JUDGMENT Jagdish Sahai, J. - Special Appeal No. 585 of 1964 has been filed by the Zila Parishad, Farrukhabad, while special Appeal No. 947 of 1964 has been filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh. Both the appeals are directed against the judgment of H. C. P. Tripathi, J. dated 25-8-1964 allowing writ petition No. 3406 of 1964 filed by Sri Ram Bharose Singh Chauhan (hereinafter referred to as Chauhan). The two appellants before us were respondents in that writ petition. 2. According to his allegations Chauhan was born on 17th August 1906. In the year 1935 he was appointed as the Tax Officer of the District Board of Farrukhabad. At that time by virtue of the provisions of Rule 7 of the rules framed under the U.P. District Boards Act (hereinafter referred to as the rules) the age of superannuation for the employees of the District Boards in this State was 60 years. That rule reads:- "Subject to rule 7-A no officer or servant of the Board shall be retained in the service of the board beyond April 1 following the date on which he attains the age of 65 years, except for special reasons to be recorded by the board in a resolution; and no extension of service for more than one year at a time shall be allowed in the case of any employee whose age is 60 years or more." 3. That rule was replaced by regulations. The regulations relating to the age of superannuation were changed from time to time. Ultimately by means of notification No. 1923-A/IX-A-l (227)-57 dated June 24, 1958, the following provisions were introduced:- Amendments 4. For regulation 1, substitute the following:- 1. "the age of retirement from service of all employees of District Board shall be 58 years beyond which no one shall ordinarily be retained in the service of the Board : Provided that those employees of Board who were 50 years or above of age on December 31, 1955, will be allowed to continue in service till they attain the age of 60 years." 2. In regulation 2 and in the form appended thereto for the figure "55" wherever occurring substitute the figure "58". 5. Before the amendment mentioned above regulation I read:- "1. In regulation 2 and in the form appended thereto for the figure "55" wherever occurring substitute the figure "58". 5. Before the amendment mentioned above regulation I read:- "1. The age of retirement from service of all employees of District Boards shall be 55 years, beyond which no one shall ordinarily be retained in the service of the Board : Provided that the age of retirement of such employees as were:- (a) between 45 and 50 years of age December 31, 1955, shall be 57 years, and (b) fifty years of age or over on December 31, 1955 shall be 60 years, for special reasons to be recorded by the Board in the relevant resolution or where the Board is not itself the appointing authority by the appointing authority in its order : Provided that no extension shall be granted. (i) for any period exceeding one year at a time ; and (ii) unless the employee concerned continues to be physically fit and efficient : Provided further that in no case shall a person be retained in employment beyond the age of 60 years." 2. In regulation 2 and in the form appended thereto substitute the figure "55" for "60". 6. On 18th of July 1962 the U.P. Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961, was enforced and the U.P. District Boards Act 1922 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was repealed. In June 1963 the District Boards in this State were replaced by Zila Parishads and all employees of the District Boards automatically became servants of the corresponding Zila Parishads. Chauhan thus came in the service of Zila Parishad, Farrukhabad. 7. On 4th May 1964 Chauhan received a notice from the Chief Executive Officer of Farrukhabad Zila Parishad to the effect that he (Chauhan) would be attaining the age of superannuation on 16th Aug. 1964 and for that reason would be finally relieved of his duties with effect from the forenoon of that date. 8. Chauhan filed Writ Petition No. 3406 of 1964 in this Court and prayed that the notification dated 24th January 1959, by which the age of retirement had been fixed at 58 years, be quashed. He also prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus commanding the two respondents, that is, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Zila Parishad, Farrukhabad, not to superannuate him until he had attained the age of 60 years. He also prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus commanding the two respondents, that is, the State of Uttar Pradesh and the Zila Parishad, Farrukhabad, not to superannuate him until he had attained the age of 60 years. 9. Before Tripathi, J. the following three submissions were made on behalf of Chauhan:- (a) For the retirement of Chauhan the only provision applicable was rule 7 as it existed in 1935. The subsequent amendments could not be used in order to retire him. In any case the present regulation is hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. (b) The services of Chauhan could not be terminated except by means of one years notice. (c) The present regulation (as it now stands after the notification of 24th January 1958) not being retrospective in its application cannot be used to retire Chauhan. Tripathi, J. recorded the following findings:- 1. Sec. 173(2) of the Act under which the regulations are framed does not confer any legislative power on the State Government. 