Order.- This petition raises a question relating to the power of the Court to grant leave under Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure in relation to probate duty payable under section 57 of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. The respondent claiming to be an executor under the wills executed by T. S. Sankara Mooppanar and T. S. Subbiah Mooppanar, filed O.P. No. 90 of 1962 for probate, which, as it is stated at the Bar, after caveat has been registered as a probate suit on the file of the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Tirunelveli. Before the matter was registered as a suit, the petitioner applied for being recognised as a pauper with reference to probate duty payable in due course. This petition was allowed on the ground that the petitioner was possessed of no means to pay the probate duty. This petition by the respondents is to revise the order. Mr. Ramaswami Iyengar for the petitioner contends that the Court has no power to allow the petition. This question is covered by two judgments of this Court in In the matter of the Estate of C. Govindaswamy1and Palani Gramani v. Manickammal2. In the earlier case, Venkatasubba Rao, J., sitting on the Original Side held that Order 8, rule 14 of the Madras High Court Original Side Rules-relating to paupers refers not only to suits but also to proceedings, and on the analogy of Order 33, rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, section 19-I of the Court-fees Act, 1870, should be reasonably interpreted, and on that view it was open to-the Court not only to entertain an application in forma pauperis but also to make a further order granting probate to the applicant without payment by him of the requisite Court-fee under Article 11 of Schedule I of the Court-fees Act. This view was followed by Gentle, J., in the second case. The learned Judge elaborately considered the question with reference both to the Original Side Rules as well as Order 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure and came to the conclusion that section 19-I of the Court-fees Act was subject to the provisions of Order 33, rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure which unequivocally dealt with exemption from payment of all Court-fees in any proceedings connected with a pauper suit. Though Order 33 by its terms applies to suits, by reason of section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, its provisions are extended to proceedings other than suits. This point of view has also been accepted in the two decisions cited. With respect I follow the principle of these two decisions and hold that the Court has power to declare pauperism in respect of payment of probate duty. Mr. Ramaswami Iyengar contends that although this was the position under the old Court-fees Act, the proviso to section 57 of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, would make a difference. Learned Counsel argues that exemption from payment of probate duty is confined by the proviso to the Administrator-General and that impliedly it follows that such exemption will not be available to others. I am unable to accept this contention. The proviso is not related to pauperism. Because the main part of section 57 directs that the probate duty should be collected before probate is granted by Court, the proviso makes an exception in the case of Administrator-General and enables him to pay the probate duty at a time subsequent to that stage fixed by the Court. In my view, the proviso makes no difference to the principles settled by the judgments of this Court in In the matter of the Estate of C. Govindaswamy1and Palani Gramany v. Manickammal2. Mr. Ramaswami Iyengar apprehended that the order of the Court below should not be construed as deciding the status of the petitioner as an executor which was questioned by his clients. Obviously, the order of the Court below had no-occasion to deal with that aspect and is only confined to the petition for declaration of pauperism of the petitioner. The petition is dismissed. No costs. V.S. ----- Petition dismissed.