ORDER S.C. Manchanda, J. - This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by the tenant directed against the order of the State Government passed u/s 7Fof the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act, hereinafter referred to as the Act, reversing the order of the Commissioner who had confirmed the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer refusing to grant the landlord permission to file a suit for ejectment u/s 3 of the Act, The main ground taken in the writ petition was that the order of the State Government u/s 7F was not a speaking order as it did not give any reasons for setting aside the concurrent findings recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. On the side of the landlord it was contended that the record of the case would show that the case had been carefully considered before the concurrent finding of the authorities was reversed by the State Government. The record accordingly was sent for and this has been perused This shows that the State Government wanted to be sure as to whether the landlord had any other shop other that the shop in the tenancy of the Petitioner. An enquiry was directed to be made through the local Tehsildar His report shows that both the parties were examined and their evidence in great detail recorded. The evidence runs into several pages and this was made a part of his report, which was sent in original to the State Government. The State Government on being satisfied that the landlord had no other shop except the one in the tenancy of the Petitioner gave the landlord permission to sue for ejectment after the lapse of period of one year to enable the Petitioner tenant to find alternative accommodation. 2. Mr. Kakkar the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has contended that although the Petitioner had taken part in the proceedings before the Tehsildar in the enquiry held by him and had in fact led evidence which was all sent to the State Government, nevertheless, it was the duty of the State Government to again give the Petitioner an opportunity of putting forward his case. He does not insist, because of the view consistently taken by this Court, that the hearing need not be oral but at least an opportunity of making a representation against the Tehsildar's report should have been furnished to him. For this proposition he relied upon several authorities of this Court. The first of these is Banarsi Das and Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1965 All. 33), where it was laid down at p. 41 that although the District Magistrate had a complete discretion in the matter yet the rules of natural justice require that he should give the persons who are likely to be affected a chance of placing their view points before him. This case does not assist the Petitioner as the 'parties' admittedly had an opportunity of placing their view points, by leading evidence before the Tehsildar. The report of the Tehsildar had made no recommendation, he had merely set out the facts which he had gathered from the evidence. The evidence also having been forwarded there was no question of any further opportunity to be given to the Petitioner tenant to place his views against any report that may have been given by the Tehsildar. 3. The next authority relied upon vas the decision of Mehrotra, J. in Dr. J. t. Bhatia v. Smt. Victoria Rani (2) (1957) AWR 396, 401), where it was laid down that "it was not open to the revisional authority to assume the fact to be correct without giving sufficient opportunity to the Petitioner to meet those allegations." These observations were made in a different con-, text altogether and have no bearing on the question which arises in the present case. Reliance was next placed on the observations of the Supreme Court in M. Chockalingam and Another Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras and Another, AIR 1963 SC 1456 where it was laid down that in proceedings u/s 35 of the Income tax Act, it was incumbent upon the Income tax Officer under the law to issue a notice to the Petitioner to show cause against the demand of penal interest. It was also observed that where the proceedings are quasi judicial apart from statutory provision regarding a notice, the principles of natural justice would also require an opportunity to show cause to be given. 4. It was also observed that where the proceedings are quasi judicial apart from statutory provision regarding a notice, the principles of natural justice would also require an opportunity to show cause to be given. 4. The question in the present case is not that no opportunity was given but "whether" a second opportunity ought to have been given after there-port from the Tehsildar was received ? For that there is no warrant as the Tehsildar had merely recorded the evidence and forwarded the evidence for the consideration of the State Government This Court cannot sit in judgment on the appraisal of evidence or conclusions which may have been arrived at u/s 7F. The powers given u/s 7F are almost plenary and the State Government may "make such orders as appears to it necessary for the ends of justice''. If the State Government only considered the fact that the landlord had no other shop and he was anxious to start business of his own and whose attempt to start business in partnership with others who happened to have premises had been unsuccessful it will not be for this Court to say that the State Government ought necessarily to have balanced the convenience of both parties and if it had failed to do so its order should be treated as one passed without jurisdiction. A Full Bench of this Court has laid down that if the convenience of the tenant had not been considered and only that of the landlord the order passed will not be one passed without jurisdiction. It is no doubt true that after the decision of the Supreme Court in Lala Sri Bhagwan v. Ram Chandra (4) (1965 AWR 304) the proceedings u/s 7F must be taken to be quasi judicial proceedings and as such the principles which apply to such proceedings require to be observed by the State Government. What those requirements are may be gathered from the decision of the Supreme Court in Sardar Govind Rao and Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (5) (AIR 1965 S.C. 1220) where it was laid down: The next question is whether Government was justified in making the order of April 26, 1955 ? That order gives no reasons at all. The Act lays upon the Government a duty which obviously must be performed in a judicial manner. The Appellants do not seem to have been heard at all. That order gives no reasons at all. The Act lays upon the Government a duty which obviously must be performed in a judicial manner. The Appellants do not seem to have been heard at all. The Act bars a suit and there is all the more reason that Govt. must deal with such cases in a quasi judicial manner giving an opportunity to the claimants to state their case in the light of the report or the Deputy Commissioner. The Appellants were also entitled to know the reason why their claim for the grant of money or a pension was rejected by Govt... Even in those cases where the order of the Government is based upon confidential material this Court has insisted that reason should appear when Government performs curial or quasi judicial functions. These requirements in the present case would appear to have been satisfied. As already observed, the parties were given an opportunity by the State Govt. of representing their view points. Not only that at the time of the enquiry the Tehsildar, who was directed to make an enquiry, had actually given the parties an opportunity of leading their evidence and had forwarded that evidence without making any recommendation to the State Government. It is impossible in these circumstances to say that the principles of natural justice have been violated. The view taken by the State Government may not be the correct one but that would be no ground for substituting the view of this Court in a matter where the decision of the State Government u/s 7F of the Act is intended to be final. 5. For the reasons given above, the petition is dismissed. There will however be no order as to costs. The stay order is discharged, but the order of the State Government is directed not to take effect for six months, provided that the Petitioner files no appeal. If an appeal is filed, the stay order will have to be obtained from the appellate court.