2. There being an implied contract between Chauhan on the one hand and the Zila Parishad Farrukhabad on the other under which Chauhan could be retired only after he had attained the age of 60 years, Chauhan had a vested right to continue in service until he completed 60 years and this vested right could not be destroyed by a regulation. 3. The regulation is hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India inasmuch as under the provisions of the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, the U.P. Municipalities Act, the U.P. Notified Areas Act the age of superannuation is 60 years. 4. The regulation is not retrospective in its application and cannot for that reason apply to the case of Chauhan. 10. Sri S.N. Kakkar, who has appeared for the Zila Parishad, Farrukhabad, and Sri Kamal Narain Singh, the Junior Standing Counsel, who has appeared for the State of U.P. have challenged all the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge. The counsel for the parties have confined themselves to the questions raised before the learned Single Judge and have not raised any fresh point. The counsel for the parties have confined themselves to the questions raised before the learned Single Judge and have not raised any fresh point. Sec. 173(2) of the Act reads:- (2) Provided that the State Government may, if it thinks fit, make regulations consistent with this Act in respect of any of the matters specified in Clauses (a) to (m) of sub-Sec. (1), and any regulation so made shall have the effect of rescinding any regulation made by the Board under the said sub-Section in respect of the same matter or inconsistent therewith." 11. It is admitted by the parties that the present regulation has been framed under the provisions of Sec. 173(2) of the Act. With great respect to Tripathi, J., we are unable to agree with him, that Sec. 173(2) does not confer on the State Government the power to frame regulations relating to conditions of service of the employees of the District Boards, nor can we share his view that there is an implied contract between Chauhan on the one hand and the District Board, Farrukhabad (now the Zila Parishad, Farrukhabad) on the other that Chauhan would be entitled to continue in service until he attains the age of 60 years. The only ground on which the learned single Judge has held that there is such an implied contract is that in 1935 at the time when Chauhan was employed by the District Board, Farrukhabad, the age of superannuation under Rule 7 was 60 years. Beyond this nothing has been shown to us by Sri S.C. Khare, the learned counsel for the appellant, and nothing has been brought to our notice from the judgment of Tripathi, J. on the basis of which such an implied contract could be inferred. It is true that when a person enters in the service of another, there is some sort of contractual relationship, the contract being that the servant has to discharge the duties of his office and the master has to pay his wages. At the time when Chauhan joined service, Sec. 173(2) stood in the same terms in which it stands today or in which it stood on 24th June, 1958. It is the Government and not the District Board or the Zila Parishad which has framed the regulations. At the time when Chauhan joined service, Sec. 173(2) stood in the same terms in which it stands today or in which it stood on 24th June, 1958. It is the Government and not the District Board or the Zila Parishad which has framed the regulations. Whereas it is possible to say that when Chauhan entered in the service of the District Board he by his conduct and by the circumstance that he was joining the service of a corporate body which was a creature of the District Boards Act undertook to abide by its statutory provisions, it is difficult to see how it can be contended that the Government agreed at no time the regulation would be so amended as to lower the age of retirement. With great respect to Tripathi, J. we would like to point out that he has overlooked two very relevant circumstances. First of all the State Government was not a party to the so called implied contract between Chauhan and the District Board, Farrukhabad. Consequently nothing prevented the State Government either in the name of contract or on the ground of estoppel to amend the regulation. Secondly the District Board Farrukhabad was a corporation created under the provisions of the Act. It had only such powers as could be called out from the statute and no more. When the statute provides that the State Government shall be at liberty to frame a regulation under Sec. 173(2) of the Act, the District Board of Farrukhabad could not enter into any express or implied contract which would be contrary to the provisions of Sec. 173(2) of the Act. That being the position, we have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that there was no implied contract whatsoever between the District Board of Farrukhabad on the one hand and Chauhan on the other under which the latter could insist that no regulation could be framed by the Government changing the age of superannuation from 60 years to 58 years. We are also satisfied that the District Board of Farrukhabad could not enter into any contract either express or implied militating against the statutory provisions contained in Sec. 173(2) of the Act. It is well settled that parties cannot contract out of a statute. We are also satisfied that the District Board of Farrukhabad could not enter into any contract either express