JUDGMENT V.P. Gopalan Nambiar, J. 1. The appellants sued to set aside a sale deed Ext. P1 dated 28-3-1115 executed by their mother, to the 1st defendant. The suit was on behalf of their sub tarwad and on the ground that the alienation was not supported by consideration or by tarwad necessity. The suit was instituted on 8-12-1126. As originally laid, the suit was only against defendants 1 to 4, the 1st defendant, being the alienee, the 2nd defendant being the mother of the plaintiffs and the alienor under Ext. P1, and defendants 3 and 4 being the sons of the 1st defendant. Defendants 5 to 7 were impleaded in pursuance of an application made for the purpose on 2-10-1127. At the time of the institution of the suit, the 1st plaintiff was a major, having become such on 8-9-1124. The remaining plaintiffs were minors on the date of the institution of the suit. 2. Defendants 5 to 7, the newly impleaded parties, raised inter alia the contention that the suit against them was barred by limitation. 3. The Trial Court found that the document was supported by consideration, but not by tarwad necessity, and decreed the suit as prayed for. On appeal, the lower appellate court found that the transaction was supported by consideration only to the extent of Rs.100/-, but that it was not for tarwad necessity. It further found that the suit was barred by limitation, as against defendants 5 to 7 they having been impleaded in the suit only beyond 13 years from the date of Ext. P1 and also beyond three years of the date of attainment of majority of the 1st plaintiff. In the result, it decreed plaintiffs' suit as against defendants 1 to 4 and dismissed the same as against defendants 5 to 7. The plaintiff has preferred this Second Appeal. 4. In order to get over the bar of limitation against defendants 5 to 7, it is argued by the counsel for appellant, that the alienation in question, is only voidable and not void, and that the alienee's possession would become adverse only after the lapse of twelve years from the date of the repudiation of the transaction by the plaintiffs. In the present case, the repudiation itself being by the institution of the suit, it is claimed that there could be no limitation as against defendants 5 to 7. In the present case, the repudiation itself being by the institution of the suit, it is claimed that there could be no limitation as against defendants 5 to 7. I am wholly unable to accept this argument. There is no controversy before me that without setting aside the document Ext. P1, the plaintiffs' cannot recover possession as against defendants 5 to 7. The suit even for setting aside the document, was laid against defendants 5 to 7 only on 2-10-1127 when an application for impleading them was made. This being admittedly beyond twelve years of Ext. P1 and beyond three years of the attainment of majority by the 1st plaintiff, it seems clearly to follow that the suit as against defendants 5 to 7 is barred by limitation. 5. It was next contended for the appellant, that although the 1st plaintiff attained majority on 8-9-1124, the remaining plaintiffs were minors on the date of the institution of the suit, and that some of them continue to be minors even at present, and that therefore the suit by the remaining plaintiffs was well within time. Counsel for respondents pointed out that the view expressed by the majority of the Judges in the Full Bench decision in Kunhammed v. Narayanan Nambudiri ( 1963 KLT 759 ), is against the contention of the counsel for the appellant. In the said decision, Madhavan Nair, J. at page 768 considered the nature of the right of a junior member to challenge an unauthorised alienation of property by the Karanavan of a tarwad, and observed that the right must be regarded as of the tarwad or the family in which the property is vested. It was further observed by the learned judge that if such be the nature of the right, discharge in regard to such a right within the meaning of S.7 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, can be given only by the karanavan, who is the accredited representative of the tarwad. On the facts of the case before the Full Bench, as the quiescence was not by the karanavan, but by a junior member it was held that the suit was not barred. 6. On the facts of the case before the Full Bench, as the quiescence was not by the karanavan, but by a junior member it was held that the suit was not barred. 6. Velu Pillai J. at page 771 in Para.2 observed: "The right to impeach or to set aside an alienation of property belonging to that group is in essence a right of that group, which may be exercised on its behalf by any of its members; yet, for that reason, it does not seem proper to hold that the right so exercised in his personal or individual right. The loss of property by alienation is of the group, the suit to recover when laid is on behalf of the group and the property when recovered goes back to the group; every member of the group has no doubt a proprietory right, but that right is in all the group's belongings, that it may well be said, that the right is of the group exercisable through any of its members." 