JUDGMENT S.N. Katju, J. - This is a decree-holder's appeal which is directed against the decree of the lower appellate court by which it dismissed the appeal before it on the ground that it was not maintainable. The following extract from the order of the lower appellate court gives the fact of the case:- "The decree holder appellant was proceeding with the execution of his decree. Through the Execution case No. 309 of 1959 he was required to take steps which he did not take and moved an application No. 95C on 13-11-1961. He alleged in it that he had been restrained from prosecuting the said execution case by an order of the Civil Judge. He therefore desired stay of his execution case until the final decision of the injunction issued against hire by the Civil Judge. This application for stay was opposed by the respondent through his application dated 30-11-60. While disposing of these two applications the learned Munsif observed that there was no I reason to stay execution sine die. lie further observed that the appellant could bring a fresh execution. Consequently he struck off this execution case No. 309 of 1959 with a conditional order for costs. It is against this order of the learned Miunsif that the present appeal has been filed." 2. Learned counsel for the decree holder appellant contended that the order of the learned Munsif refusing to stay the execution proceedings and striking off the application for execution was a composite order which amounted to a decree and as such an appeal from that order was maintainable before the court below. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor respondents argued that striking off the application for execution and staying execution proceedings only amounted to an interlocutory order and consequently no appeal was maintainable before the lower appellate court. The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the aforesaid order passed by the Munsif amounted to a decree and as such an appeal from that order lay before the court below. 3. There appears to be difference of opinion between some High Courts with regard to the question whether an order staying execution proceedings amounts to a decree. In Durga Dev v. Hans Raj, AIR 1930 Lahore 187 and P. Sundaresan v. Venkatesiah, AIR 1949 Madras 196, it was held that an order staying or refusing to stay execution proceedings was an appealable order. In Durga Dev v. Hans Raj, AIR 1930 Lahore 187 and P. Sundaresan v. Venkatesiah, AIR 1949 Madras 196, it was held that an order staying or refusing to stay execution proceedings was an appealable order. Learned counsel or the appellants referred to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Lala Har Narain Lal Bahal v. Mathura Prasad, AIR 1940 Allahabad 326. It was observed: "These decisions it will be observed are no authority for the proposition that all orders staying the execution of decrees under Section 47, Civil P. C., are not decrees and not appealable. The test to be applied in determining whether an order is appealable or not may be stated thus : does the order conclusively determined the rights and liabilities of parties in a controversy which has arisen between them and which relates to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of a decree ?" 4. In the present case the effect of the order of the Munsif striking off the application for execution was the termination of the execution proceedings for the time being. It may be that it was open to the decree-holder to revive the execution proceedings by presenting a fresh application for execution of the decree. Nevertheless the order striking off the execution proceedings resulted for the time being in terminating the execution proceedings. If no fresh application was made by the decree-holder to revive the execution proceedings the effect of the earlier order passed by the Munsif continued and the execution proceedings stood terminated, Learned counsel for the respondents contended that the fact that it was open to the decree-holder to revive the execution proceedings by making a fresh application for execution, meant that the order passed by Munsif striking off the execution proceedings did not conclusively determine the controversy between the parties and, therefore, it could not be held that the aforesaid order of the Munsif,vas an order passed within the meaning of Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, it did not amount to a decree. Learned counsel referred to Atindra Lal Pakrasi v. Manoranjan Chowdhary AIR 1957 Calcutta 142 and Koypathodi Moidin Nutty v. A. k. Doraiswami Aiyar, AIR 1952 Madras 51 The facts of the aforesaid cases are clearly dis tinguishable from the present case. Learned counsel referred to Atindra Lal Pakrasi v. Manoranjan Chowdhary AIR 1957 Calcutta 142 and Koypathodi Moidin Nutty v. A. k. Doraiswami Aiyar, AIR 1952 Madras 51 The facts of the aforesaid cases are clearly dis tinguishable from the present case. Learned counsel further relied on a decision of this Court in Abdul Hamid v. Firm Shyam Lal Chiman Lal, A.I.R. 1935 Alld. 502 In the aforesaid case an application for execution had been made by the decree-holder. The judgment-debtor had preferred an objection against the aforesaid application. The judgment-debtor's objection was dismissed by the execution court. It was held by this Court that the order dismissing the objection preferred by the Judgment-debtor did not amount to a decree. I respectfully agree with the aforesaid view. The effect of the order dismissing the objection of the judgment-debtor was that the application for execution filed by the decree-holder would continue to have its course and the obstruction against it as placed by the objection preferred by the judgment debtor had been removed. Thus the execution proceedings continued to go and as long as they went on there could be no decree within the meaning of Section 417 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus the order passed by the execution court dismissing the objection preferred by the judgment-debtor was obviously not a decree because it did not conclusively determine the controversy between the parties in the execution court. In the present case the order passed by the Alunsif striking off execution resulted in terminating the execution proceedings then pending before the court and there is no escape from the conclusion that as long as the order striking off the execution proceedings remained in force the controversy between the parties had to be taken as decided and there could be no further flow in the proceedings before the execution court. The mere fact that any subsequent application preferred by the decree-holder could result in the revival of the execution proceedings would not take away the force I of the order passed by the Munsif by which it had struck off the execution proceedings. It has to be seen whether the aforesaid order by itself amounted to a decree or not. The mere fact that any subsequent application preferred by the decree-holder could result in the revival of the execution proceedings would not take away the force I of the order passed by the Munsif by which it had struck off the execution proceedings. It has to be seen whether the aforesaid order by itself amounted to a decree or not. As I have said above as long as it stood it did terminate the execution proceedings and, therefore, it was an order passed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil procedure and amounted to a decree from which an appeal was fully maintainable. 5. I would, therefore, set aside the order passed by the court below and direct that the appeal before the lower appellate court shall be restored to its original number and decided according to law. 6. The appeal is allowed but the parties will bear their own costs in this Court.