Judgment :- 1. The petitioner who is the secretary of Kottayam District Co-operative Milk Supplies Union was prosecuted along with the second accused, the sales manager at Changanacherry for having sold to P. W. 1, the Food Inspector adulterated milk, an offence punishable under S.16 (1) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act 37 of 1954 (shortly stated the Act). The fact that the milk that was sold was adulterated is well proved and is, is fact, not disputed by the accused. The second accused was the actual vendor of the milk, but both the accused were convicted by the Additional First Class Magistrate, Changanacherry and the conviction was confirmed, in appeal, by the Sessions Judge, Kottayam. The first accused, the secretary alone has filed the revision petition. 2. The only question that arises for decision is whether for the sale of the adulterated milk by the second accused the sales manager at Changanacherry, the first accused who is the secretary of the union stationed at Kottayam could be held guilty of the offence. S.17 (1) of the Act says that where an offence under this Act has been committed by a company every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and was responsible, to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. There is a proviso to this sub-section to the effect that the secretary or other person can prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge and in spite of his exercising all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. Sub-section (2) of S.17 says that if the prosecution establishes that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company such person shall be deemed to be guilty. It is not known why the company as such was not prosecuted. The prosecution of the secretary was obviously under sub-section (1), in that the secretary was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. It is not known why the company as such was not prosecuted. The prosecution of the secretary was obviously under sub-section (1), in that the secretary was in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. No materials have been produced to warrant the inference that the offence was committed with the consent or connivance or neglect of the secretary. Therefore the onus is on the prosecution to prove that the secretary was responsible to the society for the conduct of the business of the society, namely the vending of milk and milk products. Unless this initial onus is discharged, there is no onus cast on the accused to prove that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offence. 3. The working of the co-operative society is governed by the bye-laws of the society. The Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies has proved that Ex. D-1 is the bye-laws of the society. It is the committee, which means the governing body of the society that is entrusted with the management of the affairs of the society. The secretary is only one of the officers of the society and he has to act under the directions of the committee. A scrutiny of Ex. D-1 shows that the different sales managers are to be in complete charge of the collections and distribution of milk, butter, etc., in the various depots and it clearly shows that the secretary is not in any way responsible to the society for the distribution of the milk products. He is only to be in overall supervision of the affairs of the society. It must also be remembered that the distribution of the milk by the sales manager was at Changanacherry while the petitioner the secretary is stationed at Kottayam with no manner of control over the milk distribution at Changanacherry. This would not make him a person who at the time the offence was committed "in charge of and responsible to the society for the conduct of the business of the society". In the absence of any such evidence on the side of the prosecution there is no further onus cast on the accused. If authority for this position is required reference may be made to the decision in Public Prosecutor v. Karuppayyan A. I. R.1958 Mad. In the absence of any such evidence on the side of the prosecution there is no further onus cast on the accused. If authority for this position is required reference may be made to the decision in Public Prosecutor v. Karuppayyan A. I. R.1958 Mad. 183, Jagadish Prasad Gupta v. State of West Bengal 65 C. W. N.1107 and Public Prosecutor v. Subramaniam A. I. R.1960 A. P. 584. This is also the view that is taken in State of Kerala v. Revathi Amma 1963 K.L. T. 474. Reference may also be made to the decision in Momtaz Begum v. State A. I. R.1962 Cal. 202, a case dealing with a similar provision contained in S.14-A of the Employees Provident Funds Act. The evidence led by the prosecution falls short of the strict standard of proof required for conviction under S.16(1). This point has not at all been considered by the courts below. In the result the conviction and sentence passed on the petitioner-first accused is set aside. Fine if paid would be refunded. The revision petition is allowed. Allowed.