7. The learned Chief Justice took the view that the right of a junior member of an illom or tarwad to question the unauthorised alienations of illom or tarwad property is an individual and personal right of his; and that the plaintiff's suit in the exercise of his individual and personal right was within time. 8. Having regard to the exposition of the law in the decision noticed above, the view of the majority seems to be to the effect that the right to set aside wrongful alienation of tarwad property is a right to be exercised by a junior member on behalf of the tarwad, and that if the karanavan of the tarwad had remained quiescent for over the statutory period the right to challenge the alienation would be lost. Applying the principle to the present case, it is common ground that the 1st plaintiff was the karnavan of the plaintiffs' sub tarwad. The 1st plaintiff became a major on 8-9-1124 and the suit as far as the defendants 5 to 7 are concerned could be regarded as having been instituted only on 2-10-1127, the date on which application to implead them was made. The said date being beyond twelve years of Ext. The 1st plaintiff became a major on 8-9-1124 and the suit as far as the defendants 5 to 7 are concerned could be regarded as having been instituted only on 2-10-1127, the date on which application to implead them was made. The said date being beyond twelve years of Ext. P1 and beyond three years of the attainment of majority by the 1st plaintiff, the suit was clearly out of time as far as defendants 5 to 7 are concerned. 9. The appellants' counsel attempted to circumvent the difficulty in a different way. It was argued that under S.30 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (which was omitted by the Adaptation of Laws (No. 2) Order dated 1-11-1956) the appellants' suit in the present case could well be regarded as being within time. The said section ran as follows: "30. Provision for States for which the period prescribed is shorter than prescribed by any law previously in force in a Part B State. Notwithstanding anything therein contained any suit for which the period of limitation prescribed by this Act is shorter than the period of limitation prescribed by any law corresponding to this Act in force in a Part B State which is repealed by the part B States (Laws) Act, 1951 (III of 1951), may be instituted within the period of two years next after the coming into force of this Act in that Part B State or within the period prescribed for such suit by such corresponding [law whichever period expires first (omitted by Adaptation of Laws (No. 2) Order, 1956 dated 1-11-1956)." 10. The argument was that under Art.114 of the Travancore Limitation act 16 of 1100 a suit to set aside Ext. P1 could be filed within 12 years of the date of the alienation. It was claimed that the corresponding Article of the Indian limitation Act, 1908 did not provide for the case of a wrongful alienation by the karanavan of a Marumakkathayam tarwad, and that some of the judicial decisions have applied Art.120 to a suit for setting aside the alienation. On this ground, it was claimed that S.30 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 was attracted. Even assuming that it is, I am unable to see how the same can help the appellant in any way. On this ground, it was claimed that S.30 of the Indian Limitation Act 1908 was attracted. Even assuming that it is, I am unable to see how the same can help the appellant in any way. The section enjoins that the suit in question may be instituted within the period of two years after the coming into force of the Indian limitation Act, 1908 or within the period prescribed for the suit by the Travancore Limitation Act, whichever is earlier. The Indian Limitation Act came into force in the Travancore Cochin State on and from 1-4-1951 by reason of the provisions of the part B States Laws Act, 1951. The outermost limit for the institution of the suit under the provisions of the Travancore Limitation Act, was 8-11-1127 (20-4-1952), which marks three years from the date of attainment of majority by the 1st plaintiff. The same is earlier in point of time than two years from the coming into force of the Indian Limitation Act in Travancore - Cochin State. 11. Counsel for the appellants attempted to stretch the period of limitation still further by invoking the provisions of S.23 of the Travancore Limitation Act. The said section , corresponds to S.22 of the Indian Limitation Act, with the substantial difference that under the former, when a new party is impleaded, the suit shall be deemed to have instituted against him when the plaint in the suit was presented in the court. Based on this provision, it was claimed that the suit in the present case must be deemed to have instituted even against defendants 5 to 7 on 8-12-1126 when it was instituted against defendants 1 to 4. I cannot accept this argument. Admittedly, on the date of the institution of the suit, the Travancore Limitation Act VI of 1100 was not in force, having been replaced by the Indian Limitation Act of 1908, and there is no provision of law by which the provisions of S.23 of the Travancore Act could be invoked for the purpose of saving the bar of limitation in the present case. 12. The decision of the lower appellate court that the suit is barred against defendants 5 to 7 is correct. The second Appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. 13. Leave to appeal is asked for, and granted.