JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a second appeal by the "allottee" of an accommodation from a decree of the First Additional Civil Judge of Agra reversing that of the First Additional Munsif, Agra and issuing an injunction restraining him from taking possession of the accommodation "allotted" to him by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Agra (to be called R.C. and E.O.). The accommodation in dispute is a portion of a house in Bara Bhai Gali Belanganj in the city of Agra. In 1961 this house was purchased by Smt. Hira Devi the plaintiff-respondent. At the time of the purchase the house was divided into two separate accommodations, each being occupied by a different tenant. These tenants were persuaded to vacate the house and Smt. Hira Devi gave notice of the vacancy to the R. C. and E. O. The notice contained a prayer under Rule 6 of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Rules for the release of the vacant accommodation in favour of the landlord on the ground that she needed it for her personal use. The date of the notice is 30th March 1961. The R. C. and E. O. did not allot the premises within 30 days of the notice as required under Rule 3. On 27-4-1961 he passed an order rejecting Smt. Hira Devis prayer for the release of the accommodation, and on 9-5-1961 he passed another order under Sec. 7 (2) "allotting" the accommodation to the appellant Ishwari Prasad. Thereupon Sint. Hira Devi filed the suit which has led to this appeal. She contended that the order of allotment was without jurisdiction as it had been passed after the expiry of 30 days from the receipt of notice of vacancy by the landlord. She also contended that the order was illegal because it had been passed on the recommendation of an Advisory Committee, but it is not necessary to consider this plea as it was not pressed before me. 2. The defendants in the suit were the R. C. and E. O. and the allottee, Ishwari Prasad, the appellant before me. Both of them resisted the suit but filed separate written statements. Both contended that the order of allotment was within jurisdiction. 2. The defendants in the suit were the R. C. and E. O. and the allottee, Ishwari Prasad, the appellant before me. Both of them resisted the suit but filed separate written statements. Both contended that the order of allotment was within jurisdiction. They admitted that it had been passed after the expiry of 30 days from the receipt of notice of vacancy, but pleaded that this did not invalidate it as Rule 3 was not mandatory and failure to comply with it did not affect the jurisdiction of the allotting authority. The learned Munsif held that Rule 3 was not mandatory and the order of allotment, though made beyond 30 days, was within jurisdiction. He dismissed the suit. On appeal the learned Civil Judge disagreed and held that Rule 3 was mandatory and therefore the order of allotment in favour of the appellant was without jurisdiction. He allowed the appeal and issued an injunction to restrain the appellant from taking possession of the accommodation under the order. The appellant has come here in second appeal. 3. After hearing Mr. A. K. Kirty and Mr. H. N. Seth for the respondent I am satisfied that the order of the learned appellate Judge is erroneous. The only argument urged by Mr. Seth in support of the judgment of the court below is that Rule 3 is mandatory and therefore, after the expiry of 30 days, the jurisdiction of the District Magistrate (or the R. C. and E. O.) to allot the accommodation no longer existed. But the weight of authority is overwhelmingly against this view. In Ram Autar v. R. C. and E. O. Jhansi, 1959 ALJ 8 it was held that though it is desirable that an allotment order should be made as soon as possible and the District Magistrate was expected to make it within 30 days, yet on a consideration of the Rules and the provisions of the Act the direction in Rule 3 was not mandatory, but directory only. It was pointed out that if the Rule is held to be mandatory many difficulties will arise as for example, disputed questions may have to be decided whether the notice was actually sent by the landlord or whether the accommodation had fallen vacant or not. 4. It was pointed out that if the Rule is held to be mandatory many difficulties will arise as for example, disputed questions may have to be decided whether the notice was actually sent by the landlord or whether the accommodation had fallen vacant or not. 4. In Sri Krishna Khanna v. Additional District Magistrate, Kanpur, 1964 ALJ 710 it was held that Rules 3 and 4, if read together, make it clear that the power of the District Magistrate to make an allotment order continues even after the expiry of the period of 30 days from the date of intimation of vacancy. 5. Mr. Seth relied on two decisions of Tandon, J. which have not been reported but a summary of which has been published in 1959 A. L. J. Summary Section at p. 65. But the view of the learned Judge was expressly overruled by the Division Bench in Ram Autar's case, 1959 ALJ 8 cited above. 6. There is an Additional reason in the present case for holding that the view of the appellate Judge is erroneous. The landlord made an application under Rule 6 for the release of the accommodation in her favour on the ground that she needed it for her own use. This Court has held that the provisions of Rule 6 are mandatory and an application under this Rule must be disposed of before any order of allotment can be made. It has been held in several cases that an allotment made without deciding the londlords application under Rule 6 is invalid. In the present case the landlord made such an application and it was compulsory of the R. C. and E. O. to dispose of this application before allotting the accommodation under Sec. 7 (2). But an application under Rule 6 cannot be rejected summarily, and the landlord has to be given a reasonable opportunity of proving that his or her needs are genuine. In a case where several persons have applied for the allotment of the accommodation, the question whether the accommodation should be released in favour of the landlord or allotted to another person can be decided only on evidence. It is difficult to presume that this question can be disposed of within a month of the receipt of the notice of vacancy from the landlord. 7. Mr. It is difficult to presume that this question can be disposed of within a month of the receipt of the notice of vacancy from the landlord. 7. Mr. Seth contended that if the Rule is not mandatory the landlord may suffer irreparable loss in a case where the District Magistrate (or the R. C. and E. O.) takes several months to make an allotment order. The short answer to this argument is provided by Rule 4 which fully safeguards the rights of the landlord in such a case. It provides that if the District Magistrate does not pass an order under Sec. 7 (2) within one month of the receipt of intimation of vacancy the landlord may nominate his own tenant and the District Magistrate must allot the accommodation to the landlords nominee, unless for reasons to be recorded in writing, he rejects the nomination and allots the accommodation to another person forthwith. The word "forthwith" enables the landlord to force the hands of the District Magistrate and compel him to make an allotment immediately after the expiry of 30 days either to his nominee or to a person selected by him. Therefore, the possibility of an unreasonable delay in making the allotment order does not arise. 8. The appeal is allowed with costs and the plaintiff respondents suit for injunction dismissed with costs throughout. Appeal allowed.