JUDGMENT D. S. Mathur, J. - This is a revision under the proviso to Sec. 76 of the U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act of 1960 (to be referred hereinafter as the Waqf Act of 1960) by Barkat Ullah against the order of the Tribunal (II Civil Judge, Kanpur) allowing the application of the Committee of Management under Sec. 63(5) of the Waqf Act of 1960 for delivery of possession of the waqf property and also all documents including receipts, counter-foils etc. pertaining to the waqf in question. 2. It is not in dispute that Barkat Ullah was acting as de facto mutwalli from before 1937. The learned advocate for the Committee of Management has, however, urged that Barkat Ullah was a mere stranger and became de facto mutwalli on the expiry of six years period of limitation. This contention has no substance. De facto mutwalli means the person who has not been validly appointed but is functioning as such. Consequently, a person acting as mutwalli is a defacto mutwalli from the date he starts acting as such, though on the expiry of six years he cannot be removed from that office except on grounds of misappropriation etc. The U.P. Muslim Wakfs Act of 1936 (to be referred hereinafter as the Waqf Act of 1936) became the law on the 20th of March, 1937; but as provided in Sec. 1 (2) thereof, Secs. 2 to 4 came into force at once and the rest of the Act was to come into force on such date as was to be notified later. Secs. 5 to 71 of the Waqf Act of 1936 came into force as late as on July 1, 1941. The Sunni Central Board of Waqfs constituted under the Waqf Act of 1936 could remove or appoint a mutwalli under Secs. 18 and 56 of that Act. These provisions having come into force on July 1, 1941 could not invalidate the acts of Barkat Ullah being done from before 1937, even though the Waqf Act of 1936 became the law on March 20, 1937. 3. The Sunni Central Board of Waqfs acknowledged Barkat Ullah as the mutwalli of the waqf in question by having received contributions from him and by not making any appointment till the beginning of 1960 when the present Committee of Management was appointed. 3. The Sunni Central Board of Waqfs acknowledged Barkat Ullah as the mutwalli of the waqf in question by having received contributions from him and by not making any appointment till the beginning of 1960 when the present Committee of Management was appointed. This was done on receipt of a letter purporting to be a letter of resignation of Barkat Ullah from the office of mutwalli. Barkat Ullah denies to have submitted resignation and also denied that the letter bore his signature. It was thereafter that the Committee of Management moved the present application for delivery of possession. 4. The Tribunal recorded the finding that the letter of resignation was a forged one and had not been submitted by Barkat Ullah. He was treated as a de facto mutwalli but the Tribunal was at the same time of opinion that the Sunni Central Board of Waqfs could appoint a mutwalli and Barkat Ullah could act as mutwalli till the appointment by the Board of a mutwalli or the Committee of Management. 5. Whether a de facto mutwalli becomes a de jure mutwalli was not raised before the Tribunal and, consequently, the Tribunal did not attach any weight to the factor and Barkat Ullah had acted as mutwalli from before 1937 and the Sunni Central Board of Waqfs had never questioned his right to function as such. 6. The most important point for consideration is whether a de facto mutwalli becomes a de jure mutwalli, and if so, could Barkat Ullah be deemed to be a de jure mutwalli. 7. Most of the cases brought to my notice relate to the right of a de facto mutwalli to collect rent or to manage the waqf property. These cases are not directly applicable to the instant case and no useful purpose shall be served by quoting them in this judgment. I shall, therefore, confine myself to only those few cases which are of assistance. In Niamat Ali v. Ali Raza, 13 ALJ R. 26. It was held that "where a person is de facto mutwalli of certain property the presumption is that he is de jure mutwalli and is entitled to appoint his successor under his will." In the instant case the Sunni Central Board of Waqfs came into existence in 1941 and it had throughout treated Barkat Ullah as the mutwalli of the waqf. The Board appoints a mutwalli only when the person claiming to be a mutwalli is not accepted to be the mutwalli. When the Board did not contemplate appointing a mutwalli right upto the beginning of 1960, it can be assumed that the Board had, by implication, given approval to Barkat Ullah functioning as the mutwalli. Question of appointment arose on receipt of the forged letter purporting to contain the resignation of Barkat Ullah. Had this letter not been received, the Board would not have appointed any mutwalli of the waqf. In these circumstances, Barkat Ullah could be presumed to be de jure mutwalli and no fresh mutwalli could be appointed without his prior removal from that office. 