act. 3. The contention on behalf of the opposite parties 12 and 13, however, is that even though the appeal by the Additional Settlement Officer (Consolidation) was decided on the 16th of March, 1963 it was a case to which the provisions of the unamended Act applied and a second appeal ought to have been filed before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The Petitioner had, however, filed an application in revision. The Petitioner had, however, filed an application in revision. The Petitioner himself having filed an application in revision before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, he cannot come and say that the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation should be quashed on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The contention on behalf of the opposite parties 12 and 13, therefore, is that even though the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation in the revision may be without jurisdiction, it cannot be challenged by the Petitioner on that ground nor has it been challenged on that ground. The Petitioner ought to have filed a second appeal and as he has not filed a second appeal he has failed to avail of the alternative remedy open to him. The petition, therefore, should not be entertained and should be dismissed. 4. In order to appreciate this argument, we have to take into consideration the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 47 of Act VIII of 1963 which reads as follows: In units notified u/s 4 of the principal Act, prior to the date on which this Act comes into force, hereinafter referred to as the said date, all work in regard to or connected with consolidation operations-- (i) beyond the stage of publication of the Statement of Proposals u/s 20 of the principal Act, where, on or before the said date, that statement had already been published; and (ii) up to and inclusive of the stage of confirmation of the statement of Principles u/s 18 of the Principal Act, where, on or before the said date, notices u/s 9 of the principal Act had already issued; shall be conducted and concluded in accordance with the provisions of the principal Act, as if this Act had not come into force: Provided that, as respects second appeals and revisions, which lay under the provisions of the principal Act, as it stood prior to its amendment by this Act but had not been instituted before the said date, the principal Act, as amended by this Act, shall apply and be deemed always to have applied as if this Act had been in force on all material dates. 5. It is hot disputed that if the proviso to this Sub-section (1) had not existed then the case would have been covered by the unamended Act and a second appeal ought to have been filed. 5. It is hot disputed that if the proviso to this Sub-section (1) had not existed then the case would have been covered by the unamended Act and a second appeal ought to have been filed. We have, therefore, to see what the effect of the proviso is and as to whether in view of the proviso a second appeal would not lie but a revision would lie from the decision of the Additional Settlement Officer (Consolidation) in first appeal. The proviso lays down that as respects second appeals and revisions, which lay under the provisions of the unamended Act but had not been instituted before the date on which the amended Act came into force, the amended Act will apply and will be deemed to have always applied as if it had been in force on all material dates. The proviso applies only with respect to second appeals and revisions and only if they lay under the unamended Act but had not been instituted before the 8th of March, 1963. What was pending before the Additional Settlement Officer (Consolidation) on the 8th of March, 1963 was a first appeal. The proviso did not apply as respect to first appeal that was pending before him and in disposing it of he was not required the consider the amended Act at all and in disposing of the first appeal he was not required to read the proviso at all. There was no occasion for the applying of the proviso at that stage as there was no question of second appeal or revision. The proviso would apply only if a right to file a second appeal or a revision had accrued but had not been exercised by filing a second appeal or revision. A second appeal or revision application lay only when a right to file a second appeal or revision had accrued, that is, after a first appeal had been decided (in respect of a second appeal) or after a second appeal had been decided (in respect of a revision application). If a first appeal was decided before 8th March, 1963 but a second appeal had not been filed, whether it could be filed or not would be governed by the proviso, that is, in accordance with the provisions of the amended Act. If a first appeal was decided before 8th March, 1963 but a second appeal had not been filed, whether it could be filed or not would be governed by the proviso, that is, in accordance with the provisions of the amended Act. Similarly, if a second appeal was decided before 8ih March, 1963 but a revision application had not been filed before 8th March, 1963 whether a revision would lie or not would be decided in accordance with the provisions of the amended Act. As has been remarked by a Division Bench in Special Appeal No. 95 of 1963 decided on 23rd January, 1964 the proviso is by way of an exception to what is contained in Sub-section (1), and if a case in not governed by the proviso the main provision contained in Sub-section (1) will apply. As in this case the case was not governed by the proviso at all, the appeal before the (Additional) Settlement Officer having been decided on the 16th of March, 1963 i.e. after the 8th of March, 1963, the main provision will apply. As the proviso does not govern the case, a second appeal was maintainable and as no second appeal was filed by the Petitioner he has failed to avail of the alternative remedy available to him where the relief which is sought here could have been granted. The petition, therefore, should be dismissed on that ground. The Petitioner cannot get the order of the Deputy Director (Consolidation) passed in revision quashed on the ground of want of jurisdiction because he himself chose that forum and went up in revision before the Deputy Director (Consolidation) while he ought have gone, in second appeal. On the preliminary point raised on behalf of opposite parties 12 and therefore; the petition has to be dismissed. 6. I, accordingly, dismiss the writ petition but make no orders as to costs.