ORDER K.B. Asthana, J. - This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution questioning the validity of an order dated 1.6.1960 passed by a learned Single Member of the Board of Revenue dismissing a second appeal, filed by the Petitioner Ram Jiawan Koeri before it, at the preliminary hearing. It is prayed that the impugned order of the Board of Revenue be quashed by a writ of certiorari. 2. Opposite parties numbers 3, 4 and 5 to this petition brought a suit u/s 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act for a declaration that they were the sole Sirdars of the agricultural holdings in dispute. They alleged that under a private partition amongst the members of the family the disputed agricultural Holdings had fallen to the exclusive share of the Plaintiffs. Ram Jiawan Koeri, the Petitioner in this petition, who was the Defendant in the suit set up a counter plea that in the private partition amongst the members of the family the disputed holdings had exclusively fallen to his share and he has always been in possession of the same and the Plaintiffs bad no right or title in the same. There was no allegation in the plaint and no plea was raided in the plaint that if the Plaintiffs, that is, the opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5 were not found to be the exclusive tenure holders they be declared as the co tenure holders. An Assistant Col lector First Glass who tried the suit dismissed it on the finding that the Plaintiffs had not been able to establish that they were the exclusive tenure holders of the disputed agricultural holdings. On appeal by the Plaintiffs the learned Additional Commissioner on an appreciation of the evidence on record held that the private partition set up either by the Plaintiff or by the Defendant was not established and the disputed agricultural holdings remained the joint property of the members of the family. Accordingly the learned Additional Commissioner allowed the appeal and declared that the Plaintiffs were the co tenure holders along with the Defendant in the disputed holding. The Defendant then filed a second appeal from the decree of the learned Additional Commissioner. Accordingly the learned Additional Commissioner allowed the appeal and declared that the Plaintiffs were the co tenure holders along with the Defendant in the disputed holding. The Defendant then filed a second appeal from the decree of the learned Additional Commissioner. One of the main grounds taken in the appeal was that the Plaintiffs not having claimed co tenancy in the disputed holding the learned Additional Commissioner was in error in decreeing the Plaintiffs' suit for a declaration of co tenancy. The learned Single Judicial Member of the Board who heard the appeal at the preliminary hearing, as the impugned order shows, under some misapprehension observed that the Plaintiffs had filed the suit for a declaration of co tenancy rights and then embarked on a discussion of the merits of the case and having held that the finding re corded by the learned Addl. Commr. being a good finding dismissed the appeal. As already said above it is against this order of the Board that this petition is directed. 3. I have heard Sri. K.P. Singh, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Sri. R.B. Misra, learned Counsel for the opposite parties numbers 3, 4 an; 5. At the earlier hearing of the petition on behalf of the opposite party numbers 3, 4 and 5 an objection was raised that Gram Sabha who under the law is a necessary party in a suit for declaration not having been served with the notices of this petition an. the Petitioner having not taken an further step to serve the notices on the Gram Sabha this petition was rendered incompetent. Sri. S.R. Misra, an Advocate of this Court appeared before me at that stage and stated that he has filed the Vakalatnama on behalf of the Gram Sabha. A question then arose that the Vakalatnama which Sri. S.R. Misra had filed was not properly signed by the Sabhapati The hearing of the petition was thereupon adjourned to enable the learned Counsel for the opposite parties number? 3, 4 and 5 to file an affidavit or place any other material before the Court to show that the Vakalatnama filed by Sri. S.R. Misra representing the Gram Sabha, opposite party No. 6, was not a proper Vakalatnama. 3, 4 and 5 to file an affidavit or place any other material before the Court to show that the Vakalatnama filed by Sri. S.R. Misra representing the Gram Sabha, opposite party No. 6, was not a proper Vakalatnama. When the petition was listed again for further hearing after the expiry of the time granted to the learned Counsel of the opposite parties, a statement was made that he had no farther instructions in the matter on behalf of the opposite parties Nos. 3, 4 and 5 and he is not in a position to contest the validity of the vakalatnama filed by Sri. S.R. Misra. The controversy, therefore, in regard to the representation of the Gram Sabha before this Court comes to an end. The objection raised by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties numbers 3, 4 and 5 in this regard is found to be without foundation. 