Judgment :- 1. The relevant facts of the case have been set out as follows in my judgment dated the 25th October, 1963, which is now sought to be reviewed: This appeal by the plaintiffs arises out of a suit For partition of an item of property after setting aside a sale deed with respect to it, Ext. D2, of the year 1123. The two plaintiffs and the 3rd defendant are the sons of the second defendant and defendants 4 and 5 are the brothers of the second defendant. Ext. D2 was executed by defendants 2,4 and 5 in favour of the 7th defendant, who assigned his rights under it in favour of the first defendant. It has been set aside by the lower court to the extent of the plaintiffs' share, which has been held to be 1/6th, and partition has been decreed accordingly. In this appeal, the plaintiffs challenge the correctness of the decision that their share is 1/6th and claim 1/4th share in the properly, on the ground that the 5th defendant having renounced Hinduism is not entitled to any share in the property. It was not disputed in this appeal, that such renunciation took place in the year 1104 and that according to the rule of Hindu Law by which the family is governed, the 5th defendant had forfeited his right in the family property. The sole question for decision in this appeal is whether the plaintiffs' share is 1/4th as claimed by them or 1/6th as decreed. This would depend on whether the 5th defendant is entitled to a share in the property; if he is so entitled, the plaintiffs' share can be only 1/ 6th and not 1/ 4th. While there was no dispute as to the rule of forfeiture of property upon conversion in Hindu Law, the sole controversy related to the effect of the Caste Disabilities Removal Act, 1850, (Act XXI of 1850) which was extended on the 1st April 1951, to the former Travancore-Cochin State in which this case arose. While there was no dispute as to the rule of forfeiture of property upon conversion in Hindu Law, the sole controversy related to the effect of the Caste Disabilities Removal Act, 1850, (Act XXI of 1850) which was extended on the 1st April 1951, to the former Travancore-Cochin State in which this case arose. S.1 of that Act provides: "So much of any law or usage now in force within India as inflicts on any person forfeiture of rights or property, or may be held in any way to impair or affect any right of in" heritance, by reason of his or her renouncing, or having been excluded from the communion of any religion, or being deprived of caste, shall cease to be enforced as law in any court." 2. By the judgment sought to be reviewed I took the view, that notwithstanding that the conversion of the 5th defendant to Christianity took place before Act XXI of 1850 came into force in the concerned area, if he were to sue for partition of the property after the Act came into force, the rule of forfeiture on conversion cannot constitute a defence & a share would have to be decreed. I also thought, that Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain (I. L. R.33 Allahabad 356) decided by the Privy Council and Mitar Sen Singh v. Maqbul Hasan (A. I. R.1928 Oudh 138) decided by the the Oudh Chief Court supported the above view. After fuller argument on this review petition, I am convinced that I had misunderstood the effect of these decisions, for reasons to be stated presently. I therefore allow this review petition, reopen the appeal and under Order XLVII, R.8, C. P. C., direct that a note be made thereof in the register. In the nature of the question involved which was fully argued, the appeal also being posted, I proceed to pass judgment in the appeal. 3. In Gobind Krishna Narain v. Abdul Qayyum (T. L. R.25 Allahabad 546) decided by the Allahabad High Court, one Ratan Singh who was a Hindu & was joint with his son Daulat Singh, became a convert to Mohammadanism in the year 1845, prior to the enactment of Act XXI of 1850. Regulation.7 of 1832 was in force in the Bengal Presidency, the concerned area. Regulation.7 of 1832 was in force in the Bengal Presidency, the concerned area. By S.9 of that Regulation it was declared that: "When one party shall be of the Hindu and the other of the Mohammadan persuasion, or where one or other of the parties to the suit shall not be either of the Mohammadan or Hindu persuasions, the laws of those religions shall not be permitted to operate to deprive such party or parties of any property to which but for the operation of such laws, they would have been entitled. In all such cases the decision shall be governed by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience". 4. In the case cited, the effect of S.9 was equated with a direction to the court "on hearing a suit respecting inheritance, succession, marriage, etc., in which one party is a Muhammadan and the other a Hindu, when giving its decision... to be governed by the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, in such a manner as not to permit the law of one religion to deprive a party of any property to which, but for the operation of such law, he would have been entitled". The court said:_ "That, we think, is the meaning of this section of the Regulation. It did not abrogate the Hindu law as to the consequences of apostacy, but laid down for the guidance of the judge a rule under which he might refuse to enforce those consequences. But it does not purport to affect the substantive law. The Hindu Law remained unaltered in this respect, and we hold that under it Daulat Singh became on his father's conversion sole owner of the property which up to that time had belonged jointly to him and to his father." In Gobind Krishna Narayin v. Khunni Lal (I. L. R.29 Allahabad 487) the effect of the conversion of Ratan Singh came up again before the Allahabad High Court, when it affirmed the rule laid down in the earlier decision. 