8. Jagan Nath Das v. Birbhadra Das, ILR XIX Cal. 776. Is a case where a person was nominated to the office of shebait. The principle laid down therein can usefully be applied to a de facto mutwalli. It was held that a suit to oust of shebait from office had to be instituted within six years and if instituted beyond the prescribed period, would be barred by limitation. The Muslim Waqf Acts of 1936 and 1960 do not prescribe any period of limitation and, consequently, it can be laid down that if the Board does not challenge the appointment of a de facto mutwalli or does not appoint any other mutwalli within a period of six years, the de facto mutwalli cannot be removed on the ground that there was some defect in his nomination or selection. 9. To sum up, in a case of the present nature, where the Sunni Central Board of waqfs had itself treated Barkat Ullah as the mutwalli, he became a de jure mutwalli and no mutwalli or Committee of Management could be appointed by the Board without first of all giving him a hearing and removing him from the office of the mutwalli. Barkat Ullah had not resigned from the office and, consequently, he could continue to function as mutwalli till his removal by the Board or under orders of the court. No order of removal had been passed by the Board. The Board had apparently appointed the Committee of management under the impression that Barkat Ullah had resigned from the office. Nor has any court passed an order holding Barkat Ullah guilty of mismanagement or misfeasance nor has he been removed from the office. No order of removal had been passed by the Board. The Board had apparently appointed the Committee of management under the impression that Barkat Ullah had resigned from the office. Nor has any court passed an order holding Barkat Ullah guilty of mismanagement or misfeasance nor has he been removed from the office. In other words, there was no vacancy in the office of the mutwalli, nor could it be said in good faith that the right of Barkat Ullah to continue in office as mutwalli was in dispute. Secs. 56 of the Waqf Act of 1936 and 48 of the Waqf Act of 1960 were inapplicable and no appointment of mutwalli or Committee of Management could be made under either of these sections. The general power of supervision conferred on the Board shall also be of no avail, as an appointment can be made to a vacant office or to that office after removal of the holder thereof. In the circumstances, Barkat Ullah could continue to function as mutwalli and delivery of possession of waqf property to the Committee of Management could not be ordered. 10. It is on the request of the learned advocate for the Committee of Management that I am now making a reference to the case of Haji Mohammad Saeed v. Mohammad, 1965 ALJ 324. That was a case where the plaintiff was held to be a de facto mutwalli managing the property for about 20 years. It was observed that a de facto mutwalli could manage the endowment, remain in possession of its properties as manager and sue for the recovery of its properties or its dues until displaced by a de jure mutwalli. A de facto mutwalli remains a de facto mutwalli till his rights mature and he becomes de jure mutwalli, or a mutwalli has been validly appointed. It cannot, consequently, be said that I am departing from the view expressed in the above case. But even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that this Court is taking a different view, I feel, I am bound by the Division Bench decision, referred to above, and for so long as that decision is not set aside, I can disregard the single Judge decision in 1965 A. L. J. 324. 11. But even if it be assumed for the sake of argument that this Court is taking a different view, I feel, I am bound by the Division Bench decision, referred to above, and for so long as that decision is not set aside, I can disregard the single Judge decision in 1965 A. L. J. 324. 11. When on the facts established delivery of possession to the Committee of Management could not be ordered and even then the Tribunal directed delivery of possession, its order shall be against the law which can be set aside by this Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. 12. The revision is hereby allowed and the order dated 8-8-1962 of the Tribunal is set aside. It is further ordered that the application of the Committee of Management, opposite party No. 1, under Sec. 63(5) of the Waqf Act of 1960 shall stand dismissed. Costs easy. Revision allowed.