4. The real question which falls for determination in this petition is whether the learned single Judicial Member of the Board who dismissed the Petitioner's second appeal at the preliminary hearing committed a manifest error or an error apparent on the re-cord. It is obvious that the learned Member has fallen into a manifest error when he made the observation in the opening sentence of paragraph 2 of the impugned order in the following words "The Plaintiffs brought the suit for a declaration that they were co sirdars along with the Defendant of plots numbers 184 and 518". It is not disputed before me by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties numbers 3, 4 and 5 that the above quoted observation of the. learned Judicial Member of the Board is not supported by the allegations in the plaint. The suit of the Plaintiffs was a suit for declaration that: they were the sole (sic)irdars of the disputed holdings and tot that they were the co Sirdars along with the Defendants. The question then arises whether the learned Mosafaer of the Board, had he apprehended the Plaintiffs case correctly, wherein the only declaration which was sought was of sole Sirdari right and not co Sirdari rights, would have dismissed the appeal summarily. The question then arises whether the learned Mosafaer of the Board, had he apprehended the Plaintiffs case correctly, wherein the only declaration which was sought was of sole Sirdari right and not co Sirdari rights, would have dismissed the appeal summarily. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contended before see that u/s 229B no declaration of Co tenancy in any agricultural holding is contemplated What is (sic) plated is either a declaration that the Plaintiff is a Sirdar of the holding if the claim in the plaint is based on exclusive rights or for a declaration of the Plaintiff's share if the cl(sic) is on the basis of jointness. I think there is substance in this submission of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner for I find that taste is nothing in Section 229B laying (sic) that a simple declaration Can be given by a Revenue court that the Plaintiff is a co tenure. holder. What this section contemplates is that when a claim is based on joint rights then the proper declaration which can be gives is of the share therein. It is obvious that by the words "for a declarations of a share in it," is meant the declaration of the quantum of that share for the law presupposes that a person who is a co tenure holder or shares a holding jointly with others has a share in it. The way in which Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 229B can be reasonably interpreted is that the declaration is to be about the extent of the shove. Moreover, as it strikes me Section 229B envisages two distinct kinds of suits-one class of suits which are based' on exclusive claim to a holding and the second class of suits which are based on a joint claim. It is difficult to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the opposite parties numbers 3, 4 and 5 that it is open to a revenue court u/s 229B give a declaration of co tenancy though exclusive tenancy was pleaded if on the evidence on record it is found that the Plaintiff was a co tenant The submission was that a larger relief claimed would include a smaller (sic) and it was always open to the court to grant the lesser relief. There" appears to be an obvious fallacy in this sub mission of the learned Counsel for the opposite parties. A claim of exclusive right is different and distinct from a claim of joint rights. It cannot be said that the claim of exclusive tenancy includes a claim of joint tenancy. It follows therefrom that if the plain-tiff in a suit for declaration for exclusive rights is not able to establish that right he cannot ask the court and the Court cannot grant him the relief of joint rights though on the evidence on record it is found that the. Plaintiff had no exclusive right but a joint right. In those circumstances, in my view, the proper course open to the court is to dismiss the suit. The finding of joint tenancy or joint right in those circumstances would not be a finding for the purpose of giving a declaration but only for the purpose of disproving the Plaintiff's case as set up in the plaint that he had an exclusive right. The finding of co tenancy recorded on the evidence adduced by the parties in those circumstances, to my mind, could not be made, a foundation for giving a declaration which is not contemplated by Section 229B. Further it must always be kept in mind that the revenue courts are courts of special jurisdiction and not of general jurisdiction as ordinary civil courts are. Their jurisdiction and. power is strictly confined by the. Statute which constitutes them and confers upon them their jurisdiction. When Section 229B does not contemplate a declaration of co tenancy the revenue court cannot claim; the power or jurisdiction to give such a declaration under, some general law. It Would be seen that even when a suit is filed for a particular declaration u/s 42 of the Specific Relief Act it has been held. that if the Plaintiff fails to establish the legal character or rights for which he sought the declaration in his plaint a court has no jurisdiction to grant him another kind of declaration not pleaded in the plaint, even though another legal character or right appears to. the court to have been, established on the evidence on record. See Maina and Ors. v. Brijmohan and Ors. (1) (17 I.A. 187). the court to have been, established on the evidence on record. See Maina and Ors. v. Brijmohan and Ors. (1) (17 I.A. 187). The Privy Council in this case reversed the judgment of the High Court and upheld the dismissal of the Plaintiff's suit, by the. subordinate courts ; inasmuch as the Plaintiffs had failed to prove to particular rights which they alleged and their title to die particular relief claimed. 