or implied militating against the statutory provisions contained in Sec. 173(2) of the Act. It is well settled that parties cannot contract out of a statute. For the reasons mentioned above we are satisfied that there could be and there was in fact no implied contract which stood in the way of the State Government changing the regulation relating to the age of superannuation in exercise of the powers under Sec. 173(2) of the Act. 12-13. We are unable to find any cogent reason for holding that Chauhan had a vested right not to retire before the age 60 years. We have already said earlier that the theory of implied contract cannot be sustained. There is nothing in Sec. 173(2) of the Act which in any way curtails the power of the State Government to frame a regulation in respect of a matter contained in Clauses (a) to (m) of Sec. 173(1). There is also nothing in that provision to show that whereas a regulation can be made, it cannot be amended by the Government. Even if there could be any doubt (we entertain none) it stands resolved by the provisions of Secs. 14 and 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act. These two provisions read:- "14. Powers conferred on the State Government to be exercisable from time to time.- Where, by any Uttar Pradesh Act, any power is conferred on the State Government then that power may be exercised time to time as occasion requires. 21. Power to make to include power to add to amend, vary or rescind, orders, rules or bye-laws. - Where, by any Uttar Pradesh Act, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws is conferred, then, that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions if any to add, amend, vary, or rescind any notifications, orders, rules or bye-law so issued." 14. The word rules occurring in Sec. 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act in our opinion, includes regulations. That being the position, we have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the State Government was free to amend the regulations relating to the retirement of the employees of the District Boards (now Zila Parishads). The word rules occurring in Sec. 21 of the U.P. General Clauses Act in our opinion, includes regulations. That being the position, we have no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the State Government was free to amend the regulations relating to the retirement of the employees of the District Boards (now Zila Parishads). That such a rule can be amended is well settled. In Ram Autar Pandey v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1962 ALJ 31 the question that came up for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court was whether a rule altering the age of superannuation from 58 to 55 years was valid. All the three learned Judges who constituted the Full Bench unanimously held that such a rule was valid. 15. In Bishun Narain Misra v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1965 SC 1567, the facts were that at the time of recruitment of Bishun Narain Misra the age of retirement (or superannuation) for Government servants of his class was 55 years. He should, therefore, have normally retired on 11th of December 1960. But by a notification dated 27-11-1957, the Government raised the age of retirement (or superannuation) to 58 years. On 25th May 1961, however, the State Government again reduced the age of retirement (or superannuation) to 55 years by a notification of that date issued under the provisions of Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The same day the Government issued an order to the effect that all Government servants who would have retired because of the change in the age of retirement after 25-5-1961 and before 20-12-1961 were retained in service upto 31-12-1961 except those who reached the age of 58 years in which case they were to retire at the age of 58 years. Accordingly Bishun Narain was retired on 31-12-1961. The Supreme Court held that the amendments in the rules first increasing the age and then decreasing it were valid. Their Lordships also held that the doctrine of retrospective application could not be invoked in such a case. Their Lordships observed:- "We are, therefore, of opinion that the new rule reducing the age of retirement from 58 years to 55 years cannot be said to be retrospective. Their Lordships also held that the doctrine of retrospective application could not be invoked in such a case. Their Lordships observed:- "We are, therefore, of opinion that the new rule reducing the age of retirement from 58 years to 55 years cannot be said to be retrospective. The proviso to the new rule and the second notification are only methods to tide over the difficult situation which would arise in the public service if the new rule was applied at once and also to meet any financial objection arising out of the enforcement of the new rule. The new rule, therefore, cannot be struck down on the ground that it is retrospective in operation." 16. The regulation as it now stands applies to all persons who are at present in the service of the Zila Parishads or who were in the service of the District Boards on 24th of June 1958. All that it provides for is that the employees shall retire at the age of 58 years. Consequently we are unable to see how it can be suggested that the rule operates retrospectively or that it has. been applied retrospectively. 