JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - This special appeal by the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika is directed against the judgment of Gopalji Mehrotra, J., dated 21-12-1956, allowing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 101 of 1956 with costs. 2. Smt. Basanti Kuer (respondent) owned house No. 58/95 in Nilwali Gali in the city of Kanpur. This house and some others were acquired by the Municipal Board, Kanpur. Thereafter they were demolished. On the site of these houses plots were carved out. Plot No. 37, Block E, was allotted to the respondent Basanti Kuer in Nachghar Scheme No. 24. In April 1955 she submitted a plan in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 178(a) of the Municipalities Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act); and on 23-6-1955 the Scheme Secretary of the Kanpur Development Board returned the plan to her with certain objections. Smt. Basanti Kuer thereupon sent a reply to the Scheme Secretary, meeting the objections raised by the latter. Thereafter neither the Municipal Board Kanpur nor the Kanpur Development Board, both of which were functioning under a common Administrator, the Boards having been superseded, replied to the respondents letter. After having waited for more than two months the respondent Basanti Kuer on 7-9-1955 served a notice, purporting to be under Sec. 180(3) of the Act on the Kanpur Development Board, calling upon the Board to sanction the plan according to law. The notice also stated that if no objection to the plan was received within 15 days, Basanti Kuer would presume that sanction had been accorded to the plan submitted by her. Notice under Sec. 180(3) of the Act having failed to elicit any reply from the Board, Basanti Kuer started making constructions in accordance with the plan submitted by her. A little later she received a letter dated 11-10-1955 from the Scheme Secretary purporting to be a notice under Sec. 186 of the Act, to the effect that the constructions carried out by her contravened the bye-laws of the Board. On 20-10-1955 she sent a reply, stating therein that after the expiry of the statutory period she had begun to make constructions and had actually completed part of the constructions, and that objections could not be raised at that stage. On 20-10-1955 she sent a reply, stating therein that after the expiry of the statutory period she had begun to make constructions and had actually completed part of the constructions, and that objections could not be raised at that stage. On 21-12-1955 another notice was issued to her purporting to be under Sec. 186 of the Act, calling upon her to demolish within seven days of the receipt of the notice two rooms on the ground floor and two rooms on the first floor. 3. Admittedly, Srimati Basanti Kuer did not file an appeal under Sec. 318 of the Act. She came straight to this Court and filed writ petition No. 101 of 1956. Gopalji Mehrotra, J. was of the opinion that "no offence was committed by the petitioner within the meaning of Sec. 185 of the Municipalities Act, and consequently no notice could be issued by the Board under Sec. 186 of the Act." Learned Standing Counsel for the Municipal Board, placing reliance upon Cl. (4) of Sec. 180 of the Municipalities Act, urged before Mehrotra, J. that nothing in sub-Sec. (3) of the Act should be construed to authorise any person to act in contravention of the bye-law. He added that there was a cleat prohibition for a person to act in contravention of the bye-laws and inasmuch as the constructions were clearly made in contravention of the bye-laws, the same had been made illegally and no sanction, in respect of the same could be deemed to have been granted. 4. Gopalji Mehrotra, J., rejecting the above submission, observed as follows:- "Sec. 180(4) of the Act only provides that even if it be held that the sanction has been granted or that it may be deemed to have been granted, that by itself does not authorise the petitioner to make constructions in contravention of the bye-laws. If the petitioner makes constructions in contravention of the bye-laws, she may be liable for prosecution for breach of the bye-laws, but Sec. 180(4) to my mind does not render the sanction which is deemed to have been granted by virtue of Sec. 180(3) as cancelled." 5. If the petitioner makes constructions in contravention of the bye-laws, she may be liable for prosecution for breach of the bye-laws, but Sec. 180(4) to my mind does not render the sanction which is deemed to have been granted by virtue of Sec. 180(3) as cancelled." 5. He also remarked that "he did not think that any appeal is provided for against this order." He further opined that even if the notice served on the respondent Basanti Kuer was appealable, an appeal would not be an equally adequate and efficacious remedy and in that view of the matter the writ petition filed by her was maintainable. Having found as mentioned above, he allowed the writ petition with costs. 6. We have heard Mr. N. D. Pant, the learned counsel for the appellant. He had made the following two submissions before us:- 1. That the view taken by Gopalji Mehrotra, J. on Sec. 180(4) of the Act is wrong; and that if a plan infringes the provisions of a bye-laws, notwithstanding the lapse of two months after the service of notice on the Board, the scheme would not be deemed to have been sanctioned. 2. (a) Under the provisions of Sec. 318 of the Act an appeal lay to the District Magistrate. (b) The view of the learned Single Judge that the appeal was not an equally adequate and efficacious remedy as a writ, is not correct. 7. On behalf of respondent Basanti Kuer Mr. Hari Swarup, the learned counsel placed reliance upon Bohrey Mathura Prasad v. State through Notified Area Committee, Kasi Kalan, district Mathura, 1950 ALJ 404. In that case the provisions of Sec. 185 of the Act came up for interpretation before Harish Chandra, J. Sec. 185 of the Act reads:- "Whoever begins, continues or completes the erection or re-erection of, or any material alteration in a building or part of a building or the construction or enlargement of a wall, without giving the notice required by Sec. 178, or in contravention of the provisions of Sec. 180, sub-Sec. (5) of an order of the Board refusing sanction or any written directions made by the board under Sec. 180 or any bye-law, shall be liable upon conviction to a fine which may extend to five hundred rupees." 