5. In the meantime, the earlier case, Gobind Krishna Narain v. Abdul Qayyum (I. L. R.25 Allahabad 546) went up in appeal to the Privy Council and was reversed on another point in Karimuddin v. Govind Krishna Narain (I. L. R.31 Allahabad 497). 5. In the meantime, the earlier case, Gobind Krishna Narain v. Abdul Qayyum (I. L. R.25 Allahabad 546) went up in appeal to the Privy Council and was reversed on another point in Karimuddin v. Govind Krishna Narain (I. L. R.31 Allahabad 497). The decision in Gobind Krishna Narain v. Khunni Lal (I. L. R.29 Allahabad 487) also was appealed against and the judgment of the Privy Council is reported in Khunni Lal v. Gobind Krishna Narain (I. L. R, 33 Allahabad 356). Their Lordships expressed their inability to concur with the judgment of the High Court, and after noting that in the year 1845 when Ratan Singh abandoned Hinduism and adopted the Mohammadan faith, S.9 of the Regulation VII of 1832, was in force in the Bengal Presidency and was applicable, observed: "Act XXI of 1850 extended the principle of S 9, Regulation VII of 1832, of the Bengal Code, throughout the territories subject to the Government of the East India Company. After reciting the provisions of S.9 and stating that it would be beneficial to extend its principle to the rest of British India, it enacted." Section I of Act XXI of 1850 which, as it then stood, with certain variations which are not material, corresponded to what has been extracted earlier in this judgment. After reciting the provisions of S.9 and stating that it would be beneficial to extend its principle to the rest of British India, it enacted." Section I of Act XXI of 1850 which, as it then stood, with certain variations which are not material, corresponded to what has been extracted earlier in this judgment. Their Lordships continued, "The intention in both enactments is perfectly clear; by declaring that the Hindu or Mohammadan law shall not be permitted to deprive any party not belonging to either of those persuasions of a right to property, or that any law or usage which inflicts forfeiture of rights or property by reason of any person renouncing his or her religion, shall not be enforced, the Legislature virtually set aside the provisions of Hindu law which penalizes renunciation of religion or exclusion from caste." and stated the conclusion thus: "The affect of the legislation of 1812 and 1850 was that on Ratan Singh's abandonment of Hinduism, Daulat Singh did not acquire any enforcible right to his father's share in the joint family property which he could either or assert himself transmit to his heirs for enforcement in a British Court of justice." The view of the High Court was, that S.9 of Regulation.7 of 1832 laid down only a rule of procedure, and did not abrogate the rule of Hindu law as to the consequences of apostasy, and that on the conversion of Ratan Singh, Daulat Singh became the sole owner and Act XXI of 1850 did not come into force until five years after the conversion. So even the High Court was not prepared to hold that Act XXI of 1850 had retrospective operation. The point to be borne in mind is, that the conversion of Ratan Singh took place when Regulation.7 of 1832 was in force and this was the reason why the Privy Council held that Ratan Singh did not forfeit his right on conversion. 6. In the other case relied on by me, Miter Sen Singh v. Maqbul Hasan (A. I. R.1928 Oudh 138) the property was outside British India until that area was annexed in the year 1856. Apostasy being of the year 1843, neither Regulation.7 of 1832 nor Act XXI of 1850 was held to be applicable. This was the rationale of the decision and has no bearing on the present case. 7. Apostasy being of the year 1843, neither Regulation.7 of 1832 nor Act XXI of 1850 was held to be applicable. This was the rationale of the decision and has no bearing on the present case. 7. There is nothing in Act XXI of 1850, which gives it a retrospective operation. By the conversion of the 5th defendant in the year 1104 under the law then applicable, he forfeited his right to the property, which thereafter vested in the other members of the joint family to his exclusion. Such a vested right cannot be defeated when Act XXI of 1850 became applicable in the year 1951. Learned counsel has placed before me a direct authority in support of his contention that Act XXI of 1850 does not operate to defeat vested rights. In Case No. 99 of 1858 reported in Rulings of the Court of Sudder Udalut,1858 to 1862 (August), Madras at page 94, the plaintiff renounced his religion in the year 1839 and his mother sold a property in the year 1846; it was held that the Act of 1850 had no retrospective effect, and so the plaintiff having lost bis rights by his conversion, could not sue to set aside the sale. 8. I am therefore of the view that the 5th defendant had lost his rights by conversion. In the result, in substitution of my former judgment and decree, I hereby declare that the plaintiffs are entitled to claim an 1/4th share in the property. The decree of the lower court is modified to the above extent, and is confirmed in other respects. The appeal is allowed with costs payable by the contesting first defendant-first respondent. The court fee paid on the review petition shall be refunded to counsel for the petitioner. Allowed.