17. In Anil Nath De v. Collector of Central Excise Calcutta, AIR 1958 Calcutta 407, it was held as follows:- "Now this is the rule and part of the contract of service of the petitioner with Government. In order to get out of the rigour and operation of this Rule, Mr. Hazra tried to contend that this Rule was introduced in September 1953, subsequently to the appointment of the petitioner in service, and, therefore, was no part of the contract of the petitioners service with the Government. I am unable to agree with this contention. The service in this case means that the Government servant accepts as 3 A. I R. 1958 Cal. 407 " part of his conditions of service of these Rules as they from time to time are made and modified .... A part of the obligations of a Government servant, as I understand under these Rules, is that he takes the risk of the amendments made in these Rules from time to time. 407 " part of his conditions of service of these Rules as they from time to time are made and modified .... A part of the obligations of a Government servant, as I understand under these Rules, is that he takes the risk of the amendments made in these Rules from time to time. So long these Rules or their amendments do not violate any provisions of the Constitution or of any relevant Statute, mutability of these Rules forms part of the Contract and conditions of service, and are to be deemed as engrafted therein as and when they or their amendments are made, unless expressly or by necessary implication, they say otherwise." 18. In S. V. G. Iyengar v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1961 Mysore 37 it was observed as follows:- "It is clear from the proviso to Article 309 that the rules which shall be effective until the appropriate Legislature makes a law are not only the rules made for the first time under that proviso but include also these which are made from time to time in the exercise of the power conferred by Sec. 14 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and also those rules as modified, amended or varied in the exercise of the power conferred by Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act. Rules so made in the exercise of the power conferred by the General Clauses Act have, it is clear, to be registered as rules undoubtedly made under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution." 19. In Padmanabhacharya v. State of Mysore, A.I.R. 1962 Mysore 280, it was observed:- "The rule by which the age of retirement was increased to fifty-eight years was a rule enacted by the Raj-pramukh in the exercise of his power under the proviso to Article 309. That being so, that rule could have been modified or amended only by the Raj-pramukh by the enactment of another rule made under that constitutional provision." (italicised by us). 20. In Raj Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1954 Alld. 343. the question was whether a person already in service could be governed by a new rule which operated to his detriment. 20. In Raj Kishore v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1954 Alld. 343. the question was whether a person already in service could be governed by a new rule which operated to his detriment. The learned Judges, dealing with this objection, observed as follows:- "The third point urged by the applicant is that he was not governed by the new Rule 465 as amended in the year 1948 because he entered service in 1923. This contention has no force. Under the Government of India Act of 1919, the Secretary of State had the power to make rules for the recruitment and conditions of service etc. of the servants of the Crown. Both the parties in the present case proceeded on the assumption that rule 465, as it existed in 1923, was validly made. The authority which could make this rule had also the power to alter or modify it from time to time. This authority is embodied in Sec. 32(3) of the Interpretation Act, 1889 in relation to English Statutes just as in relation to Indian Statutes it is embodied in Sec. 21 of the General Clauses Act, 10 of 1897, and in relation to Acts of the State of Uttar Pradesh it is embodied in Sec. 27 of the U.P. General Clauses Act. Therefore the authority which made Rule 465 had also the authority to amend it." 21. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1958 SC 36 at 42, it was observed : "It is, therefore, quite clear that appointment to a permanent post in a Government; Service either on probation or on an officiating basis, is, from the very nature of such employment, itself of a transitory character and, in the absence of any special contract or specific rule regulating the conditions of service, the implied term of such appointment, under the ordinary law of master and servant, is that it is terminable at any time." 22. It would appear that their Lordships held that in the absence of any special contract or specific rule a public servant would be subject to the rules of service as framed. 23. Mr. It would appear that their Lordships held that in the absence of any special contract or specific rule a public servant would be subject to the rules of service as framed. 