JUDGMENT M. C. Desai, C.J. - This is a petition for certiorari for the quashing of an order passed under Sec. 12-C of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act by an election tribunal allowing an election petition and setting aside the petitioners election as Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat. The reason given for the setting aside of the election was that he was convicted in February 1961 of offences of Secs. 323 and 332 read with Sec. 34, I. P.C. and sentenced to a fine. The tribunal took the view that the offences of Secs. 332 and 323 are offences involving moral turpitude and that on account of the conviction the petitioner was not eligible to be chosen, nominated or appointed to, and for holding, the office of Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat vide Sec. 5-A (h) of the Panchayat Raj Act. 2. I shall ignore the offence of Sec. 323, I.P.C. because the offence of Sec. 332 is that of Sec. 323 in an aggravated form and if the commission of it disqualified the petitioner it does not matter whether the offence under Sec. 323 also disqualified him or not. I do not exercise appellate jurisdiction over the election tribunal; this is a petition for certiorari and not an appeal from its order. I have no jurisdiction to correct any error whether of fact or even of law and I have only to see whether it exercised the jurisdiction vested in it without committing any manifest error of law. I cannot say that it committed any manifest error of law by holding that the offence of Sec. 332 involves moral turpitude. The offence consists in causing simple hurt to a public servant in order to deter him from performing his duties. Causing injury to a public servant in order to deter him from performing his duties is certainly immoral. Any decent person would strongly criticise the conduct of a person who strikes a public servant in order to prevents him from performing his duties. There is some reason for saying that the offence involves moral turpitude and the tribunals finding to this effect cannot be said to be so devoid of reason that it must be held to be manifestly erroneous. 3. Under Sec. 44 the Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat is elected by the Panches from amongst themselves. The petitioner was a Panch. There is some reason for saying that the offence involves moral turpitude and the tribunals finding to this effect cannot be said to be so devoid of reason that it must be held to be manifestly erroneous. 3. Under Sec. 44 the Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat is elected by the Panches from amongst themselves. The petitioner was a Panch. It was contended by Sri Hargovind Dayal Srivastiava that Sec. 44 does not impose any disqualification, that it is not subject to Sec. 5-A and that if a Panch is elected as Sarpanch his election cannot be set aside at all. He referred to Ram Rakhan v. Vishwanath, 1959 Revenue Decisions 293 (H.C.) but the facts of that case are different. It was not a case of disqualification under Sec. 5-A at all. Under Rule 85 a person cannot be elected a Panch unless he is at least thirty years of age. If a person is elected a Panch even though he is under thirty years of age his further election as Sarpanch under Sec. 44 cannot be quashed on the ground that he was not eligible to be a Panch at all. Here the disqualification is not on the petitioners holding the office of a Panch but on his holding the office of the Sarpanch of a Nyaya Panchayat. It is not the case that he was not eligible to be a Panch at all; under Sec. 5-A he is disqualified to be elected as the Sarpanch. Sec. 44 is subject to Sec. 5-A even though there is no express provision in it laying down that it is so subject. There is nothing repugnant between the provisions of Sec. 5-A and Sec. 44 and, therefore, it was not necessary for the legislature to lay down in Sec. 44 that it was subject to the provisions of Sec. 5-A. The bar imposed by Sec. 5-A on the election of a Panch as the Sarpanch is absolute; any Panch who is subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in it cannot be elected as Sarpanch at all. Sec. 44 only lays down that the Sarpanch shall be elected by the Panches but who cannot be elected is laid down in Sec. 5-A. 4. Sec. 44 only lays down that the Sarpanch shall be elected by the Panches but who cannot be elected is laid down in Sec. 5-A. 4. Next it was contended that, as held by this Court in the case of Buddha v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Malihabad, 1965 ALJ 123 the petitioner was not disqualified at all inasmuch as the period of disqualification did not commence because the State Government has not yet prescribed the date of commencement. I find that this plea was not taken before the election tribunal at all. No plea not taken before the inferior tribunal can be raised for the first time in a petition for certiorari because this Court does not exercise original jurisdiction but only sees whether the inferior tribunal acted within its jurisdiction without committing a manifest error of law. If a certain plea was not raised before the tribunal it did not commit any manifest error of law by not considering it. It was bound to consider only those pleas which were urged before it and not other pleas even though they might be relevant. 5. There is no force in this petition. It is dismissed with costs. Petition dismissed.