5. It was then contended by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties numbers 3, 4 and 5 that there has begs a long line of decision of the Board of Revenue that if the Plaintiff comes to the Court for a declaration of exclusive right of a tenancy and if he fails to establish that right a declaration of co tenancy can be given if on the evidence on record co tenancy is established. Learned Counsel has not drawn my attention to any decided case of the Board of Revenue in support of this submission of his. On the other hand learned Counsel for the Petitioner has drawn my attention to the ease of Hirdai Narain v. Bhagwati Prasad (2) (1954 AWR (Rev) 46) decided by the Board of Revenue in which the Board held that there was a wide gulf between the causes of action based on sole tenancy and co tenancy and the Board rejected an application for amendment of the plaint to convert the suit as based on co tenancy rights for the reason that it would change the nature of the suit. I think in the case cited the Board took the correct view of law but I do not express any final opinion in this respect. The case cited by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner is an authority which cuts across the above submission made by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties numbers 3, 4 and 5. My attention was next drawn by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties to a decision of my brother S.N. Singh. J. in Second Appeal No 1503 of, 1957 decided on 5.8.1965, as an authority in support of the proposition that in a suit based on a claim of exclusive tenancy a declaration of co tenancy can be given if on the evidence on record cc tenancy is found to be established. J. in Second Appeal No 1503 of, 1957 decided on 5.8.1965, as an authority in support of the proposition that in a suit based on a claim of exclusive tenancy a declaration of co tenancy can be given if on the evidence on record cc tenancy is found to be established. I do not think this decision of my bro then S.N. Singh, J. in any way help the learned Counsel for the opposite parties. Firstly, the said decision is not in a suit filed: before a re venue court for a declaration of any tenancy right u/s 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolitio and Land Reforms Act; secondly to learned Judge on the material on record presumably including the pleadings in the plaint observed that the entire property pertaining to Zamindari was in dispute before the, Court, In the instant case the dispute was confine to two plots, namely, numbers 184 and 518 and to no other property. The Plaintiff claimed sole right of Sirdari in respect of the said plots and prayed for a declaration under Clause (a) of Sub-section (1) of Section 229B, They having failed to establish that they were the exclusive Sirdars of the said plots the suit ought to have been dismissed inasmuch as no declaration in the farm as contemplated under Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 229B Was prayed for in the plaint by setting up a claim of jointness in the said plots. When the Board in the case of firdai Narain v. Bhagwati Prasad (2) (supra) even disallowed an amendment of the plaint to add a claim based on co tenancy whether rightly, or wrongly it is unthinkable that a revenue court has the power and jurisdiction to grant a declaration of co tenancy merely on the evidence on record when neither the suit brought before it is based on a claim of co tenancy and nor the relief in the form of Clause (b) of Sub-section (1) of Section 229B is prayed for. A reference was also made by the learned Counsel for the opposite parties to certain observat ions of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Kedarlal Seal and other v. Harilal Seal (3) ( AIR 1952 S.C. 47 ) which are to the effect that a court would be slow to throw out a claim on a mere technicality of pleading when the substance of the thing is there and no prejudice is caused to the other side however clumsily or inartistically the plaint may be worded and in any event it is always open to a court to give a Plaintiff such general or other relief as it deems just. I am unable to understand how the learned Counsel for the opposite parties can derive any assistance from these observations of the learned judges of the Supreme Court. It is not the case of the opposite parties before me that their plaint in substance contained a claim based on co tenancy and it can be construed to be a plaint claiming co tenancy rights. Moreover, as already observed above, the revenue courts are courts of special jurisdiction and they could grant only those relief's Which fall under the UPZA and LR Act. I An concerned in this case only with what has been provided in that Act. The revenue courts cannot take recourse (sic)co settee General-power to grant a relief in a forth white is not contemplated by that Act. 6. For the reasons given above, I allow this petition, quash the impugned order of the Board and direct that the second appeal of the Petitioner before it would stand admitted and be heard and decided according to law in the light of the observations made above. I may, however, make it clear that It would be open to the Plaintiff to apply for amendment or to withdraw the suit and it would be for the Board to decide those matters if raised, unaffected by any of the observations made by me in my judgment in these respect. The Petitioner would be entitled to his costs from opposite parties numbers 3, 4 and 5.