23. Mr. S.C. Khare, learned counsel for the respondent, has placed reliance upon several decisions, the majority of which are under the Companies Act and do not deal with either the law of master and servant or with the question as to whether or not a Government servant or District Board Servant is bound by the rules framed subsequent to his appointment. The first case which he has cited is Moti Ram Deka v. General Manager, North Eastern Railway, A.I.R. 1964 SC 600. Mr. Khare does not place reliance upon the majority judgment (delivered by Gajendragadkar, J. on his behalf as also on behalf of K. N. Wanchoo, M. Hidayatullah and N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.) but on the observation made by Shah, J. in the minority judgment and which read:- "Therefore termination of services of a person who held appointment to a substantive post and was entitled under the previous rules to continue until he attained the age of superannuation, or till compulsory retirement under R. 149 (3) made applicable to him after he entered service, would per se amount to dismissal or removal and it would be inconsistent with Article 311. This is not because the Rule is invalid, but because it would expose the public servant concerned to forfeiture, by amendment of the rules which were in existence at the time when he entered service, of rights which he had already acquired." 24. It, is true that this observation to some extent does support the submission of Mr. Khare, but the question before their Lordships was a different one. The other six Judges have not expressed themselves on that question. In view of the circumstance that the question to be decided by the Supreme Court was a different one and also because the other six judges have not committed themselves to the observation of Shah, J. we are of the opinion that the remarks of Shah, J. do not amount to a declaration of law by the Supreme Court. In fact, we do not think that Shah, J. wanted to lay it down as a rule of law that a rule cannot be amended to the detriment of a Government servant after he has joined service. In fact, we do not think that Shah, J. wanted to lay it down as a rule of law that a rule cannot be amended to the detriment of a Government servant after he has joined service. In Bishun Narain Misra v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1965 SC 1567, the point in issue was directly the same as the one before us. Consequently we feel ourselves bound by that decision. Mr. Khare next relied upon Jogesh Chandra Dutta Gupta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1955 Assam 17. In that case the question before High Court was whether the Government could under its rule-making power change the rules regulating the conditions of service of a civil servant after he had retired in such a way as to deprive him of rights which had vested in him. Their Lordships held that that could not be done. That case is no authority for the proposition that even while a person is in service and there is no special contract between him and the Government or the statutory body, a rule to his detriment could not be framed. Learned counsel then placed reliance upon Laxminarayan, Singh v. Corporation of the City of Nagpur, AIR 1955 Nagpur 206 . The question that arose before their Lordships was- "Whether the plaintiffs were within their rights to refuse to undertake this new duty, or conversely, whether the Municipal Committee could compel them to undertake this task on pain of the penalty imposed." 25. That was not a case of master and servant; nor was it a case where a service rule had been amended. This case therefore does not provide any assistance to us. In Pt. Sunder Lal Vasudeva v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1957 Pun. 140, the question that arose for consideration was a quite different one. In fact the learned Judge deciding that case never held that a rule like the one before us could not be framed. In our opinion that case is also clearly distinguishable. The only cases cited by Mr. Khare that remain to be considered are those which relate to companies and in which the question raised before us was neither raised nor decided. It is therefore not necessary to mention those cases. 26. In our opinion that case is also clearly distinguishable. The only cases cited by Mr. Khare that remain to be considered are those which relate to companies and in which the question raised before us was neither raised nor decided. It is therefore not necessary to mention those cases. 26. Having given the matter our anxious consideration, we are of the opinion that the State Government had the jurisdiction to amend the Regulations I and II in the form in which they stand today or stood on the 24th June, 1958, when the amendment was made. 27. With great respect we are unable to agree with Tripathi, J. that the impugned regulation is hit by Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India on the ground that the age of retirement under the U.P. Municipalities Act, U.P. Notified Areas Act, the Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam and the U.P. Town Areas Act is 60 years and not 58. The employees in the U.P. District Boards are a completely separate class from those employed in the U.P. Nagar Mahapalikas, U.P. Municipalities, U.P. Notified Areas and U.P. Town Areas. In fact it cannot be said that the employees appointed under the U.P. District Boards Act and those employed under other local bodies stand in the same situation. 28. Having given the matter our anxious consideration we are of the opinion that judgment of H. C. P. Tripathi, J. should be set aside, and the writ petition filed by the respondent Ram Bharose Singh Chauhan be dismissed with costs. We therefore allow these special appeals with costs, set aside the judgment of H.C.P Tripathi, J. dated 25-8-1964 and dismiss writ petition No. 3406 of 1964. Appeals allowed.