JUDGMENT V.G. Oak, J. - This is a second appeal by a defendant arising out of a suit for declaration and recovery of arrears of salary. Sheo Prasad Bajpai was an employee of the Municipal Board of Kanpur. He was suspended on 25-4-1953. On 9-7-1953 the President of the Municipal Board passed an order terminating the services of Sheo Prasad. That order was communicated to him on 26-7-1953. Sheo Prasad filed an appeal to. the State Government. The State Government declined to interfere in the matter on the ground that the appeal was incompetent. That order was communicated to Sheo Prasad on 14-5-1954. Sheo Prasad, therefore, filed the civil suit on 23-12-1954 for a declaration that the order dated 9-7-1953 was null and void and inoperative. He claimed a sum of Rs. 1,794/12/6 as arrears of his salary from 25-4-1953 to 23.12.1954. 2. The plaintiff's claim was opposed by both the defendants (the Municipal Board of Kanpur and the State Government). It was denied that the order dated 9-7-1953 was inoperative or illegal. I t was also pleaded in defence that the plaintiff's claim was barred by time. On both the points, the trial court found in plaintiff's favour. The court, therefore, passed in plaintiff's favour a decree for declaration and arrears of salary. An appeal filed by the Municipal Board of Kanpur was dis missed by the lst Additional District Judge of Kanpur. The Municipal Board (now Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur) has, therefore, come to this Court in second appeal. 3. The trial court noticed that the State Government did not dispose I of Sheo Prasad's departmental appeal on merits. On this point, the learned Munsif observed : "The State Government's refusal to entertain the plaintiff's said appeal amounted to refusal of an adequate opportunity of defence to the plaintiff. Therefore, in my opinion e order of the Chairman of the defendant No. 1 ...... is void illegal." 4. It is not easy to follow this reasoning. Assuming that the State Government was wrong in taking he view that the departmental appeal was incompetent, it does not follow that the order passed by the President of the Municipal Board as void or illegal. The trial court ad to decide that point for itself on Brits of the case. 5. The main point raised in the second appeal relates to limitation. The trial court ad to decide that point for itself on Brits of the case. 5. The main point raised in the second appeal relates to limitation. The defendant relied upon Section 326 of the U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, hereafter referred to as the Act. Sub-Sec. (1) of Section 326 states: "No suit shall be instituted against a board or against a member, officer or servant of a board, in respect of an act done or purporting to have been done in its or his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been, in the case of a board, left at its office ....." Sub-Sec. (3) of Section 326 states:- "No action such as is described in sub-Sec. (1) shall unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for declaration of title thereto be commenced otherwise than within six months next after the accrual of the cause of action." 6. The combined effect of sub-Sections (1) and (3) of Section 326 is that, a suit for declaration and arrears of salary had to be filed within eight months of the accrual of the cause of action. Parties are not agreed as regards the starting point for limitation. According to the plaintiff-respondent, the starting point for limitation was 14-5-1954-the date on which the order of the State Government dismissing the appeal was communicated to the plaintiff. According to the defendant-appellant, the starting point for limitation was 26-7-1953 the date on which the order terminating the plaintiff's services was communicated to the plaintiff. 7. Mr. S. N. Verma appearing for the appellant relies upon a decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board, Kanpur, 1957 A.L.J. 768 In that case it was held that a complete cause of action is furnished by resolution of dismissal passed by the Municipal Board under Section 58 of the Municipalities Act. Such a cause of action is not suspended for any length of the time in the absence of an appeal to the State Government, nor does the filing of such an appeal have the effect of suspending it. 8. Such a cause of action is not suspended for any length of the time in the absence of an appeal to the State Government, nor does the filing of such an appeal have the effect of suspending it. 8. That decision was upheld in appeal by the Supreme Court in Sita Ram Goel v. The Municipal Board Kanpur, 1959 A.L.J. 106 Their Lordships observed on page 110: "The enactment of Section 58(l) in the manner in which it has been done giving to the employee only a right to appeal to the State Government within 30 days of the communication to him of the order of the Board without anything more is enough to show that neither was the suspension of the order nor the suspension of the effect thereof as a result of the filing of an appeal ever in the contemplation of the Legislature." 9. The Act contains different provisions for imposing penalties on municipal employees. Section 58 of the Act empowers a board to punish its executive officer. Section 58 runs thus : "A board may punish, dismiss or remove its executive officer by special resolution ....subject to his right of appeal to the State Government....." 10. Another such provision is contained in Section 74 of the Act. Section 74 states "Subject to any provisions to the contrary contained in Sections 57 to 73 servants....may be punished or dismissed by the President provided that an appeal shall lie....to the State Government.... " 11. In the instant case the order terminating the services of the plaintiff was passed by the President of a Municipal Board. So, the present case is governed by Section 74 of the Act. The learned counsel for the plaintiff-respondent urged that the principle underlying Section 58 of the Act will not govern orders passed under Section 74 of the Act. He pointed out that under Section 58 of the Act, an order of punishment is passed by the entire Municipal Board, whereas under Section 74 of the Act an order is passed by an individual, namely, the President of the board. It was further pointed out that the language of the two sections is different. The expression used in Section 58 of the Act is :- "Subject to his right of appeal to State Government." 12. It was further pointed out that the language of the two sections is different. The expression used in Section 58 of the Act is :- "Subject to his right of appeal to State Government." 12. The expression used in Section 74 of the Act is :- "Provided that an appeal shall lie to the State Government." 13. After examining the provisions of Section 74 of the Act the learned Additional District Judge observed thus : "There is compulsion for filing an appeal under Section 74, U. P. Municipalities Act and the respondent could not institute a civil suit with. out filing an appeal to the State Government under Section 74, U. P. Municipalities Act." 14. That reasoning is erroneous. Under Section 74 of the Act, it is not obligatory to file an appeal to the State Government. It is true that the word 'shall' has been used in Section 74. But the word 'shall' does not make it obligatory upon a municipal employee to appeal to the State' Government. In spite of the difference in language of Sections 58 and 74, of the Act, each section merely en ables an aggrieved municipal employee to appeal to the State Government against an order of punishment. There is no provision making an appeal compulsory. It is not, therefore, correct to say that, under Section 74 of the Act the plaintiff was bound to appeal to the State Government before approaching the civil court. 15. So, in spite of the difference i the language of Sees. 58 and 74 o the Act, the principle underlying the decision in Sita Rain Goel's case will also govern cases falling under Section 74 of the Act. It was open the plaintiff to approach the civil court without filing an appeal to the State Government under Section 74 of the Act. It follows that 26-7-1953 must be taken as the starting point for limitation. The suit was filed on 23-12-1954 more than eight months after the accrual of cause of action. So, under Section 326 of the Act, the plaintiff's claim was barred by time. 16. The second appeal is allowed. The plaintiff's suit is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs in all the three courts.