8. Harish Chandra, J., while interpreting this provision, observed as follows:- "The contention of learned counsel for the applicant is that the words "any bye-law" occurring in the section must be read with the preceding words and that the written directions referred to in the section are written directions made by the board either u/s 180 or any bye-law and that a person who acts in accordance with the written directions of the board will not be liable if in doing so he commits a breach of any bye-law of the Notified Area or the Municipality concerned. In my view this is the correct interpretation of Sec. 185 and the commas occurring in that Section of the Act as printed in the Collection of Act passed by the Lieut-Governor of the U.P. of Agra and Oudh in the year 1916 would lead to the same conclusion." 9. With great respect to Harish Chandra, J., we would like to point out that it was completely overlooked by him that no directions could be issued by a Board under a bye-law. Mr. Hart Swarup, appearing for respondent Basanti Kuer, could also not point out to us any bye-law under which a direction could be issued by the Board. It is therefore obvious that Bohrey Mathura Prasad v. State, 1950 ALJ 404 has been decided on a wrong assumption. 10. Sec. 180, so far as relevant for our purposes, reads as follows:- "180 (1) - Subject to the provisions of any bye-law the board may either refuse to sanction any work of which notice has been given under Sec. 179 or may sanction it absolutely or subject to (a) .............................. (b) ..................... (2) In the case of a refusal to sanction under sub-Sec. (1), the board shall communicate in writing the reasons for such refusal to the person giving notice under Sec. 178. (b) ..................... (2) In the case of a refusal to sanction under sub-Sec. (1), the board shall communicate in writing the reasons for such refusal to the person giving notice under Sec. 178. (3) Should the board neglect or omit for one month after the receipt of a valid notice under Sec. 178 to make and deliver to the person who has given such notice an order of the nature specified in sub-Sec. (1) in respect thereof, such person may by a written communication call the attention of the board to the omission or neglect, and, if such omission or neglect continues for a further period of fifteen days, the board shall deemed to have sanctioned the proposed work absolutely: (4) Provided that nothing in sub-Sec. (3) shall, be construed to authorise any person to act in contravention of this Act or of any bye-law." 11. The words "construed to authorise any person to act in contravention of this Act or of any bye-law" occurring in Cl. (4) of Sec. 180 of the Act clearly mean that the person would have no right to make the construction. It would be noticed that sub-Sec. (4) is a proviso to sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 180 of the Act. Sub-Sec. (3) provides that if the board has omitted or neglected to object to the plan within 15 days, it shall be deemed to have sanctioned the proposed work absolutely. Sub-Sec. (4) provides an exception to this deeming clause in so far as it provides that even though in an ordinary case after the expiry of 15 days it would be deemed that the proposed work has been sanctioned, such would not be the case if the plan contravened the provisions of a bye-law. The words "shall be construed to authorise any person" mean to confer on the person the authority to construct. We are therefore of the opinion that Cls. (3) and (4) of Sec. 180 of the Act in no way help the respondent Basanti Kuer and as the impugned constructions contravened a bye-law the notice served on the respondent Basanti Kuer was a perfectly valid notice. 12. In view of this finding, which is a decision on merits, it is really unnecessary to go into the question of the alternative remedy provided for by Sec. 318 of the Act. 12. In view of this finding, which is a decision on merits, it is really unnecessary to go into the question of the alternative remedy provided for by Sec. 318 of the Act. We would however, like to point out that there is a growing tendency to by-pass the remedies provided for by the status under which orders are passed and to rush to this Court, invoking its writ jurisdiction. Sec. 318 of the Act reads:- "318. (1) Any person aggrieved by any order or direction made by a board under the powers conferred upon it by Secs. 180(1), 186, 204, 205 (1), 208, 211, 212, 222 (6). 241 (2), 245, 278, 285 or under a bye-law made under heading G of Section 298, may within thirty days from the date of such direction or order, exclusive of the time requisite for obtaining a copy thereof, appeal to such officer as the State Government may appoint for the purpose of hearing such appeals or any of them, or, failing such appointment, to the District Magistrate : Provided that where a Board has been superseded under Sec. 30 and the District Magistrate has been appointed, under Cl. (b) of Sec. 31 to exercise and perform the powers and duties of the Board, the appeal shall lie to such authority as may be prescribed. (2) The appellate authority may, if it thinks fit, extend the period allowed by sub-Sec. (1) for appeal. (3) No appeal shall be dismissed or allowed in part or whole unless reasonable opportunity of showing cause or being heard has been given to the parties." 13. There is no doubt that the respondent Smt. Basanti Kuer could have filed an appeal under the above provision to the District Magistrate, Kanpur. Sec. 321 of the Act reads: - "321 (1) No order or direction referred to in Sec. 318 shall be questioned in any other manner or by any other authority than is provided therein. (2) The order of the appellate authority confirming, setting aside or modifying any such order or direction shall be final: Provided that it shall be lawful for the appellate authority, upon application, and after giving notice to the other party, to review any order passed by him in appeal by a further order passed within three months from the date of his original order." 14. This provision makes the orders of the District Magistrate final. It is thus obvious that there is a clear legislative mandate that a person aggrieved by a notice issued under Sec. 185 of the Act, should in order to have his grievance redressed, file an appeal; and it is matter of legislative policy to treat the order passed by the District Magistrate under Sec. 218 as final. That being the legal position, interference by means of a writ should be made only when it becomes absolutely necessary to do so. We are unable to agree with the learned single Judge that the remedy provided in the shape of peal was not adequate or equally efficacious. He has given no reasons for having come to that conclusion. The District Magistrate could have interfered on questions of fact as also of law. His powers were not in any manner restricted and he could grant full relief to Smt. Basanti Kuer. The appellant was, therefore, not justified in not filing an appeal and coming straight to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow this special appeal with costs. Set aside the judgment of Gopalji Mehrotra dated 21-12-1956 and dismiss writ petition No. 101 of 1956.